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Introduction 
 
This dissertation consists of four chapters on the economics of technology.  
The chapters study different aspects of innovation generation and diffusion.  
In broad terms, chapter one looks at how innovation spreads by social 
contact, while chapter two looks at welfare consequences of diffusion.  
Chapter three examines how information sources affect diffusion, and 
chapter four looks at the relation of finance with innovation generation. 
 
The first chapter empirically investigates the dynamics of the marginal 
propensity to pirate for computer software.  We introduce a state space 
formulation that allows us to estimate error structures and parameter 
significance, in contrast to previous work.  For data from 1987-92, we find 
a rising propensity to pirate as the number of existing pirate copies 
increases, and higher late piracy incidence than implied by static models.  
We strengthen prior results on the impact of piracy in the spreadsheet 
market, finding it to be the only significant internal influence on diffusion.  
However, when we allow for negative error correlation between legal and 
pirate acquisitions, we contradict earlier work by finding that, in the word 
processor market, piracy did not contribute to diffusion and only eroded 
legal sales. 
 
The second chapter is a paper forthcoming in the European Journal of 
Operational Research1.  We present an information good pricing model 
with persistently heterogeneous consumers and a rising marginal 
propensity for them to pirate.  The dynamic pricing problem faced by a 
legal seller is solved using a flexible numerical procedure with demand 
discretisation and sales tracking.  Three offsetting pricing mechanisms 
occur: skimming, compressing price changes, and delaying product launch.  
A novel trade-off in piracy's effect on welfare is identified.  We find that 
piracy quickens sales times and raises welfare in fixed size markets, and 
                                                 
1
 Waters, J., 2014. Welfare implications of piracy with dynamic pricing and heterogeneous 
consumers. European Journal of Operational Research, In press. 
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does the opposite in growing markets.  In our model, consumers benefit 
from very high rates of piracy, legal sellers always dislike it, and pirate 
providers like moderate but not very high rates. 
 
In the third chapter, we study the effect of different information sources on 
technology adoption between and within companies.  Our model of 
economically optimising companies predicts that initial adoption will be 
primarily affected by information that reduces uncertainty about a 
technology’s performance, while intensification of intra-firm use will be 
mainly influenced by information that increases income from the 
technology.  The theory is tested on data describing adoption of organic 
farming techniques by UK farmers.  Our predictions are broadly supported 
by the empirical results.  Information from land agents, farmers, and 
newspapers mainly influences initial adoption, from academia and 
government largely influences intensification, and from crop consultants, 
suppliers, and buyers influences both. 
 
Financing innovation presents informational and control problems for the 
financier, and different solutions are used for funding of US companies and 
universities.  In the fourth chapter, we examine how funding characteristics 
influenced the change in innovation during the 2007-8 financial crisis for 
both.  We extend prior theories of external financing’s effect on company 
performance during crises, firstly to university performance, and secondly 
to show the influence of time variation in aggregate funding.  Empirical 
results are consistent with our theory: external dependence and asset 
intangibility had a limited effect on company innovation on entering the 
crisis, but increased university innovation. 
 
We do not describe here the limitations and gaps of the studies, and 
proposals for future work.  Instead, they are addressed in the conclusions of 
each chapter. 
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Chapter 1
Variable marginal propensities to pirate and
the diffusion of computer software
1.1 Introduction
Social contact has long been implicated in technology diffusion, following
Bass (1969). The idea is that existing users of a technology influence non-
users to adopt the technology. Similar mechanisms have been proposed
for describingmarkets subject to software piracy, the illegal copying of soft-
ware. In pirate diffusion literature including Givon et al. (1995), Prasad and
Mahajan (2003), and Liu et al. (2011), influenced non-usersmay acquire the
legal or pirated good. Owners of the pirated goodmay influence non-users,
like legal owners.
The pirate diffusion literature presents a variety of reasons why piracy
may be beneficial to legal sellers and consumers. In Givon et al. (1995) and
Givon et al. (1997) it is suggested that pirate acquisitions may accelerate le-
gal diffusion through pirate owners’ social contacts with non-users. Prasad
and Mahajan (2003) show that legal profits may be increased for the same
reason, when piracy rates are subject to control by the legal sellers and sales
affect price preferences of remaining non-users in a specific way. Liu et al.
(2011) propose a similar mechanism, where either piracy or pricing can be
1
selected as routes to obtain optimal diffusion speed prior to mature market
sales.
Themarginal propensity to pirate is the proportion of pirate acquisitions
out of total new acquisitions. Its value and dynamics are critical influences
on whether piracy does indeed benefit legal sellers. If the marginal propen-
sity to pirate rises as themarket size increases, then legal sellers will capture
little of the latemarket. If they then takemeasures to avoid piracy, consumer
welfare is likely to be affected.
Despite the importance of the marginal propensity to pirate, we are un-
aware of any pirate diffusion studies that test whether it rises or falls with
diffusion. Much pirate diffusion research has been theoretical. The em-
pirical work by Givon et al. (1995) and Givon et al. (1997) assumes that the
marginal propensity to pirate is constant. InHaruvy et al. (2004), the ratio of
pirate sales to legal sales can fall at a constant exponential rate as the num-
ber of users increases. However, the interpretation of the rate in terms of
piracy protection and resulting company optimisation function precludes
the possibility of an increasing ratio.
There are reasons to believe that increased diffusion could lower or raise
the share of piracy in acquisitions. For example, on one hand legal sellers
may find it cost-effective to take action against piracy only when it reaches
a certain level, so increased piracy could lower the marginal propensity to
pirate. On the other hand, widespread piracy may make new piracy less
difficult and more socially acceptable, so that the marginal propensity to
pirate would rise with higher piracy prevalence.
In this paper, we estimate the level and change in the marginal propen-
sity to pirate for data on spreadsheets and word processors. The statistical
significance of the parameters and themodels’ predictive power is assessed.
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We compare diffusionwhenwe allow for variablemarginal propensity to pi-
rate to diffusion without it.
Our theoreticalmodel is a smallmodification of that inGivon et al. (1995).
It introduces an adjustment factor to pirate sales, where the factor is the
number of users of pirate goods raised to an estimated coefficient. The ad-
justment represents the effect of factors promoting or hindering piracy. We
also consider an alternative modification where past piracy explicitly ad-
justs piracy’s share of sales.
The stochastic component of the model includes errors in the legal and
pirate acquisitions, and allows for their correlation. In order to achieve
identification, we restrict the error matrix to depend on a single parame-
ter. However, we consider multiple forms for the error, including positive
and negative correlation and heterogeneity.
We use data on legal software sales taken fromGivon et al. (1995), which
is also used in Haruvy et al. (2004) and (for calibration) in Liu et al. (2011).
As with these prior authors, we have no piracy data. Givon et al. (1995) es-
timate their model by non-linear least squares while omitting joint error
specifications between the legal and pirate data, and so do not report pa-
rameter standard errors. Standard errors are also missing from non-linear
least squares estimates in Givon et al. (1997), simulated annealing estimates
in Haruvy et al. (2004), and calibrated model solutions in Liu et al. (2011).
We estimate our model by formulating it in state space form, with pirate
acquisitions as an unobserved state variable. We calculate one-step ahead
predictions using the Kalman filter, and maximise the resulting likelihood
to give parameter estimates. We allow for cross-sectional relations between
legal and pirate diffusion, and present parameter standard deviations un-
like prior work. We use the continuous time, discrete observation extended
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Kalman filter to avoid time interval bias, in common with Xie et al. (1997).
However, whereas they use the filter projection as a Bayesian updating pro-
cedure for parameter estimates and sales simultaneously, we leave the pa-
rameters outside the state variable, and somake them available for classical
estimation. As extensive piracy represents a hidden phenomenon of uncer-
tain impact, limiting the impact of prior beliefs is a prudent approach to
analysis and permits classical inference.
Our central estimates show that the share of pirate acquisitions out of
current acquisitions rose with past piracy. The expanded specification of-
fers gains in fit and assumption plausibility that are robust across different
deterministic and stochastic specifications, but frequently lack parameter
certainty. Predictive performance is mixed. We find dynamic estimates of
piracy that are higher than static estimates at long time scales.
Givon et al. (1995) find that past piracy is an important internal influence
on spreadsheet diffusion. We strengthen their result, finding that piracy
was the only economically and statistically significant internal influence on
spreadsheet diffusion, with no role for past legal sales. Our finding is consis-
tent across all specifications. Givon et al. (1995) also find that piracy influ-
enced word processor diffusion. In many specifications we obtain similar
results. However, when we allow for negative correlation between legal and
pirate errors, piracy is a negligible influence on diffusion and only serves to
displace legal sales. The negative correlation stochastic specification out-
performsmodels with no correlation, and is our preferred specification. We
interpret the difference between the results on piracy’s effect as being due
to stochastic correlations being incorrectly ascribed to deterministic links
when no correlations are allowed.
In section 1.2we present ourmodel and in section 1.3we look at the data
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and empirical method. Results are in section 1.4 and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section we present our model of diffusion with increasing marginal
propensity to pirate. The model is a small deterministic variation on the
one described in Givon et al. (1995), and a larger stochastic variation. It
describes the joint evolution of a technology’s acquisition by legal andpirate
means. The deterministic component is similar to a bivariate Bass model
in that either source or an external advertiser can inform a non-user about
the technology, who then adopts. The stochastic specification allows for
correlation in the adoptions by either route.
There is a population of agents of constant size m who are able to buy
a computer. The adoption process for computers follows a standard uni-
variate Bass model. At any time, some of the population will have acquired
a computer, and the rest will not yet have bought one and remain poten-
tial buyers. Initially, there are no owners. The potential users are subject
to external advertising, so that a fixed proportion p of them are contacted
by advertisers and then buy the computer in any time period. There is also
a word-of-mouth effect by which an additional share of potential adopters
adopts in the period, where the share is proportional to the number of pre-
vious adopters with constant of proportionality equal to q/m. The diffusion
pattern for computers thus follows the differential equation
dNt/dt = (p+q
Nt
m
)(m−Nt) (1.1)
An agent can acquire a computer software product only if they own a
computer. Of the computer owning population, a number Zt of these po-
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tential software users will have acquired the software and the remainder to-
talling Nt − Zt will not yet have acquired it. They can acquire it only once.
Initially there are no computer software users. The software can be pro-
duced as a legal or pirate copy. The number of legal owners is Xt and the
number of pirate owners is Yt , so Xt +Yt = Zt .
Non-users are subject to external influence so that they acquire legal
copies at an instantaneous rate of a. They are also subject to internal in-
fluences from current legal and pirate owners. Legal owners influence them
to acquire either legal or pirate copies at a rate that is linear in the number
of legal owners, b1Xt/Nt . Pirate owners influence them to acquire software
by either route at a rate linear in the number of pirate owners, b2Yt/Nt . For
non-users who are internally influenced to acquire the software, a share α
acquires the legal good, while the remaining 1−α intend to acquire a pirate
copy. These number of these motivated non-users who adopt the pirate
copy is then either magnified or diminished by the number of existing pi-
rate copies. For example, it may bemagnified if current pirates make piracy
more acceptable, or diminished if increased piracy leads to anti-piracymea-
sures being taken. The magnification or diminution is represented by a
multiplier applied to the number of pirate adopters, max(Yt−1,1)
ε , depend-
ing on whether ε is greater or less than zero. Givon et al. (1995) constrain
ε = 0.
Thus, we have the following model
dXt = (
[
a+α
b1Xt +b2Yt
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt −Yt))dt +dw1
dYt = (
[
(1−α)max(Yt ,1)
ε b1Xt +b2Yt
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt −Yt))dt +dw2 (1.2)
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where dw = (dw1,dw2) ∼ N(0,Qdt) is a normal error term with covariance
matrix Qdt. The explicit introduction of general errors and allowance for
their covariance is a novelty over the specification in Givon et al. (1995), or
the sampling errors in Haruvy et al. (2004). We consider their structure in
the estimation section.
1.3 Estimation
In this section, we describe our empirical approach, presenting the data and
estimation method.
1.3.1 Data
The data we use is from Givon et al. (1995). It consists of legal sales of per-
sonal computers using a DOS operating system, of spreadsheets (which we
later abbreviate to S in tables), and of word processors (abbreviated to WP
in tables) in the UK, and is reported monthly from January 1987 to August
1992 inclusive. As with Givon et al. (1995), we assume that DOS personal
computers were introduced in October 1981 and the two software products
were introduced inOctober 1982. These assumptions are used to determine
initial values for cumulative sales in January 1987.
1.3.2 Estimation by maximum likelihood
We now present the estimation method for our model and its restriction to
the Givon et al. (1995) pirate model. It is maximum likelihood estimation
with tracking of the likelihood function through an extended Kalman filter.
The approach generates estimates of the joint error structure in legal and
pirate acquisitions, and parameter standard errors.
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1.3.2.1 The extended Kalman filter with continuous state and discrete obser-
vations
The extended Kalman filter with continuous state and discrete observations
operates on state space models of the form
dξt+1/dt = f (ξt,ut)+vt+1 (1.3)
zt = h(ξt)+wt (1.4)
where zt is a vector of variables observed at time t and ξt is a state vec-
tor of possibly unobserved variables. ut is a vector of exogenous variables,
while f and h are differentiable functions. The error vectors vt+1 andut+1 are
mutually uncorrelated white noise, with contemporaneous error variances
given by E(vtv
T
t
) =Qt and E(wtw
T
t
) =R.
The filter generates repeated linear forecasts based on past data given at
discrete intervals, with forecasts generated recursively through a linearised
approximation to the continuous generating system. It proceeds by two
steps at each period in a time series, alternating between forecasting based
on past data and projection based on current data. It tracks the forecasted
state variable ξt given data available at time t − 1 (when the forecast is de-
noted ξt|t−1) and the projected state variable given data available at time t
(the projection is denoted ξt|t). The forecast mean squared errors are also
tracked. They are denoted Pt|t−1 = E((ξt − ξt|t−1)(ξt − ξt|t−1)
T ) and Pt|t =
E((ξt−ξt|t)(ξt−ξt|t)
T ).
In detail, the filter stages are as follows.
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Initialisation
Estimates are made of the state vector and its mean squared error matrix in
the absence of any information at time zero, that is, of ξ0|0 and P0|0.
Forecasting
Given ξt|t and Pt|t for any t, we integrate the equations
dξt/dt = f (ξt,ut) (1.5)
dPt/dt = FtP
T
t
+PtF
T +Qt (1.6)
where Ft = d f/dξ
T is the Jacobian of f evaluated at (ξt ,ut). The inte-
gration is performed from t to t + 1, with the initial ξt = ξt|t and Pt = Pt|t in
the first and second equations respectively. We set ξt+1|t and Pt+1|t to be the
integrated values at the corresponding end points. The forecasted value for
the observation equation and its MSE are then
zt+1|t =Hξt+1|t (1.7)
MSE(zt+1|t)=Ht+1Pt+1|tH
T
t+1+Rt+1 (1.8)
whereHt+1 = dh/dξ
T is the Jacobian of h evaluated at ξt+1|t .
Updating
Given ξt+1|t and Pt+1|t , we update the forecasts with data zt+1 at time t + 1
using the formulae
ξt+1|t+1 = ξt+1|t +Kt+1(zt+1−h(ξt+1|t)) (1.9)
Pt+1|t+1 = (I−Kt+1Ht+1)Pt+1|t (1.10)
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where I is the identity matrix with dimension equal to the number of
state variables, and
Kt+1 = Pt+1|tH
T
t+1(Ht+1Pt+1|tH
T
t+1+Rt+1)
−1 (1.11)
.
1.3.2.2 State space representation of the pirate diffusionmodel
We may represent our extended pirate diffusion model in equations 1.2 in
state space format with the following definitions:
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ξt =

Xt
Yt

 (1.12)
f (ξt,ut) =

 f1
f2

 (1.13)
ut = 0 (1.14)
F =

F1,1 F1,2
F2,1 F2,2

 (1.15)
vt =

εX
εY

 (1.16)
zt =
(
Xt
)
(1.17)
h(ξt)= ξt (1.18)
H =
(
1 0
)
(1.19)
wt =

0
0

 (1.20)
where the components of the vector f (ξt,ut) are given by
f1 =
[
a+α
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1) (1.21)
f2 =
[
(1−α)max(Yt−1,1)
ε b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1) (1.22)
and the components of the matrix F are given by the following expres-
sions:
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F1,1 =αb1−a−2α
b1
Nt
Xt−1−α
b1+b2
Nt
Yt−1 (1.23)
F1,2 =αb2−a−α
b1+b2
Nt
Xt−1−2α
b2
Nt
Yt−1 (1.24)
F2,1 =
[
(1−α)max(Yt−1,1)
ε b1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
−
[
(1−α)max(Yt−1,1)
ε b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(1.25)
F2,2 =
[
(1−α)ε max(Yt−1,1)
ε−1 b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
× (Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
+
[
(1−α)max(Yt−1,1)
ε b2
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
−
[
(1−α)max(Yt−1,1)
ε b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(1.26)
.
The stochastic component of our model includes all sources of error.
In contrast, the formulations in Schmittlein and Mahajan (1982) and Basu
et al. (1995) allocate all error to differences from multinomial sampling of
adoption timing. Thus, while bothwe and these authors usemaximum like-
lihood estimation, we are not susceptible to the type of criticism levelled in
Srinivasan and Mason (1986) that our error specification leads to underes-
timation of errors.
Our general variance-covariancematrix specification allows for contem-
poraneous correlation only and is given by
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Qt =

q1,1 q1,2
q1,2 q2,2

 (1.27)
Rt = 0 (1.28)
for scalars q1,1, q1,2, q2,1, and q2,2.
We have assumed that the errors occur in the state equation rather than
the observation equation, so that errors are persistent over time. This ap-
proach is consistent with the accumulating errors used in estimationmeth-
ods including OLS (Bass, 1969), NLS (Srinivasan and Mason, 1986; Jain and
Rao, 1990), and MLE (Schmittlein and Mahajan, 1982; Basu et al., 1995)
specifications of the deterministic-stochastic Bass model.
The restriction on theRmatrix reduces the number of parameters in our
model. State space models are typically underidentified in maximum like-
lihood estimation (Hamilton, 1994, pp.387-8). To achieve identification, we
further restrict the parameters in theQmatrix. Our initial specification sets
q1,1 = q2,2 = σ
2 for some constant σ2 and q1,2 = q1,2 = 0. Later, we consider
alternative specifications for the fixed parameters.
The initial state vector ξ0|0 in January 1987 is generated by iterating on
the system in equations 1.2 from October 1982 using the parameters esti-
mated in Givon et al. (1995). The initial mean squared error matrix P0|0 is
assumed to be the zero matrix, so the starting state vector is known with
certainty.
For the forecasting stage, we integrate equations 1.5 and 1.6 numerically
over ten iterations. We also require estimates of Nt . From equation 1.1, it
follows a Bass model. Givon et al. (1995) make the same assumption and fit
the equation by non-linear least squares. We retain their estimated param-
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eters of p = 0.00037, q = 0.0316, and m = 15,386,100.
1.3.2.3 Maximum likelihood estimation
The one step ahead forecasts for the observation zt+1|t and its mean squared
error MSE(zt+1|t) are described by equations 1.7 and 1.8. Given a distribu-
tion fZt of the next observation dependent on these two parameters, wemay
construct the sample log likelihood as
T−1
∑
t=0
log fZt+1(zt+1) (1.29)
where the distribution fZt+1 is conditioned on zt+1|t and MSE(zt+1|t). Un-
der the assumption of normal distributions for ξ0|0, vt , and wt , the log likeli-
hood is (Hamilton, 1994, p.385)
log fZt+1(zt+1) =(2pi)
−n/2
∣∣Ht+1Pt+1|tHTt+1+Rt+1∣∣−1/2
× exp{−(1/2)(zt+1−Htξt+1|t)
T (Ht+1Pt+1|tH
T
t+1+Rt+1)
−1
× (zt+1−Htξt+1|t)} (1.30)
where |M | is the determinant ofM and n is the dimension of wt .
We maximise the log likelihood function in equation 1.30 numerically.
The maximisation has to give estimates in feasible parameter regions, with
positive q variance parameters, a, b1, and b2 contact parameters that are
positive and bounded by unity, and the same for the α share parameter.
We further constrain the ε parameter to lie between −0.2 and 0.2, the α pa-
rameter to be no larger than 0.02, and q1,1 not to exceed 10
9. Estimates are
comfortably within these domains, so they restrict the region for checking
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without excluding probable solutions.
To constrain the variables to lie in the required domains, wemap to them
by functions whose input variables are unconstrained (see Hamilton (1994,
pp.146-8)). The functions are φ = 0.2ε/(1+ |ε|), and φ = kλ 2/(1+ λ 2) with
the other parameters replacing λ for appropriate rescaling factors k. We
thenmaximise the transformed functionswith respect to the unconstrained
variables using a Nelder-Mead algorithm. We start the algorithm from the
parameter solutions in Givon et al. (1995). The solutions in the transformed
parameters give solutions in the original parameters.
TheHessian for themaximised transformed function yields secondderiva-
tive estimates of the standard errors for the transformed parameters. We
can calculate standard error estimates for the original parameters by calcu-
lating the Hessian with respect to the non-transformed function. However,
a flat likelihood function in a couple of the parameter directions and limits
on accuracy for numerically calculated second derivativesmeant that nega-
tive estimates of variancewere occasionally produced in the non-transformed
function (but never in the transformed function). So we use variance esti-
mates calculated from the outer product of the score matrix at the original
parameter values. The estimates were invariably positive.
The estimationwas implemented in theRprogramming language (RDe-
velopmentCore Team, 2009) using the library packagesMASS andnumDeriv.
We employed theMicrosoft Excel add-in Excel2LaTeX to generate the tables.
The code is available from the author’s website1.
1http://ebasic.easily.co.uk/02E044/05304E/mpp and diffusion.html
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1.4 Results
In this section we present our results. Subsection 1.4.1 gives estimates for
our model and its restriction with constant marginal propensity to pirate,
as in Givon et al. (1995). Subsection 1.4.2 looks at the model’s out of sam-
ple performance, subsection 1.4.3 examines estimates with alternative er-
ror specifications, and subsection 1.4.4 considers parameter estimates for a
qualitatively similar but functionally different model.
1.4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1.1 shows parameter estimates for our model and its restriction to the
Givon et al. (1995) model. In column one, our model is fitted to the word
processor data. The a parameter equals 0.00146, which is higher than the
0.0002 rate reported in Givon et al. (1995). Our rates lie between the mean
and median of estimates reported in the meta-analysis of Bass curves in
Van den Bulte and Stremersch (2004), whereas the Givon et al. (1995) es-
timate lies at the lower end of their range. Thus, we find that word pro-
cessors were subject to external influence to a more usual extent than is
found in Givon et al. (1995) (although the Van den Bulte and Stremersch
(2004) data does not disaggregate their reported figure by annual, quarterly,
andmonthly frequency of calculation, so the sub-divided ranges maymove
closer to the Givon et al. (1995) figure). Thus, we find a higher effect of ex-
ternal influence on diffusion. The b1 parameter equals 0.109, describing
the internal influence on sales by legal owners. The value is lower than in
Givon et al. (1995) where it is 0.135. Our estimate for the pirate internal
influence parameter b2 is 0.0888, again lower than in Givon et al. (1995) at
0.135 too. Our α parameter is 0.163, representing the proportion of inter-
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nally influenced adopters who buy the legal software when few past pirate
copies have been made. It is higher than in Givon et al. (1995) (0.144). The
σ2 variance parameter is 10,800,000, giving an implied standard deviation
for legal and pirate acquisitions of 3,300 units per month. The ε parame-
ter is 0.0226, indicating that the marginal propensity to pirate rises as the
number of pirates rises. This is consistent with a hypothesis that increasing
piracy prevalence makes it more viable or acceptable for new adopters to
acquire pirate copies. The significance of all parameters is low, except for
the error variance.
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Table 1.1: Parameter estimates for our pirate model and the
ε = 0 restricted model
WP WP S S
a 0.00146 0.00151 0.00155 0.00148
0.00463 0.0048 0.00429 0.00262
b1 0.109 0.229 0.00176 0.00000
0.798 1.01 0.595 0.341
b2 0.0888 0.0962 0.0509 0.114 **
0.356 0.173 0.38 0.0547
α 0.163 0.124 ** 0.224 0.101 **
0.39 0.0596 1.36 0.045
σ2 0.0108 *** 0.0107 *** 0.00379 *** 0.00403 ***
0.00202 0.00203 0.000732 0.000756
ε 0.0226 0.0684
0.171 0.484
AIC 1287.0 1285.1 1217.0 1218.8
MSE (%) 100 100 95 100
Standard deviations are shown below the coefficients. *** denotes
a p-value of less than 0.01, ** of less than 0.05, * of less than 0.1.
MSEs are expressed as percentages of the MSE for the correspond-
ing restricted model. σ2 is reported in units of 109. WP means word
processor and S means spreadsheet.
In column two, we set the ε parameter to zero to see how the parameters
and fit adjust compared with the model including it. The parameters on
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a, b2, and σ
2 change little, although the significance on b2 increases whilst
remaining low. The b1 parameter rises to 0.229, with low significance. The
α parameter drops to 0.124, and becomes significant at five percent. The
Akaike InformationCriterion selects the smallermodel over the largermodel,
and the mean squared errors from the two models are almost identical in-
dicating no in-sample predictive benefit from including the ε term.
Column three reports parameter estimates for our model applied to the
spreadsheet data. The coefficient of external influence a is 0.00155, similar
to that for word processors and compared to 0.00069 in Givon et al. (1995).
The legal owners’ influence parameter b1 is negligible, and far below the
external influence parameter b2 of 0.0509. In Givon et al. (1995), the esti-
mated parameters are larger and comparable at 0.0976 for the b1 parameter
and 0.104 for b2. Our α parameter is 0.224 compared with 0.121 in Givon
et al. (1995). The error variance is 3,790,000 implies a standard deviation for
monthly legal and pirate acquisitions of 1,900 units per month. The esti-
mate for the ε parameter is 0.0684, so that themarginal propensity to pirate
rises with the number of pirates. Except for the variance parameter, signifi-
cance is low.
Column four shows the model when ε is excluded. The a, b1, and σ
2
parameters are similar to the model with it. The b2 parameter rises to 0.114,
and theα parameter drops to 0.101. Both are now significant at five percent.
The Akaike Information Criterion selects our model with variable marginal
propensity to pirate, and the model offers a non-trivial reduction in mean
squared error.
The performance of our model vis-a`-vis the restricted model is mixed.
The ε parameter estimates are plausibly positive and low in value. With the
word processor data, the extra variable offers no improvement in fit and
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weakens the significance on the α parameter, but not the other parameters.
With the spreadsheet data, there are noticeable gains for the fit, but the pa-
rameter significance worsens perhaps indicating that qualitative behaviour
of the larger model better describes the data but the functional form is not
correctly specified. We examine these issues in the next subsections.
A further notable point is the insignificance of the legal internal influ-
ence in any specification. The estimates point to the only possibly statis-
tically significant internal influence coming from past acquirers of pirate
copies.
Figure 1.1 shows the predicted sales as generated by the Kalman filter
at our estimated parameters. The top panel shows the fitted sales for word
processors in our model (column one in table 1.1, with red dashes) and in
the restricted model (column two, with green dots). Our model fits the data
better across most of the period except towards its end where its predic-
tions are lower than the restricted model, and far lower than the suddenly
hiked sales. The extra parameter available in our model allows for better
fitting but comes at a cost in that pirate sales dominate late in the period,
if the optimal ε parameter is positive. The legal sales are lower as a result.
In the bottom panel, we see the fitted sales for spreadsheets for our model
(column three), and for the restricted model (column four). The fit is com-
parable between the twomodels formost of the period, but at the end of the
period our model fits much better the sudden fall in sales. The reason for
the relative fit is that the extra flexibility in ourmodel allows for comparable
fit quality over most of the curve, and then better fit to the late fall as pirate
sales displace legal sales. The different directions of the sales shifts at the
end of the period explains why the mean squared error for our model with
the word processor data is the same as the restricted model, whereas it is
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Figure 1.1: Predicted and actual sales for word processors (top) and spreadsheets
(bottom). Red dashes are for the model with estimated ε , green dots are for the
model with ε set at zero
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Figure 1.2: Pirate acquisitions, predicted sales, and actual sales for word processors
(top) and spreadsheets (bottom). Red dashes are for the model with estimated ε ,
green dots are for the model with ε set at zero
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much lower with the spreadsheet data.
Figure 1.2 shows the same graphs with pirate acquisitions included. The
top panel shows forecast piracy for the word processor data. Our model,
following the upper line with red dashes, shows pirate acquisitions rising
quickly to account formost software acquisition. A similar path is shown for
the restricted model, which is the upper line marked by green dots. Piracy
incidence in our model is slightly lower than that in the restricted model at
the start of the period but exceeds it later by another small amount, with
the point of equality occurring quite early on at the end of 1988. Our model
includes the extra term accelerating new pirate acquisitions at high rates of
past pirate adoptions, so that early piracy tends to be lower and late piracy
higher than in the absence of the extra coefficient.
The lower panel shows the corresponding curves for the spreadsheet
data. Our model and the restricted model again show similar shapes. The
restricted model has a shallower increase, so that our model again fore-
casts lower incidence of piracy when its prevalence is low, but greater in-
cidence when its prevalence is high. Our model’s forecasts exceed those of
the restrictedmodel from early 1990, and the gap ismoderately large at high
piracy prevalence. The larger gap for spreadsheets than word processors is
due to the higher estimated ε coefficient for the spreadsheet data.
1.4.2 Out of sample performance
This section compares the predictive performance of ourmodel with that of
the restricted model. To do so, we re-estimated our model using data from
the first 58 periods, retaining the last ten periods for assessing out of sample
fit. For the word processor data, the out of sample period is marked by a
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large sales jump, while for the spreadsheet data the period saw a possible
sales growth slowdown.
Table 1.2: Parameter estimates in-sample andMSEs out of sample
WP WP S S
a 0.00183 0.00242 0.00164 0.00161
0.00187 0.00179 0.00336 0.00207
b1 0.00252 0.00000 0.00075 0.00001
0.239 0.194 0.587 0.305
b2 0.0594 0.145 *** 0.0556 0.106 *
0.128 0.044 0.406 0.055
α 0.291 0.105 *** 0.199 0.105 **
0.449 0.0219 1.17 0.0411
σ2 0.00413 *** 0.0053 *** 0.00309 *** 0.00314 ***
0.000263 0.000419 0.000473 0.000477
ε 0.0843 0.056
0.136 0.462
MSE, o.o.s. (%) 119 100 83 100
Standard deviations are shown below the coefficients. *** denotes a p-value
of less than 0.01, ** of less than 0.05, * of less than 0.1. MSEs out of sample
are expressed as percentages of theMSE out of sample for the corresponding
restricted model. σ2 is reported in units of 109. WP means word processor
and S means spreadsheet.
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Figure 1.3: Predicted and actual sales for word processors (top) and spreadsheets
(bottom), with ten out-of-sample periods. Red dashes are for the model with esti-
mated ε , green dots are for the model with ε set at zero
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The results are in table 1.2. Column one shows the estimates for our
model applied to the word processor data. The a parameter of external in-
fluence is 0.00183, a little higher than the estimate over thewhole range. The
b1 internal legal influence parameter is economically and statistically incon-
sequential. The b2 internal pirate influence parameter is 0.0594, slightly be-
low the whole domain estimate. The legal share parameter α is 0.291, far
above the whole period value. The variance estimate σ2 is 0.00413, under
half of the full period estimate that includes the sudden sales growth. The
estimate of the marginal propensity to pirate parameter ε is 0.0843 com-
pared with the full sample ε estimate of 0.0226. The parameter significance
is generally low except on σ2, and very low on b1.
Column two shows similar parameters for the restrictedmodel estimated
on theword processor data, without ε . The pirate internal influence param-
eter is fifty percent higher than its full period estimate. The legal share pa-
rameter is a little lower. Both these parameters become significant at one
percent, unlike the full period estimate or the estimate for the model with
variable propensity to pirate.
Our model has a much higher out of sample MSE than the restricted
model. Including the variable marginal propensity to pirate worsens fit in
this case. The positive ε coefficient results in the share of pirate acquisitions
rising over time and the share of legal acquisitions falling, which leads to a
far better fit than the restricted model over the in sample period (figure 1.3,
top panel). However, the curvature in our predicted sales curve means they
lie below the predicted sales of the restrictedmodel after the unprecedented
sales jump in the out of sample period.
Column three has the parameter estimates for ourmodel using the spread-
sheet data. The external influence, internal legal influence, and legal share
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parameter are all close to their full period estimates. The internal pirate
influence parameter is even smaller than for the full sample, and the error
variance parameter is moderately lower. The marginal propensity to pirate
parameter is also similar to the value for the whole period, and is positive.
Except the variance parameter, significance is low.
The spreadsheet parameter estimates with the ε parameter set to zero
are in column four. The estimated volatility is twenty percent lower, but
otherwise the parameters are similar to their full period estimates in size
and significance.
Themean squared error in spreadsheet sales projection for ourmodel is
only 83 percent of the MSE for the restricted model. In our model, the pos-
itive ε parameter means that the share of new piracy rises as the number
of past pirates increases, so that legal sales’ share declines. Legal sales are
lower in our model than in the restricted model during the sample period,
tracking the decline in actual sales (figure 1.3, bottom panel). The ε param-
eter is quite high at 0.056, so that the gap is quite large which accounts for
the size of the MSE forecast gain.
The non-additive functional formmeant that we could not verify the er-
ror correlation assumptions necessary to run Clark-West tests (Clark and
West, 2007) of the extra variable offering no predictive gains. When the tests
were run under uncertain assumption validity, the null of no gains was re-
jected at ten percent for spreadsheets (assuming no autocorrelation in the
data). Significance fell a little on allowing for first order autocorrelation.
Our model seems to capture behaviour over periods without large sales
jumps better than the restricted model. However, the restricted model of-
fers more robust predictions when faced with shocks biased against the
general direction of movement. It is unclear, based on the available data,
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whether such shocks are inherent to the system and occur frequently. If
they are and do, then more extensive misspecifications may be preferable
to less misspecified models if the partial misspecification decreases predic-
tive accuracy after the shock.
1.4.3 Alternative error specifications
Our model in equations 1.2 describes the errors in the legal sales and pirate
acquisition series by a bivariate normal distribution. In order to achieve pa-
rameter identification, our base estimations restricted the variance-covariance
matrixQ to be amultiple of the identity matrix. In this section, we compare
our estimates under other error specifications.
We consider four Q specifications, applied to the word processor and
spreadsheet series in turn. The first specification puts the variance for the
larger pirate series to be twice the variance for the legal series, so q1,1=σ
2 for
some constant σ2, q2,2 = 2σ
2, and q1,2 = q1,2 = 0. The second specification al-
lows for positive correlation between the legal sales and pirate acquisitions,
setting q1,1 = q2,2 =σ
2 and q1,2 = q1,2 =σ
2/2. Thirdly, we specify negative cor-
relation between the two series, so q1,1 = q2,2 = σ
2 and q1,2 = q1,2 = −σ
2/2.
In the fourth specification, heteroscedastic errors are allowed so q1,1 = q2,2 =
Ntσ
2 and q1,2 = q1,2 = 0, recalling that Nt is market capacity at time t, which
we express in millions.
Our model was re-estimated with each of these variance specifications.
The coefficient estimates are given in Table 1.3. The word processor results
are presented in the first four columns. With doubled pirate variance in col-
umn one, the coefficients are similar to the base estimates in value and sig-
nificance. The marginal propensity to pirate rises a little more quickly. The
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Table 1.3: Parameter estimates with alternative error specifications
WP WP WP WP S S S S
Err. × 2 Pos. cor. Neg. cor. Het. err. Err. × 2 Pos. cor. Neg. cor. Het. err.
a 0.00139 0.00163 0.00123 0.00217 0.00163 0.00161 0.00157 0.00169
0.0046 0.00579 0.00701 0.00163 0.00493 0.00443 0.00407 0.00183
b1 0.0911 0.334 0.381 0.00007 0.000104 0.000989 0.000366 0.00232
0.786 1.59 1.49 0.293 1.36 0.719 0.495 0.367
b2 0.0864 0.101 0.000769 0.0518 0.103 0.0597 0.044 0.0524
0.386 0.378 0.0999 0.176 0.831 0.458 0.318 0.28
α 0.175 0.103 0.226 0.317 0.109 0.188 0.259 0.207
0.483 0.178 0.472 0.74 0.724 1.18 1.52 0.896
σ2 0.0108 *** 0.0108 *** 0.0103 *** 0.00242 *** 0.004 *** 0.00385 *** 0.00375 *** 0.000936 ***
0.00198 0.00209 0.00206 0.000491 0.000813 0.000754 0.000716 0.000213
ε 0.0283 -0.0147 0.0454 0.0924 0.00776 0.0535 0.0826 0.0624
0.202 0.116 0.216 0.224 0.454 0.477 0.494 0.354
AIC 1287.0 1287.5 1286.4 1261.1 1220.4 1217.9 1216.1 1197.3
MSE (%) 100 100 98 104 105 101 99 101
Standard deviations are shown below the coefficients. *** denotes a p-value of less than 0.01, ** of less than 0.05, * of less than
0.1. MSEs are expressed as percentages of the MSE for the base estimations (columns one and three of table 1.1). σ2 is reported
in units of 109. WP means word processor and S means spreadsheet.
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AIC and MSE are no different. For positive correlation in column two, the
estimated effect of legal internal influence ismuch larger (b1 = 0.334) than in
the base model. The marginal propensity to pirate declines as the number
of pirate copies rises (ε = −0.0147), unlike in the base estimates. The pos-
itively correlation provides a route by which pirate acquisitions influence
legal sales, and which can therefore account for the diminished importance
of the direct influence of piracy on diffusion in this estimation. The AIC is
higher for this specification and the mean squared errors are the same.
Column three shows the estimates with negative correlation. Parameter
estimates for external influence and variance within series are similar to the
base estimate. However, the estimates of the legal internal influence and the
legal share parameter aremuch larger, at 0.381 and 0.226 respectively. Thus,
for small times t the proportion of past legal adopters who induce new legal
adoptions is 0.381× 0.226/Nt = 0.086/Nt . The estimated effect of pirate in-
ternal influence is negligible. Taking also into account the number of new
adoptions induced by past legal adoptions and the size of the external in-
fluence parameter, the early legal diffusion looks like a standard univariate
Bass diffusion. The marginal propensity to pirate rises much more quickly
in this specification than in the base model (ε equals 0.0454 compared with
0.0226). The AIC and MSE are lower. In this specification, piracy acts pri-
marily to displace legal diffusion without promoting it.
Column four shows the parameters for the model with heterogeneous
errors. Compared with the base model parameters, the external diffusion
parameter is moderately larger. The legal internal influence coefficient is
negligible, and the pirate internal influence coefficient is much the same.
The marginal propensity to pirate rises much more quickly in this speci-
fication (ε = 0.0924). The AIC is lower, but the MSE increases by a larger
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percentage.
Parameter estimates for the spreadsheet data are shown in columns five
to eight. The parameters for the double pirate error specification are shown
in column five. The external influence and legal internal influence param-
eters are much the same. The variance coefficient is similar at 0.004. The
pirate internal influence parameter is almost doubled at 0.103, while the le-
gal share parameter is halved at 0.109. The rise in marginal propensity to
pirate is positive and low, with ε at 0.00776 compared with 0.0684 in the
base specification. Significance is generally low, the AIC is higher and the
MSE increases by five percent.
In column six, the results are shown for the positive correlation error
specification. The parameter estimates are not too dissimilar from the base
specification. The AIC andMSE are higher. The parameters for the negative
correlation error specification are shown in column seven. The parameters
are similar to the base specification, with the marginal propensity to pirate
parameter a bit larger. The AIC andMSE are both a little lower. The parame-
ters for the heterogeneous error specification are in column eight. They are
again similar to the base specification. The AIC improves by two percent
and the MSE worsens by one percent.
In summary, the alternative error specifications broadly support an in-
creasing marginal propensity to pirate. For both the word processor and
spreadsheet data, the negative correlation specifications reduce the AIC and
the MSE. For the word processor data, the resulting model shows piracy
growing rapidly and making little contribution to legal diffusion. Parame-
ter significance is generally low.
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1.4.4 An alternative model
1.4.4.1 The alternative specification
We noted earlier that our model gives plausible values for the ε parame-
ter and some improvements in fit, but with low parameter significance. In
this section, an alternative specification is examined that exhibits the same
broad type of qualitative behaviour. The aim is to see if better fitting param-
eters can be produced, or at least verification of the qualitative outcomes.
The alternative specificationmakes the legal shareα decline as the num-
ber of cumulative pirate adopters rises. The share of new internally influ-
enced adopters who buy is revised to α/(1+max(Yt ,1)
ε), where Yt is the
number of pirates. The remaining share, 1−α/(1+max(Yt ,1)
ε), acquires a
pirate copy. We omit the piracymultipliermax(Yt ,1)
ε described in themodel
in section 1.2. In the newmodel, piracy has no accelerating effect unlike the
earlier model, and instead only displaces legal sales.
Algebraically, the model is
dXt = (
[
a+ α
1+max(Yt ,1)ε
b1Xt+b2Yt
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt −Yt))dt +dw1
dYt = (
[
(1− α
1+max(Yt ,1)ε
) b1Xt+b2Yt
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt −Yt))dt +dw2
(1.31)
where dw = (dw1,dw2)∼ N(0,dt
2Q), andQ= σ2I(2).
We repeat the state space representation in section 1.3.2. Now the vector
f is given by
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f1 =
[
a+
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1) (1.32)
f2 =
[
(1−
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
)
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1) (1.33)
and the components of the matrix F are given by the following expres-
sions:
F1,1 =
[
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
b1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
−
[
a+
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(1.34)
F1,2 =
[
− ε max(Yt−1,1)
ε−1 α
(1+max(Yt−1,1)ε)2
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
+
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
b2
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
−
[
a+
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(1.35)
F2,1 =
[
(1−
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
)
b1
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
−
[
(1−
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
)
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(1.36)
F2,2 =
[
ε max(Yt−1,1)
ε−1 α
(1+max(Yt−1,1)ε)2
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
+(1−
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
)
b2
Nt
]
(Nt −Xt−1−Yt−1)
−
[
(1−
α
1+max(Yt−1,1)ε
)
b1Xt−1+b2Yt−1
Nt
]
(1.37)
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1.4.4.2 Results for the alternative specification
Table 1.4: Parameter estimates for the alternative model form
WP WP S S
a 0.0016 0.00167 0.00115 0.00135
0.0039 0.00391 0.00525 0.00271
b1 0.167 0.283 0.000853 0.00000
1.27 1.25 0.932 0.551
b2 0.11 0.0857 0.112 0.113
0.237 0.229 0.18 0.0854
α 0.246 0.245 *** 0.33 0.208 **
0.628 0.0947 2.43 0.0903
σ2 0.0108 *** 0.0107 *** 0.00403 *** 0.00407 ***
0.00209 0.00203 0.000827 0.000752
ε 0.000467 0.0503
0.326 0.664
AIC 1287.0 1285.0 1220.8 1219.4
MSE (%) 100 100 99 100
Standard deviations are shown below the coefficients. *** denotes
a p-value of less than 0.01, ** of less than 0.05, * of less than 0.1.
MSEs are expressed as percentages of the MSE for the correspond-
ing restricted model. σ2 is reported in units of 109. WP means word
processor and S means spreadsheet.
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Table 1.4 shows the results of estimation for the alternative model. In
column one, we see the model fitted to the word processor data. The ex-
ternal influence parameter is 0.0016, comparable with our estimate for our
mainmodel. The legal internal influence parameter is 0.167, higher than the
main model estimate but comparable with Givon et al. (1995). The same is
true for the pirate internal influence parameter. The α parameter is larger
than for the main model, but the two are not directly comparable. In our
model and for low values of the ε parameter, the α parameter is twice the
legal share. Error variance estimates are unchanged. The ε parameter is
positive, indicating the pirate share of internally influenced adoption rises
as the number of pirate copies rises. Parameter significance is low except
for variance. Column two fixes the pirate share, and produces almost the
same estimates as column two of table 1.1 whose specification is identical.
Differences arise from slight variations in numerical convergence. Includ-
ing the variable marginal propensity to pirate raises the AIC and does not
change the MSE.
Column three reports the fitted parameters for the spreadsheet data.
The external influence parameter is comparablewith that in themainmodel,
as is the negligible legal internal influence coefficient and the error variance
estimate. The pirate internal influence parameter is 0.112, which is twice as
high as for the main model and comparable with Givon et al. (1995). The
legal share is 0.165 after adjustment for comparison with the earlier work,
making it lower than in themainmodel but a little higher than inGivon et al.
(1995). The ε parameter is moderately positive, indicating rising marginal
propensity to pirate. Its significance, as for the other parameters except er-
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ror variance, is low. As shown in column four, the model with ε set to zero
has much the same parameters as the constrained main model. Its AIC is
slightly lower, but has higherMSE than the unconstrainedmodel in column
three.
In summary, the alternativemodel also identifies a risingmarginal propen-
sity to pirate in theword processor and spreadsheet data. Themodel perfor-
mance is not quite as good as for the main model. Perhaps the acceleration
of pirate sales due to piracy, which is present in themainmodel butmissing
from this specification, captures an aspect of the data generating process.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has examined diffusion of computer software in the presence
of piracy. It has generally found that the marginal propensity to pirate rises
with the number of past pirate copies. It has found that piracy is responsible
for most of the internally influenced diffusion in the spreadsheet market
in the period under examination. In the word processor market, an error
specification with negative correlation outperformed other specifications
and indicated that only legal saleswere responsible for internally influenced
diffusion.
A number of avenues for future work are suggested. One of them follows
fromnoting that a rising propensity to pirate alters the timing of welfare and
profit emergence. Further work could examine their dynamics and strategic
behaviour undertaken by legal sellers in order to manage piracy.
Including themarginal propensity to pirate in the pirate diffusionmodel
offers gains in fit and assumption plausibility. However, they were not en-
tirely functionally convincing, with low parameter significance possibly in-
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dicating lack of parsimony. Better specifications of the deterministic com-
ponents of the model could be sought.
Our model’s predictive performance was mixed. It underperformed the
restricted model after a large shock contrary to the general sales curvature.
Further work could clarify whether these shocks form error corrections to
drifts away from the restricted model, or are not systemically related to the
models here. In the latter case, analysing the frequency of shocks and their
direction would help to clarify the probability and severity of predictive un-
derperformance.
More general specification of stochastic components has allowed us to
strengthenGivon et al. (1995)’s andHaruvy et al. (2004)’s findings on spread-
sheets and contradict them on word processors. For the latter point, it is
conceivable that the difference between the results is that our allowance of
negative error correlation strips out a source of interaction which is forced
to be included in the deterministic components of their model. Further
work could further distinguish between deterministic and stochastic inter-
actions. It could also allow for serial correlation, for example in a revised
state space formulation.
Our work finds contrasting effects of past piracy on the word processor
and spreadsheet market. Qualitative studies could examine the reasons for
the difference. Conceivably it arises because of the presence of a dominant
but declining word processor product (Word Perfect) over the period with-
out an equivalent in the spreadsheet market, or due to different corporate
strategies by market leaders.
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Chapter 2
Welfare implications of piracy with dynamic
pricing and heterogeneous consumers
2.1 Introduction
Piracy can involve extraction of profits by pirate providers from legal pro-
ducers, as pirate copies may be offered at prices as or more attractive than
those of legal goods. Companies may attempt to avoid piracy’s effects by
various means, including using price reductions to capture a larger share
of the market. Such a strategy involves lowering prices below those which
would be optimal in the absence of piracy. Legal sellers can avoid some of
the wealth loss associated with piracy, but their price reductions can trans-
fer surplus to consumers.
Skimming on the other hand is a means by which companies can in-
crease profits through successive price reductions. It involves selling at prices
equal to the marginal valuations of consumers, first by setting prices to sell
only to the highest valuing consumers, then reducing prices to sell only to
the next highest valuing consumers, and so on. Companies can thereby ex-
tract all surplus from consumers. The surplus transfers due to skimming
and piracy prevention can thus go in different directions.
In this paper we examine the welfare trade-offs between the two pric-
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ing strategies. We address three main questions. Firstly, does piracy raise
or lower aggregate welfare when these countervailing strategies operate?
Secondly, how does welfare divide between legal sellers, pirate providers,
and consumers? Thirdly, how does market growth affect these welfare out-
comes?
We find that in markets with a fixed size, total welfare rises with the
piracy rate. The best way for the legal seller to avoid piracy’s rising impact
is to reduce prices early, reducing the discounting on the value of the goods
and limiting the extent of skimming. Consumers have a strong preference
for high rates of piracy, while pirate providers like moderate rates that do
not trigger price responses from legal sellers. Legal sellers are adverse to all
piracy.
In growingmarkets, total welfare falls as the piracy rate rises. With higher
rates, the legal seller best avoids piracy’s effect by delaying product launch
until the market is large. Although skimming becomes less important, the
pricing strategy to avoid piracy results in greater delays in sales and incom-
plete satisfaction of market demand. Consumers benefit from high rates
of piracy, but to a lesser extent than in fixed size markets. Pirate providers
prefer moderate to moderately high rates, and legal sellers like low rates.
Section 2.2 describes related literature. Section 2.3 presents our model
and section 2.4 describes the numerical analysis method. Section 2.5 looks
at pricing, sales time, and welfare in the presence of piracy when market
size is fixed, while section 2.6 does the same when the market is growing.
Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Related literature
In this section we briefly look at theoretical literature relating to the main
themes in our model. Prior work suggests that piracy may increase or de-
crease aggregate welfare. An early stream of analysis examines static mech-
anisms, involving the breaking of a legal seller’s monopoly control by pirate
providers and the relative productive efficiencies of legal and pirate sell-
ers. Later writers extend the models in various ways, including examina-
tion of the welfare effect of government or company interventions against
piracy, and outcomes in dynamic settings. Other writers examine legal sell-
ers’ profits in the presence of piracy, suggesting various mechanisms by
which piracy can increase profits. A small number of papers present dy-
namic models examining the contrasting effects on profits of piracy and in-
tertemporal price discrimination.
The short run effect of piracy is analysed in Besen (1986). Production
of a good can occur by legal means or pirate means, with their relative effi-
ciencies determining which productive form gives welfare maximising out-
comes. When legal sellers are capable of capturing some of the value of pi-
rate resale, effectively making piracy an alternative production technology,
piracy may also be profit maximising if it is the more efficient productive
technology. Johnson (1985) notes the ambiguity in short run welfare effects
due to piracy. Greater inefficiency of pirate production is offset by surplus
generated when more agents acquire the good in response to the cost of
pirate acquisition being lower than legal prices.
Ahn and Shin (2010) look at the welfare consequences of piracy preven-
tion strategies. They find government enforcement of copyright law can be
more welfare enhancing than technological protection measures for digi-
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tal goods. Tsai and Chiou (2012) examine the effects of anti-counterfeiting
enforcement on welfare, and find ambiguous outcomes. They decompose
welfare into consumer surplus and legal profit, with counterfeiter profit as-
sumed to be zero under a market entry condition.
A small number of researchers have looked at how piracy affects welfare
in a dynamic framework. In a simulatedmodel, Khouja et al. (2008) observe
that the total number of sales for any level of piracy is close to the total mar-
ket size, so pirate sales compensate for restrictions on acquisitions due to
legal prices. The authors do not calculate discounted welfare although their
model allows it, which would be informative about the welfare effects of
piracy. In Herings et al. (2009), the cost of pirate copying declines directly
with the number of copiers. Discouraging piracy by increasing its cost re-
duces welfare. The authors do not present the dynamic patterns of emer-
gence.
The effect of piracy on legal sellers’ profits has been studied in the lit-
erature, with various mechanisms proposed by which piracy can be profit
enhancing. Minniti and Vergari (2010) suggest that if piracy of one good
increases the utility derived from purchase of another good, then profits
can be increased by it. Banerjee (2013) notes that profits may rise as piracy
goes up if network externalities are simultaneously present and sufficiently
strong. A number of papers (Givon et al., 1995, 1997; Prasad and Mahajan,
2003; Haruvy et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2011) use dynamic analyses to suggest
that piracy can benefit legal sellers. A common theme is that piracy can act
as a control on diffusion, either to reach a certain diffusion rate or network
size. The analyses also generally include assumptions to stop piracy getting
out of hand, and have absent or transient consumer heterogeneity.
By contrast, Khouja and Smith (2007) present a dynamicmodel of piracy
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where consumers exhibit persistent heterogeneity and intertemporal price
discrimination can occur. They show that piracy leads to departure from
skimming and reductions in profit. In Khouja et al. (2008)’s dynamic anal-
ysis, the market for a product consists of a number of individuals each of
whommaymake a pirate copy from a fixed number of neighbours if the lat-
ter have the product. Skimming by the legal seller is profit maximising for
low numbers of neighbours (when piracy is less extensive), but is not opti-
mal as the numbers of neighbours rises.
In modelling skimming and departures from it in the presence of piracy,
Khouja et al. (2008) and Khouja and Smith (2007) overlap with our model
and results. However, whereas Khouja et al. (2008) use simulation andKhouja
and Smith (2007) use algebraic solution for pricing, we use a flexible nu-
meric solution to solve our dynamic programming model. Their primary
concern is not welfare, and Khouja et al. (2008) consider a fixed size market
and Khouja and Smith (2007) examine a contracting one, compared with
the expanding market we examine and that leads to our dynamic welfare
trade-off.
2.3 Model
In this section, we describe our model of information good pricing in the
presence of piracy. Diffusion is divided into acquisitions from a legal seller
and pirate providers. The split is decided by competition between the two
groups. Potential buyers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the good,
so that price acts as a control variable on diffusion. The number of pirate
providers rises with the number of previous buyers. Aside from pirate entry,
additional dynamics in the model are induced by market growth. The legal
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seller performs dynamic optimisation over pricing, taking into account the
dynamics within the model.
There is a single legal producer of an information good. The legal pro-
ducer is profitmaximising and possesses the ability to produce the informa-
tion good developed from their own research and development. The legal
producer can instantly produce copies of the good at a constant unit cost.
As the cost of production can be absorbed into net price, we without loss of
generality set the cost to zero.
At time t, there are kt pirate providers of the good. Pirate providers pro-
duce copies of the good innovated by a legal seller. They initially get the
production technology by acquiring a copy of the good from a legal seller
or pirate provider. The technology may be as little as computer software
and a DVD burner. Pirate providers are a subset of current good users, so as
the number of past acquisitions rises, the number of pirate providers may
increase too. We assume that the number of pirate providers is related to
the number of goods previously sold by the equation kt = s(
∑t−1
τ=1 Sτ )
h for
t > 1, s > 0, and h > 0 (and k0 = 0) where Sτ is all goods sold at time τ .
Fractional numbers of pirate providers are allowed, representing providers
who are less active than average. h is the elasticity of the number of pirate
providers with respect to past sales. Its precise value does not change the
main pricing mechanisms of interest here, so we take it to be one and term
the coefficient of proportionality s as the piracy rate (see Khouja and Smith
(2007), who present amodel where the number of copies pirated in a period
is a fixed proportion of past sales). The modifying effects of different values
of h are described in the conclusion. The unit cost of pirate production is
constant and we absorb it into the net price charged by pirate providers, so
again we can without loss of generality set production cost at zero.
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The population who could have acquired the good by time t is denoted
N(t). N(t) includes people who have already acquired the good and those
who have not. We term this population as market size, as they are people
who will acquire the good if they are offered it at a price below their valu-
ation, but may not yet have been offered at such a price and prior to the
product launchmay not even be aware of it. N(t) can vary over time, for ex-
ample with a rise in the number of owners of a technology necessary for the
information good’s usage, such as DVD players or computers. A similar ap-
proach to growth inmarket size is used inGivon et al. (1995), andmodels the
number of people who could potentially own the good because they meet
the necessary criteria (like DVD player ownership) whether or not they have
yet purchased the good (like a DVD). The market size can thus grow inde-
pendently of the actual market availability of the good. Once the potential
adopter has acquired the good, they will not acquire it for a second time.
We denote the number of new potential buyers at time t by n(t) = N(t)−
N(t − 1). Potential buyers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for
the good. We discriminate between their willingness to pay for the legally
supplied and the pirate supplied good. For the legally supplied good, val-
uations of the good by consumers entering at time t are distributed uni-
formly over the interval [0, V ] for some constant V (similar to the approach
in Khouja and Park (2007), Khouja andWang (2010), Jeong et al. (2012), and
Kogan et al. (2013)). The number of consumers entering the market at time
twith a valuation exceeding a price p(t) is thus
∫ V
p(t)
n(t)
V
dv = n(t)(1−
p(t)
V
) (2.1)
As V is a constant, we can choose the units on p(t) to absorb it and leave
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the aggregate demand function qe,t = n(t)(1 − p(t)), where qe,t is the aggre-
gate quantity demanded at time t and 0 ≤ p(t) ≤ 1 is the price of the legally
supplied good at time t. Similarly, the initial consumers in the first period
have an aggregate demand function of qe,1 = N(1)(1− p(1)). The aggregate
demand at time t arising from both new entrants and previously entered
non-users is qt(p(t)).
Pirate suppliers price their good at ppirate(t) at time t. In using the pi-
rate supplied good, buyers choose to bring the quality up to the quality of
a legally supplied good and in doing so must pay a proportion c of the le-
gal price p(t). We may optionally consider the extra price to be equal to
the cost of quality restoration, so the cp(t) is an additional deadweight loss
of pirate production. The effective price of acquiring a pirate copy of the
good is thus ppirate(t) + cp(t). Pirate suppliers price to remain competitive
with legal suppliers, and set ppirate(t) such that ppirate(t) + cp(t) = p(t), or
ppirate(t) = (1− c)p(t).
Our framework does not explicitly allow for consumers facing piracy risk
cost. Although some authors allow for non-zero risk cost (for example Jeong
et al. (2012)), we consider zero risk cost to be a reasonable assumption in
manymarkets where consumer use of pirated copies is verywidespread and
the prospect of individual prosecution is low, even if consumer awareness of
the issue exists to any degree. For example BSA (2012) estimates 42 percent
of all software products installed worldwide in 2011 were pirate copies, and
in some developing countries the rates were much higher. Alternatively, we
may consider part of the value reduction cp(t) to be due to the expected
value loss due to the risk, and part of the restoration cost to arise from taking
measures to avoid detection.
Sales at any price are divided so that for each copy sold by the legal seller,
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each pirate provider sells j copies on average where jmay be fractional and
less than one. The share of legal sales in total sales is then 1/(1 + jkt), and
the share of pirate sales in total sales is jkt/(1 + jkt). Since kt = s
∑t−1
τ=1 Sτ ,
we absorb the constant j into the constant s without affecting our results.
Hence aggregate legal sales are
1
1 + kt
p(t)qt(p(t)) (2.2)
and aggregate pirate sales are
kt
1 + kt
p(t)qt(p(t)) (2.3)
The legal seller acts to maximise discounted future profits by setting a
price sequence {p(t)} for t = 1, . . . , T for some upper time limit T . T mea-
sures the period from when the legal seller is first able to sell the good to
when demand for the good falls to zero even if some of the initial demand
for the good was not satisfied. It is the length of time until a better product
emerges and makes the current one obsolete. Because of independent dis-
covery and the general drift in technological improvement (Merton, 1961;
Dasgupta andMaskin, 1987), the time T is assumed not to depend on when
the product launch occurs. Thus, the legal seller has a finite time in which
to exploit their good, and if the seller chooses to price the good so that sales
start later than the first period, then the length of sales period is shorter than
T . We could assume that the obsolescence date is stochastic, but for clar-
ity about our intended mechanism and for ease of calculation we take the
latest possible sales period as fixed at T .
In maximising profits, the legal sellers take into account the exogenous
dynamics in market size, and the endogenous dynamics in demand pref-
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erence and pirate emergence. The legal seller is assumed to have perfect
knowledge of all parameters and future dynamics. They face a dynamic pro-
gramming problemwhose objective function to bemaximised follows from
collecting the above expressions:
T∑
t=1
dt
1 + kt
p(t)qt(p(t)) (2.4)
where d is the legal seller’s discount per period.
2.4 Numerical analysis
We investigate the theoretical properties of the model by solving the legal
seller’s problem in equation 2.4 through discretisation of the demand func-
tion and exhaustive search of pricing sequences with tracking of demand
structure. We calculate the properties over a five year period with annual
price setting andmonthlymarket growth. These time parameters are set for
practical and empirical reasons. The annual pricing is intended to reflect
the persistence of prices due to contractual agreements, menu costs, and
the increase in option values of delaying purchase (so dampening the effec-
tiveness of a price change). When we have a five year horizon, the number
of numerical calculations required by our solution algorithm is relatively
limited and the solution is quick. We take five years as the lifetime of our
information good, following Liu et al. (2011) on software products.
In numerical analysis, we discretise the demand function for new en-
trants qe,t bydividing then(t)newmarket entrants intoM equal partsn(t)/M ,
2n(t)/M , . . ., n(t), with corresponding valuation prices p1(t), p2(t), . . ., pM (t).
We find price pm(t) for any m = 1, 2, . . . ,M by solving for the price at the
mid-point of the band, 0.5((m− 1)+m)n(t)/M = n(t)(1− pm(t)) or pm(t) =
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1 − (m − 0.5)/M . Zero demand is obtained at p0(t) = 1. We define nm(t)
to be the number of new entrants with willingness to pay of pm(t), form =
1, 2, . . . ,M − 1. Then nm(t) = int(n(t)/M) where int(x) denotes the integer
part of x. We take the lowest valuation whenm = M as additionally includ-
ing all rounding errors, so nM (t) = n(t) −
∑M−1
m=1 nm(t). The willingness to
pay of the initial consumers at time t = 1 is similarly discretised. We define
Cm(t) as the number of current potential buyers at time t (both from new
entrants and previously entered non-users) with willingness to pay of pm(t).
When the unique offer price in the market is from the legal seller and is
p(t), the number of individuals valuing the good atmore than p(t) is
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t)
where mp(t) = {m : 1 − (m − 0.5)/M ≥ p(t)}, which approximates the ag-
gregate demand function qt(p(t)). We can then approximate the equations
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 for legal sales, pirate sales, and the legal seller’s objective
function respectively as
1
1 + kt
p(t)
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (2.5)
kt
1 + kt
p(t)
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (2.6)
and
T∑
t=1
dt
1 + kt
p(t)
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (2.7)
The dynamics of the number of potential buyers in each valuation band
are given by Cm(t + 1) = nm(t) if 1 − (m − 0.5)/M ≥ p(t) and Cm(t + 1) =
Cm(t) + nm(t) otherwise. The dynamic in the number of pirate providers is
described by kt = s
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ)
Cm(τ). Starting values are Cm(0) = 0 for
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allm and k0 = 0.
The expression 2.7 for maximisationmay be considered a weighted sum
of the per period sales, where the weights are themselves endogenously de-
fined as the legal seller’s current shares. The per period sales are constrained
by the market growth. This interpretation helps to clarify the subsequent
role of piracy, which reduces the weights over time and whose effect de-
pends on the possible set of sales.
For a given parameter set, the legal seller’s problem is solved to give a
sequence of prices as the control variable and a sequence of sales as the
response variable. We solve the problem by a dynamic programming algo-
rithm over the five year period. The algorithm tracks the price sequences
that lead to the highest discounted revenue. At each time period, the possi-
ble non-user distributions at the start of the period are found by taking the
possible distributions at the end of the previous period and increasingmar-
ket size if growth occurs in the period. The market growth is spread evenly
over all valuation points, and increases at the specified speed. For each dis-
tribution at the start of the period, new distributions are generated by hav-
ing the legal seller offer to sell at each possible price. The possible prices
at the start of each year are the valuation prices plus a higher price corre-
sponding to no sales, and for all othermonths are constrained to be the pre-
vious month’s price. At each price and each starting distribution, non-users
at valuation levels exceeding the price buy the good and leave the non-user
distribution. Each resulting distribution has an associated price sequence
comprising the price sequence associated with the preceding distribution
together with the present price, and a sales sequence generated similarly.
We iterate over all periods to obtain final price and sales sequences after
five years. The sequence of numbers of pirate sellers is calculated as the
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specified proportion s of the one period lagged cumulative sales sequence.
We retain the pair with the highest discounted revenue, giving the optimal
price choices of the legal seller. Discounted revenue to the legal seller is cal-
culated as the legal share of total revenue divided between legal and pirate
sellers.
Table 2.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value
Piracy rate (s) 0 - 0.0001
Elasticity of pirate numbers with respect 1
to past sales (h)
Initial number of pirate providers (k0) 0
Initial market size (N(0)) 100000; 0
New buyers at time t (n(t)) 0; 1000
Number of time periods (T ) 60
Discount per period (d) 0.99
Periods in which prices are set 1, 13, 25, 37, 49
Number of demand function divisions (M) 5
Potential buyers at time 0 with 0
valuation pm(0) (Cm(0))
In all solutions we hold the monthly discount factor d constant at a rate
of 1/1.01, equivalent to annual discounting of 12.7 percent. The market
growth is specified to be zero or a positive constant. We use five valua-
tion points on the discretised demand distribution (M = 5). Table 2.1 sum-
marises the parameter values used. The effects of varying parameter values
and assumptions are discussed in sections 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7.
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The estimationwas implemented in theRprogramming language (RDe-
velopment Core Team, 2009). The code is available from the author’s web-
site 1.
2.5 Welfare with fixed market size
2.5.1 Pricing
Figure 2.1: Price variation as a function of the piracy rate with fixed size. The
rates are 0 (circles), 0.000005 (triangles), and 0.0001 (crosses).
Figure 2.1 shows how dynamic prices change as the piracy rate rises,
when market size is held constant (at 100,000). The circles indicate prices
when there is no piracy. Prices decline four times between every period, as
1http://ebasic.easily.co.uk/02E044/05304E/pricing info goods EJOR.html
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the legal seller sells to each valuation band in turn. Demand is fully met in
the final period as prices reach the lowest valuation band. Triangles indi-
cate pricing at a higher rate of piracy, where piracy’s effect is equivalent to
sharing sales with 100000× 0.000005 = 0.5 other identical legal sellers at the
end of the product life. There are three price declines that occur at the end
of the first three years, falling from the second highest valuation band to the
lowest in year four. The legal seller then exits the exhaustedmarket. Crosses
show pricing when piracy reaches the equivalent of ten legal sellers. Prices
fall from the middle to the lowest valuation band after three years, followed
by market exit from the fourth period onwards. Considering all the pric-
ing behaviour together, we see that pricing starts at a high valuation band,
it finishes in the lowest band with all demand satisfied, and price changes
becomemore compressed near the start of the period as piracy increases.
We can rationalise the observations by reference to the legal seller’s profit
maximisation. In the absence of piracy, the company can extract all surplus
from the market by charging each buyer their highest willingness to pay.
The company can do so by practicing intertemporal price discrimination.
If discounting is not excessive relative to the gains of intertemporal price
discrimination - that is, relative to the gap between valuation bands - then
skimming will be practiced.
As the piracy rate increases, pirate providers will emerge as competitors
in proportion to the number of owners. So sales made in months after ear-
lier sales periodswill be reduced in value. The value of strategies that spread
sales over long periods, including intertemporal price discrimination, will
decline relative to the value of strategies that concentrate sales over smaller
timescales. Selecting an optimal pricing strategy balances the returns from
intertemporal price discrimination against the losses due to piracy. We can
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see the selection in figure 2.1. Price changes are increasingly concentrated
over smaller periods and occur earlier. The timing of the compressed price
changes is determined by the discounting which makes early sales more
valuable to the legal seller than late sales.
2.5.2 Mean sales time
Figure 2.2: Mean sales time with fixed market size: time of launch (dots),
mean sales time after launch (triangles), and total mean sales time (crosses)
as functions of the piracy rate
With fixed market size and positive discounting, piracy leads to earlier
price declines than under intertemporal price discrimination. Such pricing
strategies accelerate sales. We can quantify the acceleration in response to
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piracy by examining the mean time for sales,
T∑
t=1
tSt/
T∑
t=1
St (2.8)
where St are the total sales at time t. The formula only includes sales
made during the product life. When sales satisfy all market demand, the
mean times for sales and diffusion coincide. However, as we will shortly see
instances in which diffusion is incomplete and the mean time for diffusion
is infinite, we consider the mean time for sales instead.
The mean time for sales may be decomposed into time until product
launch andmean sales time after launch, in the form
T∑
t=1
(t− L)St/
T∑
t=1
St + L (2.9)
where L is the launch time, that is, the first period of sales.
We calculate the launch time andpost-launchmean sales time for piracy
rates between 0 and 0.0001. The results are shown in figure 2.2. The launch
time is always the firstmonth, so the total and post launchmean sales times
are just shifted by a single month. They reduce sharply as the piracy rate
rises a little, with a further reduction at a higher rate.
2.5.3 Welfare
We now examine welfare. We saw in the last subsection that in our model,
sales are accelerated by piracy, so the value people derive from them should
be discounted less and welfare should increase. The changing pricing strat-
egy may also be expected to change the division of welfare between com-
pany and buyer. In this section, we examine how welfare is divided into
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profits, consumer surplus, and pirate charges. As it is assumed that profits
and charges are net of production costs, pirate charges are surplus captured
by producers of the pirate good. We could include non-zero and differential
production costs in the model, but the analysis would move us away from
timing issues in welfare and towards other theoretical mechanisms (John-
son, 1985; Besen, 1986; Belleflamme, 2002; Bae and Choi, 2006).
We have seen that the formula for a company’s discounted profits is
given by equation 2.7. The corresponding equation for acquisition charges
from pirate sources is
T∑
t=1
dt
kt
1 + kt
p(t)
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (2.10)
Then the total cost of adoption from any source is the sum of equations
2.7 and 2.10, or
T∑
t=1
dt
∑
m∈mp(t)
p(t)Cm(t) (2.11)
The total gross value derived from adoption from either legal or pirate
sources is the same as the total welfare. Sales occur for buyers with willing-
ness to buy of 1 − (m − 0.5)/M if and only if 1 − (m − 0.5)/M ≥ p(t). Thus,
the formula for discounted total value derived from sales (and hence total
welfare) is
T∑
t=1
dt
∑
m∈mp(t)
(1− (m− 0.5)/M)Cm(t) (2.12)
Total consumer surplus is the difference between total welfare in equa-
tion 2.12 and total acquisition costs in equation 2.11, or
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T∑
t=1
dt
∑
m∈mp(t)
((1− (m− 0.5)/M)− p(t))Cm(t) (2.13)
Figure 2.3: Welfare with fixed market size: consumer surplus (horizontal
stripes), pirate charges (vertical stripes), and legal seller profits (slanting
stripes) as functions of the piracy rate
Figure 2.3 shows welfare and its components as a function of the piracy
rate. As expected, total welfare rises as piracy does due to the reduced dis-
counting. The welfare rise is much gentler than the decline in sales time, as
most sales acceleration is to buyers with lower valuations. In themean sales
time calculation, only the number of sales matter, whereas in the welfare
calculation the valuations are included.
Profits account for the entire surpluswhen piracy is zero as perfect skim-
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ming is practiced. When the piracy rate increases a little, profits drop sharply
as companies begin to share our their profits with small number of pirate
providers over most of their extended sales strategy. As the piracy rate rises,
the number of pirating agents who share the income increases linearly, so
the legal share declines in inverse proportion and by smaller amounts as
the rate rises. Moreover, price changes are more compressed in time at the
higher rates of piracy, so that increases in piracy act over small periods of
time.
As the piracy rate rises from zero, pirate charges rapidly increase their
share of total welfare. The rate of increase declines over time, and the share
reaches itsmaximum value at a rate of 0.000075. A general small trend to in-
crease persists thereafter. However, there is a large downward correction in
the share of piracy as the rate reaches 0.00008, and as a result pirate charges
are smaller when piracy rates are largest compared with more moderate
rates.
At low levels of piracy, price adjustment is delayed because earlier ad-
justment reduces the extent of intertemporal price discrimination exces-
sively. So piracy is present when prices are higher during the early skim-
ming, and so pirate providers receive quite a large part of total welfare. As
piracy increases, it becomes optimal for the legal seller to reduce prices ear-
lier on, and so pirate providers capture lower shares of total welfare.
Consumer surplus is zero at the lowest rates of piracy. It increases by
steps as the rate rises. At the higher rates of piracy it accounts for more
than pirate charges, at around a quarter of profits. The behaviour may be
explained by noting that when the piracy rate is low, perfect intertemporal
price discrimination extracts all profits from consumers. The surplus ex-
traction falls as the piracy rate increases and pricing strategy departs from
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skimming. The large departure from price discrimination that occurs at
high piracy rates results in consumer surplus gains.
We summarise the preferences for piracy rates by the market partici-
pants when market size is fixed. Legal sellers prefer no piracy as they can
extract the entire market surplus. Pirate providers prefer a moderately high
rate where they can capture as much of the market as possible without trig-
gering the legal seller to reduce prices too steeply and early, leaving the pi-
rate providers with few and low valuing buyers. Consumers like piracy as
high as possible because of the price reductions entailed by piracy preven-
tion.
2.6 Welfare with market growth
2.6.1 Pricing
In this section, we examine pricing in the presence of piracy when market
size starts at zero and increases by 1000 every month. Figure 2.4 shows the
pricing strategy as the piracy rate rises. The circles showpricingwhenpiracy
is zero. Prices are held at the highest consumer valuation for two years.
Then prices are reduced by three steps, from the highest valuation to the
second lowest. The triangles show pricing at a higher piracy rate, so that
there are pirate providers equivalent to 60 × 1000 × 0.00007 = 4.2 legal sell-
ers by the end of the product life. The pricing adjusts so that the legal seller
delays its market entry until the start of the fourth year and then reduces its
prices over two years. The crosses show pricing when piracy ends up equiv-
alent to six legal sellers. The legal seller holds launch until the last year, and
then puts prices at the third lowest valuation.
When there is no piracy, the explanation for the pricing is that the legal
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Figure 2.4: Price variation as a function of the piracy rate when the market
is growing. The rates are 0 (circles), 0.00007 (triangles), and 0.0001 (crosses).
seller attempts to extract as much available surplus as possible. In the first
few years, they sell only at the top valuation price and so capture all surplus
from the top valuers. As the market size is growing, the consumers in the
top valuation band are replaced and surplus can continue being extracted
from them. However, the number of consumers in lower valuation bands
also grows and it enhances profits to sell to them after a time.
For non-zero piracy, the early sales increase the number of pirate providers
who share later revenues. There is an increase in the value of strategies that
compress price reductions relative to strategies that stagger them, whichwe
again see in the graph with the compression becoming acuter as the piracy
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rate rises. The timing of the compression is due to the market growth. Early
sales would capture little of the total market emergent over the whole prod-
uct lifetime, but would expose the legal seller to piracy when market size
is much larger. So it is optimal to delay the compression until later in the
period, with the delay rising with the piracy rate.
We can examine the relation between piracy and market growth by re-
ferring again to the legal seller’s optimisation problem. A change in the con-
stant market growth rate alters nm(t) to bnm(t) for some constant b and all t.
Since the valuationbands evolve underCm(t+1) = nm(t) if 1−(m−0.5)/M ≥
p(t) and Cm(t + 1) = Cm(t) + nm(t) otherwise, Cm(t) is also scaled up by a
factor of b for all t and m. Further, as pirate sales are proportional to past
sales, kt = s
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ)
Cm(τ) and so kt is also increased by a factor of
b. Inserting these adjusted functional forms in maximised expression 2.7,
we have
T∑
t=1
dt
1 + bs
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ)
Cm(τ)
p(t)b
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (2.14)
The bmultiplying the fraction can be factored out of the objective func-
tion entirely and so does not affect decision making. Thus, the effect of a
change in the constant growth rate on diffusion is the same as a change in
the piracy rate, up to a rescaling of the diffusion curve.
Another way of expressing the result is that piracy is a share of past sales,
so the effect on piracy of a scaling in sales is equivalent to an increase in
the share of pirate sales out of past sales. All income is directly rescaled by
the same factor, so doesn’t affect the legal seller’s decision making. Thus,
a rescaled market growth is equivalent to a piracy rate change for decision
making, and an equivalent rescaling for the overall income. The result is
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Figure 2.5: Optimal sales paths for market size emergence curves. Sales path
O1 corresponds to market size emergence curve C1, and O2 (= b × O1)
corresponds to market size emergence curve C2 (= b×C1). The piracy rate
for the second curve is b times lower than for the first curve.
shown graphically in figure 2.5 2. Curve C1 traces total market size at one
rate of growth and curve C2 traces market size emerging at a rate b times
higher. The sales path O1 is optimal out of many possible paths, with the
sum of points on the path giving the sales path’s value to the company.
Rescaling piracy by 1/b and increasing market size by a factor of bmaps the
set of possible sales paths for C1 to the set for C2. Thus, the optimal sales
pathO2 is just the optimal sales pathO1 scaled upwards by b at the revised
piracy rate.
2Thanks to Paul Fenn for suggesting a graphical interpretation.
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2.6.2 Mean sales time
Figure 2.6: Mean sales time when the market is growing: time of launch (dots),
mean sales time after launch (triangles), and total mean sales time (crosses)
as functions of the piracy rate
Figure 2.6 shows the mean total sales time as a function of the piracy
rate, divided into the time until launch and mean sales time after launch.
The total sales time initially does not change with a rising piracy rate, but
then undergoes small jump increases as the market entry date shifts back-
wards. The launch date is delayed heavily by rises in the piracy rate. Its
movement alternates between large jumps and long periods of no change.
The post-launchmean sales time displays the opposite movement. There is
initially a long sales time, but the time falls to almost zero at the maximum
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piracy rate.
Whenwe examined sales times for the fixedmarket size, the post-launch
sales time also declined with rising piracy. However, the launch time re-
mained the same for all piracy rates, in contrast to the results for the increas-
ing market size here. The differences in launch time explain the divergent
findings on mean total sales time.
2.6.3 Welfare
Figure 2.7: Welfare when the market is growing: consumer surplus (horizon-
tal stripes), pirate charges (vertical stripes), and legal seller profits (slanting
stripes) as functions of the piracy rate
Figure 2.7 shows total welfare as a function of the piracy rate, decom-
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posed into consumer surplus, pirate charges, and legal seller profits. The
total welfare declines over time, with one very minor decline in welfare (at a
rate of 0.00006) and two larger ones. Welfare is unchanging for most rates.
Company profits decline rapidly when the piracy rate first starts to increase
before the decline slows, as profits are inversely related to the number of
pirating agents.
Pirate charges are subject to a general increase that is initially rapid and
then slows, as the rate of substitution for legal sales declines. However, pi-
rate charges undergo downward revisions of increasing magnitude as the
piracy rate increases, with the final revision eradicating most of the pirate
charges. The declines are due to compression of price changes and trunca-
tion of sales at the end of the product life.
Consumer surplus does not change as the piracy rate rises through low
andmoderate levels. As the rate rises a little further, there is a large increase
in welfare as price changes are compressed and more surplus is transferred
from providers to buyers. The piracy rate then increases again without any
change in surplus, before surplus increases slightly at the highest piracy
rate. The surplus increase is a result of two effects: an additional delay
leading to increased discounting and reduced consumer surplus, and re-
duced skimming and surplus extraction by companies. The latter effect is
the dominant one.
We can again order the preferences for piracy of the market participants
based on the welfare they derive. The legal seller prefers no piracy while
pirate providers prefer a moderate rate, but do badly at very high rates.
Consumers like high piracy rates. Preferences for small changes in piracy
rates depend on the current rate. At low rates, it is in the interest of pirate
providers to increase rates but against the interest of legal sellers. At two
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particular rates, consumers benefit from small increases in the rate but pi-
rate providers suffer, but usually consumers are indifferent to the increase
and pirate providers benefit.
Our model identifies a dynamic welfare trade-off due to piracy. Total
welfare increases with the piracy rate when market size is constant, while it
declines with the piracy rate when market size is rising. The different wel-
fare outcomes indicate the presence of two competingmechanisms that are
differentially activated by the rate of market growth. On one hand, piracy
induces compression of price changes that accelerates sales and increases
welfare. On the other hand, piracy increases the product launch delay in
the presence of market growth, so decelerating sales. If the piracy rate or
market growth are very high, product launch may be so delayed that some
consumers who would have otherwise purchased it do not buy the product
before it becomes obsolescent.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have specified a model of pricing in the presence of piracy
and with heterogeneous consumers. Piracy is found to lower the profitabil-
ity of a skimming strategy in favour of a compressedprice reduction scheme.
With a fixed market size, piracy increases welfare but in a growing market
it reduces welfare. The optimal piracy rate choices of consumers, pirate
providers, and legal sellers do not generally coincide.
Piracy is found to trade off two effects on sales time and welfare in the
presence of market growth, by both delaying product launch and acceler-
ating subsequent sales. Further work could clarify the mechanisms alge-
braically and classify them among other possible ones with related impact.
67
Among the possible modifications could be allowance of a role for infor-
mation spreading as in Givon et al. (1995), consideration of the impact of
partial transfer of product value forward after the end of its lifetime, and
inclusion of incentives to innovate (see Jaisingh (2009), Banerjee and Chat-
terjee (2010), and Banerjee (2013)).
We have not discussed here how varying the fixed parameters would
change our results. In the working paper version of this document (Waters,
2014), we show that purchase delay mitigates the effect of piracy while ris-
ing demand elasticity increases it. Transient heterogeneity renders pricing
immune to piracy’s impact while even lownetwork demand externalities re-
duce the impact. Piracy continues to delay product launch if market growth
is subject to uncertainty. Greater elasticity of piracy with respect to past
sales increases piracy’s effect. Future work could examine the effect of these
influences in more detail.
Pirate providers have been assumed to follow the pricing of the legal
seller, after adjustment for different quality of the pirate copy. An alterna-
tive assumption would be to allow for strategic competition between the
legal seller and pirate providers (see Jaisingh (2009)). As the strategy would
give rise to a repeated game where the number of players at each stage is
dynamic, the solution is likely to be complicated and have multiple equi-
libria. In some strategies, existing pirate providers may cooperate with the
legal seller to slow down pirate entry in order to prevent their income being
reduced by new pirate providers.
Instead of our assumption of a single legal seller, we could alternatively
introduce multiple legal sellers (as in Minniti and Vergari (2010), for exam-
ple). If they are assumed to compete strategically, a repeated game would
again emerge with a dynamic number of players, as with similar behaviour
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by pirate providers. The outcomes could be analysed in future research. An
alternative assumption is that the other legal sellers follow the pricing of the
original seller. The effect of piracy on pricing would be mitigated relative to
the case with a single legal seller, because the percentage decline in the rev-
enue per legal seller due to extra pirate sellers would be much smaller. So
skimming would be expected to be practiced to a greater extent rather than
compression and delay in pricing to avoid piracy’s impact.
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Chapter 3 
 
The influence of information sources on 
initial technology adoption and 
intensification: evidence from UK farming 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Initial technology adoption is the first use of a technology by a company 
and when it occurs over time describes the inter-firm diffusion of a 
technology between companies.  Intensification is the extent of a 
technology’s use by a company, and its process over time traces intra-firm 
diffusion within companies.  Recent studies in the industrial economics 
literature have compared determinants of the two (Battisti et al, 2007; 
Battisti and Stoneman, 2003; Battisti et al, 2005; Fuentelsaz et al, 2003; 
Hollenstein and Woerter, 2008).  A promise of the work is that it can 
illuminate the determinants driving intensification by contrast with the 
more extensively investigated initial adoption. 
 
A determinant that has attracted the attention of researchers is information 
acquisition.  The determinant is important for many reasons.  Information 
provision is a primary means of governmental influence on technology 
adoption (Stoneman and David, 1986).  UK companies spent an estimated 
UK£7.6 billion in 2005 on management consultancy, with a fifth on IT-
related consultancy alone (Marrano and Haskel, 2006).  The management 
consultancy industry employs tens of thousands of UK workers (Marrano 
and Haskel, 2006). Prominent theories of intensification emphasise how 
information acquisition can explain diffusion (Mansfield, 1968; Stoneman, 
1981), and the potential role of learning is recognised in the empirical 
intensification literature even when it is not a primary concern (Battisti and 
Stoneman, 2005). 
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The agricultural economics literature has examined in some detail how 
information affects adoption, reflecting the debates on governmental 
extension programs (Anderson and Feder, 2004; Evenson, 2001), the large 
expenditures on information acquisition (Ortmann et al, 1993), the sizable 
advertising and outreach budgets by input suppliers (Gloy et al, 2000), and 
the large number of information providers (the UK Association of 
Independent Crop Consultants website www.aicc.org.uk reports 244 
members in August 2013).  The literature has treated the choice of 
information by farmers (Foltz et al, 1996; Gloy et al, 2000; Wolf et al, 
2001), the role of information in initial adoption (Garcia-Jimenez et al. 
2011; Läpple and Van Rensberg, 2011; Wozniak, 1993), and determinants 
of sequential adoption (Aldana et al, 2011; Khanna, 2001).  Yaron et al 
(1992) look at how extension services affect an index including 
thoroughness of adoption of five farming technologies.  Most relevant to 
our paper is Genius et al (2006), who look at partial or full adoption of 
organic farming with active or passive information collection as 
determinants of the extent of adoption, and as jointly determined variables. 
 
The prior work in both the industrial and agricultural literature leaves much 
unknown about how information affects initial adoption and intensification.  
In this paper, we examine the comparative impact of information sources 
on initial adoption and intensification in more detail.  We aim to 
distinguish the impact by the amount and character of the information, with 
our results formulated in comparative terms between the two types of 
diffusion. 
 
We start by presenting our theoretical model.  It describes learning about, 
and how to use, a technology through information acquisition.  The model 
has similarities to Tonks (1983) in presenting a finite horizon model of 
learning and adoption, but whereas in Tonks (1983) learning occurs 
through technology acquisition, in our model learning happens when 
information is purchased separately.  The model describes sequential 
acquisition of information and a technology by a company.  The company 
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can use exploratory information to reduce uncertainty about the 
technology’s performance, or technical information to increase the 
performance. 
 
Our model implies that different sources of information will be influential 
at the initial adoption and intensification stages.  In initial adoption, 
information’s value arises from revealing profitable opportunities from 
undertaking a technological trial.  As the value is expected to be low, it will 
be used to assess the value of a trial if it does not require expensive 
processing to use.  Thus, reliable or readily accessible information from 
sources like land agents, farmers, and agricultural magazines will be 
influential on initial adoption. 
 
For intensification, information’s value can be large if it significantly 
improves the use of the technology, and so the extent of adoption.  An 
expensive but value-creating source will be preferentially used to evaluate 
levels of intensification over an inexpensive source that does not add value.  
Such value-creating sources plausibly include buyers, consultants, 
academics, and government. 
 
We test our model using a cross section of 574 UK farmers surveyed in 
2007, looking at the extent of their adoption of organic farming techniques.  
It also contains demographic data, and description of the information 
sources that they use.  Our empirical specifications allow both for 
information exogeneity and endogeneity.  In the former case, we run probit 
and linear models, and in the latter case we use bivariate probit and 
treatment effect models.  We find that our theoretical results on initial 
adoption and intensification broadly hold.  Specifically, we find that 
information from agents, farmers, and agricultural magazines is mainly 
influential on initial adoption.  Information from academics is largely used 
for intensification, while information from crop consultants, suppliers, and 
buyers is used for both.  Government information is more associated with 
intensification, compared with our expectation of dual use. 
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Our theoretical contribution is to present a model of what type of 
information influences initial technology adoption and what type 
influences intensification.  The model allows prediction of the 
disaggregated information sources used in technological adoption, and it 
demonstrates qualitative differences in information sources used in the two 
diffusion stages.  Erdem et al (2005) also distinguish between the effect of 
different types of information on adoption, but look at consumer choice of 
goods, rather than initial adoption and intensification by companies.  Our 
model produces results similar to those in dual process persuasion theory 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1980; Kruglanski and Thompson, 
1999), where information with low processing requirements is used when 
there is little personal involvement in a subject and information with high 
processing requirements is used when there is high involvement.  Unlike 
related models of technology adoption using dual process persuasion 
theory (Angst and Agarwal, 2009; Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2006; 
Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2009; Moser and Mosler, 2008), we derive its 
results as an outcome of optimising economic behaviour prior to testing 
them. 
 
Empirically, the paper demonstrates the validity of the theoretical model in 
the case of UK organic farming adoption, and determines which 
information sources affect adoption to a more detailed degree than in prior 
work.  The results readily lead to contrasts and complementarities with the 
literature on use of farming information and technology adoption, and 
implications for further work and policy. 
 
Section 3.2 looks at our theoretical framework and section 3.3 describes 
our data.  Section 3.4 classifies our information sources, section 3.5 
presents our estimation procedure, results are in section 3.6, and section 3.7 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section we present our model of joint information and technology 
usage, in which a company can adopt a new technology with uncertain 
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performance.  There are two types of information available to purchase.  
The first is exploratory and reduces uncertainty about the returns available 
from using a new technology, while the second type is technical and raises 
those returns.  The company’s learning follows Bayesian updating, as is 
common in the literature (Aldana et al, 2011; Baerenklau, 2005; Bandiera 
and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; 
Grossman et al, 1977; Leathers and Smale. 1991; Kihlstrom, 1976; 
Stoneman, 1981; Young, 2009).  We show that the first type of information 
is associated with technology trial, while the second type is associated with 
increased technology use.  We then classify the information sources used in 
our UK data according to whether they are exploratory, technical, or both.  
The model results are then applied to state whether the sources will be 
more influential on initial adoption, intensification, or both. 
 
Our model is similar to that proposed by Tonks (1983), which is also a 
finite horizon model with learning about an uncertain technology.  There 
are significant differences between the models, however.  Tonks (1983) has 
learning occurring when the technology is adopted, whereas in this chapter 
technology and knowledge acquisition are separated.  In Tonks (1983), 
information has a single function of reducing uncertainty about the 
technology’s performance, whereas in our model information can also 
improve performance. 
 
3.2.1 Model 
3.2.1.1 Specification 
There is a risk neutral, profit maximising company which can invest in a 
new technology to replace a current technology.  Replacement can be 
partial or complete.  If the company adopts K units of the technology, then 
the additional income relative to the income from the existing technology is 
εα HK , where H measures the effect of the skill of use, ε is a stochastic 
term capturing other influences on income, and α is a constant satisfying 
01 >> α .  Income follows in the period after investment.  The cost of the 
technology is a constant k per unit. 
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The effect of skill of use, H, is assumed to depend on the amount of 
technical information, J, that the company has.  Technical information is 
assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal returns, in the form γJH =  if 
0>ε  for some constant γ satisfying 01 >>− γα .  This condition ensures 
net income has a finite solution for K and J.  When 0≤ε , 0=H  so that 
the outcome of using the new technology is no worse than for the old 
technology.  The company chooses the amount J of technical information 
to use at a constant cost of j per unit, and is effective from the period after 
its acquisition. 
 
The stochastic term ε has a normal distribution )(εf  with mean z and 
standard deviation σf.  The company is unaware of the value of z, and 
assumes that it has a normal prior stochastic distribution )(zg , with mean 
0<<gµ  and the standard deviation gg µσ −<<  where << means “much 
less than”.  Exploratory information can be used to revise the estimate of z, 
with each piece of exploratory information εi being an independent sample 
of ε.   The company updates its subjective distribution of z by conditioning 
on the observations, and updating is effective in the period after investment.  
The company chooses the number of pieces I of exploratory information to 
use at a price of i per unit.  Total expenditure iI on exploratory information 
always remains much smaller than the total budget available to the 
company. 
 
Prior to any investment, the company undertakes a trial of the technology, 
which is its initial adoption.  The dummy T takes the value 1 if a trial 
occurs and 0 otherwise.  The trial has a cost of t and reveals the value of z 
in the following period.  
 
Companies have an initial budget of M which is not exogenously increased 
at later dates.  The cost of a trial is smaller than the budget, so MtT < .  
Funds accumulate at the discount rate on future revenue, and all prices 
increase at the same rate, so that the timing of investment decisions does 
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not affect their value.  The company chooses its acquisitions of technology, 
and technical and exploratory information, over three periods. 
 
Denoting the value to the company by V, and letting suffixes indicate the 
time at which quantities are evaluated, the company solves the following 
maximisation problem in the first period: 
 
))|((max)( 21 IVEVE I=  
 
where MiI ≤ , while in the second period they solve 
 
)),|((max)|( 32 TIVEIVE T=  
 
where iIMtT −≤ , and in the third period they solve 
 
)(max),|(
,
3
γα KzJkKjJtTiIMTIVE
KJ
+−−−−= . 
 
where tTiIMkKjJ −−≤+  
 
For notational clarity, we have not included the possibility of investment in 
the first period without any prior exploratory information.  We shall shortly 
show that without any prior information, investment in the second period 
does not occur, and the same logic applies to investment in the first period.  
We have also excluded the possibility of use of information after 
investment has occurred, or use of exploratory information after a trial has 
occurred.  In our model, these uses only decrease value to the company.  
The reasons are that if technical information increased profit from 
investment, it could be more profitably used at the time of investment, 
while if exploratory information is used after a trial, it is not revealing any 
information not already revealed by the trial. 
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The model does not seem readily to take the form of a compact real options 
problem, but can be expressed in a real options framework in a more 
diffuse way.  The trial is like an asset with a stochastic distribution of 
outcomes.  Deciding on whether to undertake a trial without information 
can be considered as deciding irrevocably whether to acquire the asset prior 
to the date its value is known for sure.  Deciding on whether to undertake 
the trial when the company has perfect information is like purchasing an 
option to buy the asset when its value is revealed.  Deciding on whether to 
undertake the trial when the company has partial information is like 
purchasing an option to buy the asset when its value is quite certain.  
Pricing and comparing each of these options using real options techniques 
could be an alternative method of analysis to the one we present, but 
doesn’t seem to be any shorter. 
 
Our theoretical model considers the information acquisition choices of a 
single company, without explicit allowance for competition in acquisition 
or use of information or technology.  As we aim to highlight the different 
adoption outcomes that arise from two learning mechanisms, we consider it 
reasonable not to include competition explicitly.  If we assumed copycat 
behaviour from other companies then we could allow for their involvement 
by making more severe the diminishing returns from information use (due 
to higher costs); diminishing returns are already an assumption for 
technical information and, we shall show, a consequence of our 
formulation for exploratory information.  Alternatively strategic behaviour 
could be assumed (as in Reinganum (1981) for example), which would 
potentially have multiple simultaneously played games.  We allow for local 
word of mouth effects in the empirical specification, and consider other 
forms of interaction between adopters and potential adopters in the 
conclusion. 
 
3.2.1.2 Solution 
We solve the problems backward.  We first consider the case when no prior 
exploratory information occurs.  The third period maximisation is 
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,
3
γα KzJkKjJtTMTIVE
KJ
+−−−== , 
 
which implies an optimal income following from a trial of 
kKjJKzJ −−γα .  If 0<z  then clearly it is optimal to set 0== KJ  and 
no investment occurs.  The trial reveals the value of z, and is expected to be 
drawn from the prior distribution )(zg .  The expected optimal income 
from a trial is thus 
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The last expression uses the substitution ggyy σµ /)( −= .  Since by 
assumption gg µσ −<< , the lower limit is large.  The exponential term 
converges to zero as ∞→y  faster than any power of y and in particular 
faster than y-3.  Given the lower limit and the region of integration, we have 
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which is small since gg σµ /1 −<< .  On the other hand, the cost t of a trial 
is not.  Thus, in the absence of exploratory information, no trial is 
undertaken.  If a company doesn’t expect a technology to offer them any 
benefits – for example if the company isn’t even aware of its potential in 
production – then it will not bother to undertake a trial. 
 
Our proof depends on the normal distribution of z.  For greater breadth, it 
would be preferable to use a general distribution function.  We attempted to 
use Chebyshev’s inequality to prove the result with such a function, only 
relying on the assumptions about the mean and standard deviation of z.  
However, we could not immediately do so, and therefore cannot rule out 
the presence of a (perhaps pathological) distribution which would violate 
our result. 
 
We next turn to the case when explanatory information may be used.  The 
final period problem is to maximise 
 
γα KzJkKjJtTiIMTIVE +−−−−=),|( 3 .   (3.1) 
 
over J and K, taking I and T as given and subject to the budget constraint 
tTiIMkKjJ −−≤+ .  We also have 0≥J  and 0≥K .  If either J or K is 
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zero, the other is too.  We focus on behaviour when they are non-zero.  The 
Lagrangian for minimisation is then 
 
)( tTiIMkKjJKzJkKjJtTiIML ++−++−++++−= λγα  
 
We first consider the situation where the budget condition is binding, so 
0≠λ .  The first order conditions are 
 
01 =+− − jKzJj λα γα       (3.2) 
 
01 =+− − kKzJk λγ γα  
 
and 
 
0=++−+ tTiIMkKjJ       (3.3) 
 
We multiply equation (3.2) by J to get 
 
0)1( =−+ γααλ KzJjJ       (3.4) 
 
and the second equation is multiplied by K to get 
 
0)1( =−+ γαγλ KzJkK  
 
or 
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γ
λ KJK
z
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Substituting from equation (3.5) in equation (3.4) we have 
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or 
 
Kj
kJ
γ
α
=  
 
Since all parameters on the right hand side are positive, there is a positive 
linear relation between the amount of technical information used and the 
amount of technology purchased. 
 
Substituting for J in equation (3.3) gives 
 
0=++−+ tTiIMkKKj
kj
γ
α
 
 
or 
 
)(
)(
αγ
γ
+
−−
=
k
tTiIMK  
 
Thus, conditional on investment occurring and the budget being spent in 
full, the amount K of capital used has a negative linear relation with the 
amount I of initial exploratory information used. 
 
We also have the amount of technical information used: 
 
)(
)(
αγ
α
+
−−
= j
tTiIMJ . 
 
Equation (3.2) can be rearranged to give 
 
γααλ KJj
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Substituting for J and K gives 
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To meet the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we must have 0>λ , and so 
 
1−+






−−
+












>
γαγα
αγ
γα tTiIM
kj
z  
 
This may be read as a condition on the minimum income required for 
investment when the budget condition is binding.  The objective function 
in equation (3.1) has second derivatives given by 
 
222 )1(/ −−= γαγγ KzJdIFd  
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and 
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So the determinant of the Hessian is 
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We also have the trace 
 
0)1()1(// 222222 <−+−=+ −− γαγα ααγγ KzJKzJdJFddIFd  
 
Thus, the extremum is a local maximum. 
 
We next consider the case where the budget condition is not binding, so 
0=λ .  The first order conditions are 
 
01 =− − γαα KzJj        (3.6) 
 
and 
 
01 =− −γαγ KzJk  
 
The first equation implies 
 
jJKzJ =γαα         (3.7) 
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The second equation implies 
 
γα
γ
KJK
z
k
=         (3.8) 
 
Substituting equation (3.8) in equation (3.7) gives 
 
JKj
k
=
γ
α
        (3.9) 
 
as earlier.  There is a positive linear relation between technology and 
information acquisition.  Substituting back into equation (3.6) gives  
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Substituting back into equation (3.9) gives 
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When income derived from technological investment is low so that 
investment is low and the budget constraint is not reached, there isn’t any 
relation between expenditure on exploratory information and technology 
purchase conditional on investment occurring.  We have also seen that 
conditional on investment occurring and the budget being spent in full, the 
amount K of capital used has a negative linear relation with the amount I of 
initial exploratory information used.  However, we cannot say that the 
unconditional relationship is negative, because exploratory information 
also influences the decision for invest, which we address shortly. 
 
We next treat the second period problem of deciding whether to undertake 
a trial.  A trial reveals the value of z, allowing the optimal J and K to be 
chosen with the resulting income of γα KzJkKjJtTiIM +−−−− .  The 
distribution of the variable z conditional on I pieces of exploratory 
information ε1, …, εI is ),...,|( 1 Izg εε , and the expected gross value from a 
trial weights the gross income by the probabilities, so 
 
∫
∞
∞−
+−−−−=
=
dzzgzKzzJzkKzjJtiIM
TIVE
I ),...,|())()()()((
)1,|(
1
2
εεγα
  (3.10) 
 
where we have made explicit the dependence of J and K on z.  A trial will 
be taken if this expected value exceeds the value without a trial, which is 
 
∫
∞
∞−
−== dzzgiIMTIVE I ),...,|()()0,|( 12 εε .   (3.11) 
 
Thus we have the following solution for the decision variable T: 
 
1=T  if tdzzgzkKzjJzKzzJ I >−−∫
∞
∞−
),...,|())()()()(( 1 εεγα  
0=T  otherwise. 
 
If 1=T , then the expected value created by the trial is 
 
  89 
tdzzgzkKzjJzKzzJ I −−−∫
∞
∞−
),...,|())()()()(( 1 εεγα . 
 
In the first period, the company decides how much exploratory information 
they wish to acquire.  At the start of the first period, the value of a trial 
conditional on I pieces of unknown exploratory information ε1, …, εI is the 
stochastic quantity )|( 2 IVE .  Using the law of total expectation we can 
express the quantity’s relation to a further, unknown piece of information 
εI+1 in the form 
 
∫
∞
∞−
+++= 11122 )(),|()|( III dfIVEIVE εεε  
 
The value ),|( 12 +IIVE ε  is the expected value of the trial choice 
conditioned on the I pieces of exploratory information and additionally the 
I+1th piece of information εI+1. 
 
The regions Ω and ~Ω are defined as follows.  The region Ω is the set of 
values of εn+1 conditional on which a trial occurs (so a trial would have a 
positive expected value), and the region ~Ω is the set of values of εn+1 
where a trial does not occur (so a trial would have a non-positive expected 
value).  We separate the value of the trial into sub-integrals over these 
complementary regions: 
 
∫∫
Ω
+++
Ω
+++ +=
~
111211122 )(),|()(),|()|( IIIIII dfIVEdfIVEIVE εεεεεε  
 
If the additional information εI+1 is costlessly revealed, the company rejects 
the trial over the values of εI+1 where the trial value is below t, so that the 
expected value from a trial is the first integral alone.  If the company’s 
decision in the absence of the additional information was to reject the trial, 
and if there exist values of εI+1 where the value of the trial exceeds its cost, 
then the first integral is positive and information increases value.  Similarly, 
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if the company’s initial decision was to pursue the trial, and if there exist 
values of εI+1 where the value of the trial is below its cost, then the second 
integral is negative and information again increases value.  
 
From inspections of equations (3.10) and (3.11), to calculate )|( 2 IVE  and 
),|( 12 +IIVE ε  require the calculation of the expressions ),...,|( 1 Izg εε  and 
),...,|( 11 +Izg εε .  We use Bayes’ formula to do so.  The distribution g(z) is 
),( ggN σµ , while the distribution of the average ε  of ε1, …, εI is 
)/,( IzN fσ .  The average is a sufficient statistic for Bayesian updating of 
normal-normal distributions.  The posterior ),...,|( 1 Izg εε  is then 
distributed ),( PgPgN σµ  where 
fg
fggP
g I
I
σσ
σεσµµ
//1
//
+
+
=  and 
fg
P
g I σσ
σ
//1
1
+
= .  As ∞→I , εµ →Pg  (which is itself convergent by 
the law of large numbers) and 0→gσ .  Thus, increasing I has a 
diminishing expected effect on the conditional distribution of g(z), and 
hence on the conditional distribution of  )( 2VE .  If the distribution of 
)|( 2 IVE  doesn’t change much in response to updating with εI+1 then the 
integrated term ),|( 12 +IIVE ε  will be close in value to )|( 2 IVE  with high 
probability.  Consequently, if a trial is performed (respectively, not 
performed) with the initial information, it will tend to be performed (or not 
performed) with the extra information and the value gain from the 
information is low.  We have used normality of our distributions to obtain 
these results, but again a distribution free proof would be preferable. 
 
As the information εI+1 is revealed at a constant cost of i, the act of 
disclosure also changes the value of ),|( 12 +IIVE ε  by altering the value of 
the budget available for investment.  As by assumption the total 
expenditure on exploratory information iI is small compared to the total 
budget, equations (3.10) and (3.11) show using one further piece of 
exploratory information has a limited effect on ),|( 12 +IIVE ε .  Exploratory 
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information will be used up to the point at which its declining marginal 
value from disclosing the distribution of z equals the value of holding on to 
the funds for later. 
 
Exploratory information therefore has two effects on the amount of 
technology used.  On one hand, it reduces the amount of funds available to 
purchase the technology (or technical information).  However, since the 
cost of exploratory information is assumed to be much smaller than the 
total budget available to the company, the effect is minimal.  On the other 
hand, it increases the likelihood of a trial, and therefore any technology (or 
technical information) being used.  The value of z to which the sample 
mean ε will converge is stochastic with distribution ),( ggf σµ , and so use 
of exploratory information leaves the value of z largely undetermined, 
conditional on a trial occurring.  Since z is the determinant of the amount K 
of technology used, we can deduce that there is only a weak statistical 
association between exploratory information and intensification, whether 
that association is positive or negative in sign.  We combine with the 
earlier finding on the positive relation between technical information and 
intensification to give a hypothesis in relative terms: 
 
Hypothesis 1: intensification of technology usage has a stronger statistical 
relation (whether positive or negative) with technical information than 
exploratory information. 
 
We can similarly observe that, given the level of exploratory investment, 
the occurrence of a trial indicates that the mean of the posterior distribution 
of z exceeds a threshold, but leaves the precise value of z uncertain.  z is the 
determinant of the technical information usage J, so only a weak statistical 
association exists between technical information and initial adoption.  
Combining with the previous finding on the relation between exploratory 
information and initial adoption, the following relative hypothesis arises: 
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Hypothesis 2: initial technology adoption has a stronger statistical relation 
(whether positive or negative) with exploratory information than technical 
information. 
 
3.3 Data 
The main data used in this study is from a survey of pest management 
practices by UK farmers (Bailey, 2012; Bailey, 2009) as part of the Rural 
Economy and Land Use Programme under sponsorship by the Economic 
and Social Research Council, the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council, and the Natural Environment Research Council.  The 
survey asked farmers about their use of pesticide and alternative pest 
control technologies, their sources of information about farm management, 
their business and personal characteristics, and their attitudes to the 
technologies.  The survey was sent in 2007 to 7,500 randomly selected 
names drawn from a list of UK recipients of a farming newsletter, from 
which there were 574 usable responses.  We are unaware of any specific 
bias in the responses although it may exist. 
 
The survey contains questions on the extent of use of seventeen pest 
control techniques, besides pesticide.  The techniques can be functionally 
grouped as in Bailey et al (2009).  They classify them into portfolios 
belonging to “intra-crop bio-controllers”, “chemical ‘users’ / conservers”, 
“extra-crop conservation bio-controllers”, and “weed focussed farmers”, 
according to their function.  Each portfolio is treated as a type of 
production technology in the rest of the paper (see Battisti and Iona (2009) 
for a similar approach for management practices).  The groupings are 
shown in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 
Alternative pest control techniques and their portfolio groupings (with 
abbreviations in brackets) 
Intra-crop bio-controllers (Intracrop) 
i) Using a trap crop 
ii) Using mixed varieties in each field 
iii) Introducing predators/parasites of insect pests 
iv) Using pheromones for monitoring insects 
v) Using pheromones for controlling insects 
Chemical ‘users’ / conservers (Chemical) 
i) Using different varieties in different fields 
ii) Planting disease- or insect-resistant varieties 
iii) Spot or patch spraying 
iv) Treating seeds/seedlings to protect crop in early stages 
v) Rotating pesticide classes to avoid resistance 
Extra-crop conservation bio-controllers (Extracrop) 
i) Improving field margins to encourage beneficial insects 
ii) Using flower strips to encourage beneficials 
iii) Using beetle banks 
Weed focussed farmers (Weed) 
i) Cultivation or using rotary hoe for weeds 
ii) Rotating crops specifically to prevent pest problems 
iii) Adjusting time of planting or other practices specifically to  
avoid pests 
iv) Hand rogueing 
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Table 3.2 
Commitment to use of alternative pest control techniques 
1 = Not adopted and will not adopt 
2 = Not adopted but will consider adoption 
3 = Adopted but not currently used 
4 = Adopted and currently used 
 
For each practice, the commitment to use by each farmer is measured on 
scale of one to four.  The meanings of each number are shown in table 3.2.  
There are 39 farmers who omit any statement about their commitment to 
use the technologies and a further seven who do not code for at least one of 
the technologies.  We exclude them from our analysis.  It is possible that 
they are uncertain about their past or future behaviour.  Another possibility 
is that they have never adopted and never intend to, and should be 
classified as unity for all technologies.  However, the possibility is less 
plausible if we examine the numbers of technologies that each farmer has 
committed to never using, where the data is not entirely missing.  Table 3.3 
shows the distribution of farmers by technology exclusion.  Most farmers 
rule out relatively few technologies, with almost a quarter ruling out no 
technologies and half excluding two or less.  Only 14 percent exclude more 
than half of the technologies.  So it seems unlikely that many farmers who 
omit their data would exclude all of the technologies.  We also exclude a 
further six farmers who have missing data on other variables used in our 
analysis.  There remain 522 observations. 
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Table 3.3 
Distribution of farmers by the number of techniques they have not used and 
never intend on using 
Number Frequency    Number Frequency 
0 23.9   9 2.6 
1 14.1   10 2.3 
2 11.1   11 1.9 
3 10.6   12 2.8 
4 6.1   13 1 
5 5.2   14 1.6 
6 5.9   15 1.2 
7 5.6   16 0.2 
8 3.8        
 
For each pest control portfolio and farmer, initial adoption is calculated by 
a variable that takes the value of one if the farmer has ever adopted any of 
the technologies in the portfolio and zero otherwise.  The level of adoption 
is shown in table 3.4.  The chemical user and weed focussed portfolios are 
most widely adopted with adoption rates of 95 percent and 93 percent of 
the sample respectively.  The intra-crop bio-controller and extra-crop bio-
controller adoption rates are a little lower at 75 and 78 percent.  Thus, there 
is a widespread initial adoption of the portfolios. 
 
Table 3.4 
Numbers of farmers who have ever adopted at least one technology from 
each pest control portfolio 
Portfolio Not adopted Adopted Total Adoption rate 
Intracrop 128 394 522 75% 
Chemical 27 495 522 95% 
Extracrop 117 405 522 78% 
Weed 35 487 522 93% 
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We calculate the extent of intensification within each portfolio by summing 
the number of technologies within the portfolio that the farmer has ever 
adopted (so have commitments to use of three or four).  Our model 
considers the use of information at the time of adoption, so that the 
theoretical predictions do not distinguish between technology currently 
used and formerly used. 
 
We summarise the extent of use in table 3.5.  Distributional statistics are 
shown for each portfolio, with percentages showing the statistics divided 
by the number of technologies in the portfolio.  Mean intensification rates 
are lower than initial adoption rates, ranging from 26 percent for the intra-
crop bio-controller portfolio to 67 percent for the weed focussed portfolio.  
Thus, internal adoption is typically less than complete after initial adoption, 
as is found in Battisti and Stoneman (2003).  The other statistics indicate a 
wide dispersion of use.  Dispersion is higher relative to the mean for less 
adopted portfolios. 
 
Table 3.5 
Descriptive statistics for intensification of pest control portfolios based on 
sums of adoptions of component technologies 
Portfolio Mean Median StDev Skewness Min Max 
Intracrop 1.56 1 1.38 0.95 0 6 
 26%      
Chemical 3.94 4 1.91 -0.36 0 7 
 56%      
Extracrop 1.4 1 1.04 0.21 0 3 
 47%      
Weed 2.67 3 1.17 -0.71 0 4 
 67%      
The percentages show the total number of component technologies adopted in each 
portfolio, divided by the total number of technologies in the portfolio. 
 
As an alternative measure of intensification, we could perform factor 
analyses on the portfolios and construct linear measures of adoption from 
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the components that explain most of the variation in the data (Battisti and 
Iona, 2009).  This approach would have advantages and disadvantages.  It 
would recognise the different technological values between portfolios and 
synergies in adoption, as revealed by variation in adoption preferences.  
However, interpretations would be made less clear by the overlap between 
the intra-crop bio-controller and chemical user portfolios.  Furthermore, 
between-portfolio variation is allowed by the method but variation within-
portfolio is not permitted, and we are unsure whether such constraints are 
valid. 
 
We additionally extract survey data on information sources for the farmers.  
The survey asks what sources farmers use for anything related to farm 
management in general, and presents various options shown in table 3.6.  
For each source, farmers respond either never (coded as one), rarely (coded 
as two), occasionally (three), or frequently (four). 
  
Table 3.6 
Farmer information sources and abbreviations 
Independent crop consultants (ICC) 
Land agents or similar professional persons (AGENTS) 
University / academic researchers (ACADEME) 
Suppliers (of seed, equipment, chemicals, …) (SUPPLIER) 
Buyers (e.g. supermarkets, bread-makers, …) (BUYERS) 
Other farmers (FARMERS) 
DEFRA publications and/or website (DEFRA) 
Farmers Weekly (FWEEKLY) 
Farmers Guardian (FGUARD) 
Other 
 
We reduce the measures of information use to two levels, zero and one.  
The use measure equals zero if the source usage is coded as “never” or 
“rarely”, and one if it is coded as “occasionally” or “frequently”.  We 
consider the effect of alternative grading approaches in the results section.  
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Table 3.7 summarises the use for each information source.  There is 
considerable variation in the rates of use across sources.  The source with 
the lowest rates of use is academics (26 percent).  The most consulted 
sources are suppliers (82 percent) and independent crop consultants (80 
percent).  Buyers are less consulted (37 percent), and other farmers are 
often used (70 percent) as is government (64 percent).  Reliance on 
agricultural magazines is mixed (65 percent and 37 percent for Farmers 
Weekly and Farmers Guardian respectively), while about half of farmers 
use information from land agents and other professionals. 
 
Table 3.7 
Numbers of farmers who use information sources occasionally or 
frequently 
 
 
We also take various questions from the data to construct ancillary 
determinants for our equations.  These are both discrete and continuous 
variables.  In order to ensure parameter identification, we employ distinct 
determinants for technology adoption and information use, as well as 
shared ones.  As is common in the literature, determinant selection is 
guided by data availability, theoretical plausibility, and prior work 
indicating their relevance.  The variables are shown in table 3.8.  As the 
arguments for inclusion of the variables are presented at length, we 
describe the rationale for selection of the variables in Appendix B. 
Source Not used Used Total Use rate 
ICC 106 416 522 80% 
Agents 279 243 522 47% 
Academe 385 137 522 26% 
Supplier 96 426 522 82% 
Buyers 331 191 522 37% 
Farmers 158 364 522 70% 
DEFRA 189 333 522 64% 
FWeekly 181 341 522 65% 
FGuard 331 191 522 37% 
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Table 3.8 
Non-information determinants 
Technique adoption Information use 
Years of farming Years of farming 
Formal education Formal education 
Total agricultural area Total agricultural area 
Full time farming indicator Full time farming indicator 
Environmental scheme use Internet access score 
Environmental group consultation  
 
A final determinant (“local adoption”) is the extent of adoption by other 
farmers in the same postcode district, which aims to measure how much 
can be learnt about the technology from other adopters in the area.  This is 
often taken to reflect the existence of an “epidemic” effect of technology 
adoption due to external influence, and can also capture the effect of stock 
and order effects (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) where later adopters 
gain less from the adoption than early adopters.  These offsetting effects 
can make the impact of the number of past adopters on the current adoption 
rates ambiguous (see for example Battisti et al (2007)).  In estimations 
where the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring initial 
adoption for a farm, we define the local extent of adoption as the sum of 
similar binary variables for neighbouring farms, and excluding the original 
farm.  In estimations where the dependent variable is count data measuring 
adoption intensity, we define the local extent of adoption as the sum of 
similar count data variables for neighbouring farms. 
 
The availability of external information on the technology is distinct from 
the actual use of it, as measured by farmers’ reports in our main 
determinant variables, because the latter also reflects access, quality, 
preferences, and other factors.  Nevertheless, there is a likelihood of 
collinearity between local adoption and use of farmers as an information 
source.  When local adoption is excluded as a determinant variable from 
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the estimations in a working paper version of this paper, our conclusions do 
not change (see Waters (2013)). 
 
 
3.4 Classification of information sources 
In this section we classify the information sources used by the farmers in 
our data.  The classification is whether the sources provide exploratory 
information which reduces uncertainty about a technology’s performance, 
or whether they provide technical information which increases the income 
from use of the technology.  We can then use the theory to predict how 
each type of information will affect either initial adoption or intensification 
of use of a technology. 
 
Independent crop consultants (ICC)  
Crop consultants provide information to farmers on all facets of crop 
management.  The information may cover environmental and organic 
issues, as well as fertility, soil sampling, nutrients, growth and 
development, insects, weeds, disease, manure, hybrids, varieties, 
equipment, and hiring (Iowa Independent Crop Consultants Association, 
2013).  They usually operate commercially, with charges levied in 
proportion to the size of land about which they issue advice (Association of 
Independent Crop Consultants, 2013).  Their focus on crop matters, and 
sensitivity to farmer requirements as a matter of financial survival, makes it 
likely that they would be able to issue recommendations that can be 
accurate evaluations of technology performance and also able to improve 
its use.  Independent crop consultants are not linked to suppliers of 
recommended products, so claim to be unbiased (Association of 
Independent Crop Consultants, 2013).  If farmers then perceive them to be 
reliable because of their independence, their information may be used 
without extensive examination so strengthening them as sources of 
exploratory information.  As agronomists, they are professionally 
connected with academic agronomy and its research, even if they are not 
active researchers themselves.  They may be able to use academic research 
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to recommend and support implementation of complicated techniques, so 
strengthening their provision of technical information. 
 
Empirically, a number of papers have examined the effect of farm advisors 
on initial adoption, particularly the impact of extension agents.  Koundouri 
et al (2006) find that more extension visits to a farm is associated with 
higher probability of adopting an irrigation technology.  In Abdulai and 
Huffman (2005), contact with extension agents accelerates initial adoption 
of crossbred cows.  The acceleration is significant during the later phase of 
inter-firm diffusion.  Genius et al (2006) similarly find that contact with 
extension agents increases adoption of organic technology, with the same 
finding in Läpple and Van Rensberg (2011).  A slight qualification is in 
Tiffin and Balcombe (2011) who find that reliance on an agricultural 
advisory service as the main info source reduces initial adoption of organic 
production relative to reliance on other farmers.  Genius et al (2006) look 
at how extension agents influence intensification, as well as initial adoption.  
They find that extension has a marginally larger positive effect on 
intensification than on initial adoption. 
 
In summary, our theory suggests that independent crop consultants will 
provide both exploratory and technical information, and will be influential 
in both initial adoption and intensification of organic techniques.  
Empirically, some published evidence suggests that consultants will 
influence initial adoption, and there is limited evidence that they will also 
affect intensification.  We therefore expect that they will alter both initial 
adoption and intensification in our data. 
 
Land agents or similar professional persons 
Land agents provide support in the sale or development of property.  They 
operate commercially and so in order to survive they have to respond to 
farmer concerns.  Some are large, experienced, and have research 
departments to monitor emerging market opportunities (Knight Frank, 
2013).  On the other hand, if advising on technology adoption occurs at all, 
it is only incidental to their main service.  Thus, while land agents may 
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provide some exploratory information on technology, we do not expect 
them to provide technical information. 
 
Academic researchers 
UK academics research all aspects of farming, including technology 
innovation and adoption.  Organic farming is studied by individual 
specialists or at centres (for example at the Organic Centre Wales, based at 
Aberystwyth University).  Universities often seek links with the private 
sector, for example through visits by one party to the other, collaboration, 
teaching, training, and student visits and sponsorship.  The provision is 
likely to be stronger to farms located near larger research centres.  Given 
the nature of universities’ core work, we expect their information to be 
mostly on the technical side rather than exploratory. 
 
Suppliers 
Suppliers sell goods and equipment to farmers, and their revenue depends 
on the valuation that the farmers place on the sold items.  The valuation of 
a technology will rise for risk-averse farmers if there is less uncertainty 
about its performance.  Uncertainty may be reduced by providing the 
farmer with exploratory information about the technology, so a supplier 
may find doing so increases their income.  However, suppliers have an 
interest in presenting technologies favourably to facilitate a sale, so their 
information may be biased.  Supplier information on technology can also 
be technical (see for example Agricultural Supply Services (2013)), and 
they may engage in outreach through telephone or electronic contact, 
agricultural fairs, or visits to farms.  They are motivated by profit to 
provide sufficient information to farmers to attract them to technology.  In 
summary we expect suppliers to provide both exploratory and technical 
information, with some caution about their role in providing the former. 
 
Buyers 
Buyers may be consumers of a farm’s output, in which case they benefit 
from lower output costs or higher valuation of the good.  Alternatively, 
they may be intermediaries between a farm and the consumer or further 
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intermediaries, and their interests are in lower output costs and higher 
valuation at the next stage of production.  These interests may be met by 
efficient production, risk sharing, and fluid information. 
 
The outcome can be tight coordination between buyers and farmers, with 
highly prescriptive production processes that preclude environmentally 
friendly practices.  Such arrangements are dominant in the poultry industry, 
with frequent use in other parts of farming too (Hinrichs and Welsh, 2003).  
On the other hand, buyers may sometimes enforce sustainable or organic 
practices on a wide scale if they reflect consumer concern.  Thus, 
supermarkets have issued to their suppliers restrictions on insecticides 
(Farmers Weekly, 2013a), requirements for certification by non-profit 
conservation groups (Farmers Weekly, 2013b), and requirements on animal 
feed to be non-genetically modified or explicitly permit it (Tesco, 2013).  
Such technical prescriptions are likely to apply for all goods meeting 
certain criteria, and have to be followed to make sales and profits from the 
buyers.  Buyers can therefore provide exploratory information to farmers 
about current technologies, and technical information on how to implement 
them. 
 
The empirical econometric evidence on the effect on farm technology 
adoption of using buyer information appears limited.  Tiffin and Balcombe 
(2011) look at the impact of using buyers as the main source of information 
on initial adoption of organic production, and find that adoption is lower.  
However, their result is comparative, with the adoption rates calculated 
relative to those that occur when other main sources are used instead, so 
using buyer information does not correspond to a reduced absolute rate of 
organic adoption. 
 
Other farmers 
There are many reasons why farmers may provide information relevant to 
the adoption process.  Local farmers may provide a visible demonstration 
of a technology in practice, and may interact on an extended, two-way 
basis.  They may offer diversity of experience that cannot be matched in 
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other media sources, particularly in less conventional productive 
techniques such as organic farming.  On the other hand, they may be 
unwilling to share sensitive technical information, and their knowledge 
may be narrowly relevant to their own farm. 
 
Empirical evidence supports the claim of a positive learning effect from 
other farmers, in initial adoption and, to a lesser extent, intensification.  
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) examine initial adoption of sunflower 
production by Mozambican farmers.  They find that adoption by others in a 
farmer’s social network changes initial adoption, but in a non-linear way.  
In Young (2009), learning from others’ experience helps to explain initial 
adoption of hybrid corn using data from Ryan and Gross’s (1943) early 
study.  Tiffin and Balcombe (2011) discover that having other farmers as a 
farmer’s main information source increases initial adoption.  Conley and 
Udry (2010) look at intensification of fertiliser usage following a farmer’s 
transition to pineapple production in Ghana.  They find that it can be 
partially explained by the experience of people with whom a farmer shares 
information.  Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) determine that the average 
experience of people in a village positively influences intensification by 
farmers, but not significantly. 
 
On balance of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, we 
consider that farmers will primarily provide exploratory information. 
 
DEFRA 
The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs is a government 
department and so has financial resources far exceeding most other 
information providers.  The resources are manifest in the variety of means 
of contacting it, which include workshops, clinics, newsletters, text 
messages, and a helpline.  Exceptionally among information providers, it 
also acts as a source of funding and regulation, and it gives much detail on 
these matters.  Its dedicated Farming Advice Service (DEFRA, 2013) 
provides information on several topics relevant to organic farming.  It 
describes conditions for environmental management that farms must meet 
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in order to obtain government funding, including for organic schemes.  It 
gives guidance on nutrients and fertilisers, and on climate change 
adaptation and mitigation.  Given DEFRA’s remit, resources, and current 
information provision, we anticipate that its information will be both 
exploratory and technical.  Our model then implies that the information 
will be used in both initial adoption and subsequent intensification. 
 
Newspapers 
The Farmers Weekly magazine and Farmers Guardian weekly newspaper 
provide news reports on all aspects of farming.  There are many articles on 
organic farming (a search of the Farmers Weekly website for articles 
containing “organic farming” produced 292 results in early 2014).  These 
articles discuss the subsector’s prospects, regulation, and consequences, as 
well as on techniques (for example, Farmers Weekly (2010)).  As 
generalist publications aimed at a wide farming audience, their articles are 
likely to highlight the major trends in organic farming but may not have the 
same depth as information from a consultant or government.  Moreover, 
their interaction with their individual readers tends to operate in one 
direction only, and they cannot interact heavily with individual farmers 
because of resource limitations. 
 
Läpple and Van Rensberg (2011) examine empirically the effect of media 
information on initial adoption of organic farming in Ireland.  They find 
that media are highly significant determinants of increased adoption.  Tiffin 
and Balcombe (2011) examine initial organic adoption by UK farmers.  
They discover that farmers who rely on the press as their main information 
source tend to adopt less frequently than those who rely on other farmers.  
Considering both our theory and these prior empirical analyses, we expect 
the Farmers Weekly and Farmers Guardian to give exploratory but not 
technical information.  They would then influence initial adoption but not 
intensification. 
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We summarise our expected results across all sources in table 3.9.  The 
expectations will be compared with actual source effects observed in our 
data. 
 
Table 3.9 
Sources of information, type of information provided (exploratory / 
technical), and the expected adoption that they influence (initial / 
intensification) 
Source Type Expected 
ICC Both Both 
Agents Exploratory Initial 
Academe Technical Intens 
Supplier Both Both 
Buyers Both Both 
Farmers Exploratory Initial 
DEFRA Both Both 
FWeekly Exploratory Initial 
FGuard Exploratory Initial 
 
3.5 Estimation procedure 
In this section we describe our estimation procedure.  Our theory proposes 
which sources of information will be associated with initial adoption and 
intensification.  There are a number of considerations that guide our 
empirical formulation and estimation.  Firstly, it is likely that common 
included and omitted factors will influence both information use and 
technology choice.  We therefore adopt a system of equations allowing for 
shared covariates and correlated error terms.  Secondly, the direct effects of 
information on technology choice are of interest, not just the indirect effect 
of shared influences.  Thus, information should enter as a recursive 
determinant in the technology choice equations, as in Genius et al (2006) 
who use a trivariate ordered probit.  As information is correlated with the 
technology error term through the correlation with the error term in its own 
use equation, it is endogenous in the adoption equation.  Greene (2008, 
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p.823) shows that in the case of a recursive bivariate probit model, the 
endogeneity can be ignored in maximum likelihood estimation.  An 
alternative to obtain parameter consistency would be use a two step 
procedure (as in Koundouri et al (2006)).  In the case of a bivariate probit-
linear model with an endogenous variable, the well known Heckman 
correction can be applied to the second step of a treatment model (Greene, 
2008 p.886f and p.889f).  A third consideration in estimation is the number 
of parameters to be estimated.  A system in which use of each information 
variable is simultaneously determined would proliferate parameters.  One 
solution to this problem is to consider aggregates of information sources as 
is common in the literature (Genius, 2006; Wozniak, 1993; Wozniak, 1987).  
However, as we wish to determine the effect of individual sources, this 
approach is not followed here.  A related consideration also concerns 
feasibility of identification and estimation.  The data allows for ordering of 
use and adoption.  A multivariate ordered system would again have many 
parameters and it is also unclear if variable endogeneity can be ignored as 
in the bivariate probit model. 
 
Given these considerations, we adopt two broad approaches.  One is to 
estimate univariate adoption models containing all information variables as 
determinants and neglecting their endogeneity (as in Wozniak (1987)).  
This approach makes allowance for the simultaneous effect of the 
information variables.  For initial adoption a probit model is used, while for 
intensification a Poisson model is used.  The other approach is to treat the 
individual information sources as endogenous in systems with technology 
adoption as the other determined variable.  As identification of coefficients 
in multiple information equations is not possible with our available data, 
we consider successive bivariate systems of technology adoption and 
individual technology source use.  For the initial adoption model, a 
bivariate probit is used with information endogenous in the technology 
adoption equation.  For intensification, a probit-Poisson model is used with 
technology as a treatment effect and a Heckman correction. 
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Parameter estimation 
Initial adoption, exogenous information 
We first consider the initial adoption of organic farming when information 
source use is exogenous.  Influences on initial adoption are estimated 
through the following equations describing a farmer’s technology adoption 
 
1111 '' εγβ ++= ixz        (3.12) 
1=t  if 01 >z  and 0 otherwise,     (3.13) 
 
where z1 is a latent variable measuring the combined effect of deterministic 
and stochastic adoption influences on adoption, x1 is a column vector of 
non-information determinants of technology adoption, i is a column vector 
of dummies equal to one for each information source used and zero 
otherwise, β1 and γ are column vectors of coefficients with the same 
dimensions as x1 and i respectively,  ε1 is a standard normal error term, and 
t is a dummy for initial adoption for one of the technology portfolios.  The 
model then has the probit form for initial adoption, and we estimate it 
across our UK farmer data for adoption within each technique portfolio.  
All information sources are included as simultaneous determinants. 
 
Initial adoption, endogenous information  
We then consider initial adoption when the information source use 
variables in equation (3.12) are endogenous.  For identification purposes, 
the dimensions of the information vector i and its coefficient vector γ are 
set equal to unity.  For each information source i, we introduce a pair of 
equations to describe the farmer’s use decision 
 
2222 ' εβ += xz        (3.14) 
1=i  if 02 >z  and 0 otherwise     (3.15) 
 
where z2 is a latent variable measuring the combined effect of deterministic 
and stochastic adoption influences on adoption, x2 is a vector of 
determinants of use that may overlap with the technology adoption 
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determinants x1, β1 is its coefficient vector, and ε2 is an error term.  ε1 and 
ε2 are bivariate normal with zero means and a covariance matrix 





1
1
ρ
ρ
. 
 
The equations (3.12)-(3.15) are solved as a recursive bivariate probit 
system for technology adoption within each portfolio and each information 
source.  Estimation is by maximum likelihood.  The i information variable 
is correlated with the error variable ε2, so will generally be correlated with 
ε1 via the correlation of ε1 and ε2.  However, the endogeneity can be 
neglected in solving the log likelihood (Greene, p823).  The probability 
)1,1( == tiP  can be written as )1|1()1( === itPiP , which controls for 
the endogeneity.  Because of the properties of conditional probability, the 
term )1|1( == itP  can be written as )'(/),',''( 2222112 βρβγβ xxix Φ+Φ .  
Here ),,( 212 ρzzΦ  is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function 
to points z1  in the first standard normal variate and z2 in the second 
standard normal variate with covariance of ρ between the two variates, and 
)( 2zΦ  is the cumulative distribution function to point z2 for a standard 
normal variate.  The term )1( =iP  equals )'( 22 βxΦ , so 
),',''()1,1( 22112 ρβγβ xixtiP +Φ=== , which is the same as the bivariate 
probability treating the i variable as exogenous.  The same approach can be 
used for the other probabilities in the log likelihood, )0,1( == tiP , 
)1,0( == tiP , and )0,0( == tiP , showing that they also can be calculated 
as if the i variable was exogenous. 
 
Intensification of adoption, exogenous information 
We next turn to intensification of organic farming adoption when 
information sources are exogenous.  The effects of information sources on 
intensification are examined using a Poisson model for technology 
adoption.  The probability of a farmer adopting T techniques is given by 
 
!
)(
T
eTP
Tλλ−
=  
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where 
 
)''exp( 11 γβλ ix += . 
 
x1, i, β1, and γ are the same as for equations (3.12) and (3.13).  Estimates 
are produced for each portfolio separately, with the number of techniques 
used in them as the determinant.  All information sources are included as 
simultaneous determinants. 
 
Intensification of adoption, endogenous information 
Our final specification examines intensification of organic farming when 
information sources are endogenous.  For each information source i, the 
information use equations are given by equations (3.14) and (3.15) again.  
Given the use of information source i, the probability of the farmer 
adopting T techniques in a portfolio is 
 
!
),|( 1 T
eiTP
Tλ
ε
λ−
=  
 
where 
 
)''exp( 111 εγβλ ++= ix . 
 
ε1 and ε2 are bivariate normal with zero means and a covariance matrix 








1
2
σρ
σρσ
. 
 
Solution is by maximum likelihood estimation for each pair of information 
source use and portfolio technique adoption.  Terza (1998) formulates the 
full information maximum likelihood for a class of endogenous switching 
models including the one presented here, and we follow their scheme.  
From the conditional properties of the bivariate normal distribution, and 
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equations (3.14) and (3.15), the distribution of i conditional on ε1 is given 
by 
 
)
1
)/('1)(1(
1
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It follows that the joint distribution of i and T is given by 
 
∫
∞
∞−
= 1111 )()|(),|(),( εεεε dfiPiTPTif  
 
or 
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∞−
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After formation of the log likelihood function, the maximum is found 
through Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
 
Non-information determinants 
The set x1 of non-information determinants of technology adoption is taken 
to be the variables on the left hand side of table 3.8 together with the level 
of local adoption, while the set of determinants of general information 
usage is taken to be the variables on the right hand side of the table. 
 
Our STATA code is available from the author.  The data used cannot be 
provided as its dissemination is restricted; nevertheless it is freely available 
to researchers at the UK Data Service website1. 
 
3.6 Empirical results 
In this section we present our empirical results.  They are given in turn for 
the intra-crop bio-controller portfolio, the chemical users / conserver 
                                                 
1
 http://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/ 
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portfolio, the extra-crop conservation bio-controller portfolio, and the weed 
focussed farmer portfolio.  We discuss in detail the results for the intracrop 
portfolio to examine the consistency of the empirical results with our 
theoretical model in an individual case.  We then produce condensed 
statistics for all the portfolios together to show aggregate agreement with 
our model. 
 
Table 3.10 shows the estimates of initial adoption for the intracrop 
portfolio, and part one of the table has the coefficients for the information 
variables.  The first column presents estimates for a single probit equation 
including all information variables simultaneously.  Collinearity between 
information and the other determinants is neglected, so the coefficients on 
the information variables may absorb some of the effect of the other 
variables.  Land agents have a weakly significant effect on initial adoption, 
in line with our theoretical expectation.  The same is true for farmers.  
Buyers have a moderately significant effect on adoption, as expected.  No 
other variables are significant. 
 
The remaining columns in the top panel of table 3.10 report estimates for 
recursive bivariate probit models with one source of information jointly 
determined with adoption.  The adoption equation in this bivariate system 
gives an information coefficient that measures the direct deterministic 
effect of information.  All information source coefficients are highly 
significant.  In a recursive bivariate model with high cross-equation error 
correlation, the direct effects are not in themselves very informative 
because they do not allow for how information use affects the error in its 
determining equation, and hence how it changes the correlated error in the 
adoption equation.  The effect of information may act through omitted 
terms affecting adoption through the error term.  We address the full 
marginal effects including stochastic effects shortly. 
 
Table 3.10, part two shows estimates of the effect of other determinants on 
initial adoption in the intracrop portfolio.  Years of farming tend to have a 
negative effect on initial adoption but the coefficients are not significant; 
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we had no prior expectations on the effect.  Formal education is broadly 
associated with reduced initial adoption without much significance; we 
anticipated increased adoption.  Farmers with larger farms adopt 
significantly more often.  We had no prior expectations of size’s effect.  
We also had no expectations of the effect of being a full time farmer, and 
we find that they tend to adopt more frequently but without statistical 
significance.  Users of environmental schemes have increased initial 
adoption as we expected, without statistical significance.  Consultancy of 
environmental groups significantly increases adoption rates in line with 
expectations.  Adoption in the locality is associated with increased 
adoption; we did not have a prior expectation on its effect.  The 
correlations between the technology initial adoption and information use 
equations are both positive and negative, and generally high in absolute 
value.  It follows that stochastic influence of information on initial 
adoption is often important.  However, for several information sources the 
correlation coefficients are highly insignificant. 
 
Table 3.11 shows estimated coefficients on the determinants of information 
use for the intracrop portfolio’s initial adoption.  Years of farming are 
generally associated with lower adoption, sometimes significantly.  We had 
no anticipated sign of effect.  Formal education significantly increases the 
use of information from independent crop consultants, land agents, and 
academics.  Their information may be expected to be quite technical, so 
that education may lead to either increased understanding of, or respect for, 
it.  Education reduces reliance on information from the Farmers Guardian 
newspaper with marginal significance.  Our prior expectation was that 
education would increase information use, particularly from technical 
sources, so there is some support for our expectation from these findings.  
Larger farms are often associated with increased information use, with 
significance in the case of information from land agents, academics, and 
the Farmers Weekly magazine.  Our prior expectation was that consultants, 
agents, suppliers, and buyers would be favoured as sources on larger farms.  
Full time farmers generally have increased use of information sources, with 
marginal significance in the case of independent crop consultants and high 
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significance in the case of the Farmers Weekly magazine and Farmers 
Guardian newspaper.  We had no prior anticipation on effect signs.  The 
quality of internet access (where a lower score is associated with better 
access) has a mixed impact on information use, with significantly 
decreased use of information from suppliers and the Farmers Guardian and 
significantly increased use of buyer and Farmers Weekly information.  The 
reasons for these results are not immediately clear, and are contrary to our 
anticipated increase in information use due to internet access.  Perhaps 
some information sources are easier to use than others when the internet is 
more available. 
 
The marginal effects of information determinants on initial adoption of the 
intracrop portfolio are shown in table 3.12.  The first column has the 
marginal effects for the probit model treating information as exogenous.  
As the model is univariate, the significant information sources and their 
signs are the same as for the coefficient estimates: agents and buyers have a 
significant positive marginal effect and farmers have a negative marginal 
effect. 
 
The other columns in table 3.12 present the marginal effects of the sources 
allowing for the direct effect and stochastic effect acting through the 
correlated error terms.  Independent crop consultants have a moderately 
significant positive effect and land agents have a highly significant positive 
effect on initial adoption.  These two findings are consistent with 
expectations.  Academic sources have no significant impact, as expected.  
Suppliers do not affect initial adoption significantly, contrary to our 
expectations, but buyers do, which we anticipated.  Farmers do not affect 
adoption, contrary to anticipation.  As we expected, information from 
DEFRA has a significant influence on adoption.  Both the Farmers Weekly 
and Farmers Guardian positively influence adoption, with the latter highly 
significant and the former narrowly missing significance.  These findings 
are consistent with our theoretical expectations. 
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We now turn to intensification of use in the intracrop portfolio.  Table 3.13, 
part one shows the coefficient estimates for information sources’ effects on 
intensification.  The first column presents the estimates of a Poisson model 
where information sources are treated as exogenous and included 
simultaneously.  Information from independent crop consultants has a 
positive, significant effect on intensification, consistent with our 
expectations.  Land agent information misses having a significant effect, as 
anticipated.  Academic information has no significant effect, contrary to 
expectations.  Supplier information is entirely insignificant in its effect on 
intensification, also contrary to our expectations.  Intensification is 
significantly increased by buyer information as we expected, while farmer 
information misses a significant impact, in line with our anticipated finding.  
Information from DEFRA is associated with a significant increase in 
intensification, as expected.  Neither the magazine nor the newspaper affect 
intensification.  No effect was anticipated. 
 
The other columns in table 3.13, part one report estimates from bivariate 
Poisson treatment models with use of individual information sources 
determined endogenously.  The coefficients show the direct effect of 
information on intensification, with only suppliers, farmers, and the 
Farmers Guardian newspaper having no significant direct impact.  While 
the findings of farmers and the newspaper having no deterministic effect 
are consistent with our theoretical model (but not the finding on suppliers), 
in the bivariate model the effect of information sources acts both through 
its deterministic and stochastic effects, and we consider their combined 
marginal effect presently. 
 
In table 3.13, part two we see how the non-information determinants affect 
intensification.  Farming experience is associated with reduced 
intensification, but not generally significantly so.  We did not anticipate 
any relation.  Formal education is associated with reduced intensification; 
we had no expectations on the relation.  A possible explanation is that 
education may be a relatively complementary asset to conventional farming, 
whereas it may be less of an advantage in organic farming with lower 
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scientific and technological complexity in inputs.  The size of the farm is 
associated with some increase in intensification, but does not have a broad 
significant effect.  We anticipated a negative effect, and do not have any 
reason immediately available to explain the difference.  Being a full time 
farmer is associated with more intensified use of intracrop techniques, and 
often significantly.  We did not have any prior expectations on the 
existence of an association.  Environmental scheme use is associated with 
greater intensification and with high significance, consistent with our 
expectation.  The same applies for consultation of environmental groups.  
Local adoption increases intensification; we did not anticipate a relation 
one way or the other.  The cross-equation correlations between the 
intensification equation and information use equations are generally high in 
absolute value, although they are not always significant.  Thus, information 
often influences adoption through a stochastic as well as a deterministic 
route. 
 
In table 3.14 we can see the estimated coefficients on determinants of 
information use for intracrop intensification.  More experienced farmers 
tend to use all forms of information less frequently.  We had no prior 
expectation on the sign of an effect.  Formal education significantly 
increases the use of independent crop consultant information, and 
significantly reduces use of the Farmers Guardian newspaper.  The other 
information sources are generally affected positively but without 
significance.  The results are as expected.  Larger farms are associated with 
significantly more use of consultant information as anticipated, but 
contrary to expectations size doesn’t significantly change use of 
information from land agents, suppliers, or buyers.  It does increase use of 
the Farmers Weekly magazine.  Farming full time is associated with 
increased use of most information sources, but only significantly so in the 
case of independent crop consultants (weakly) and the two press sources 
(strongly).  We had no prior expectation on the effect of full time farming.  
Improved internet access (where a lower score is associated with better 
access) has mixed effects on use of information sources, with some sources 
being used more and some less.  The only two significant effects are on the 
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Farmers Weekly magazine, where use increases, and on the Farmers 
Guardian newspaper, when use falls.  We expected that internet use would 
increase information use, and the gap with the actual results may perhaps 
be explained by internet use complementing some sources and rendering 
others superfluous. 
 
Table 3.15 shows the marginal effects of use of each information source.  
The first column reports marginal effects for the Poisson model.  The 
effects have the same sign and significance as for the coefficient estimates, 
with independent crop consultants, buyers, and DEFRA providing 
significant information.  It was anticipated that all three would influence 
intensification.  Farmers also provide marginally significant information, 
contrary to expectations.  The remaining columns report the marginal 
effects for the Poisson treatment model, where the effect of information 
sources on intensification acts through deterministic and stochastic routes.  
Independent crop consultants have a highly significant positive effect on 
intensification, consistent with expectations.  Land agents are also very 
significantly associated with intensified usage.  We thought that there 
would be no effect.  Academic information is associated with very 
significantly less intensification, as expected.  Supplier information has no 
significant effect on intensification, contrary to our expectations.  
Information from buyers significantly increases intensification, also in line 
with expectations.  Farmer information has no significant effect on 
intensification.  We considered that farmer information would not 
influence intensification.  Information from DEFRA has a highly 
significant positive effect on intensive usage, as expected.  Information 
from the two press sources has a weak effect (Farmers Weekly) and no 
significant effect (Farmers Guardian), and none was anticipated. 
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Table 3.10, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of initial adoption of an intracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.2129 1.4384***         
 0.1433 0.492         
Agents 0.2216*  -1.0650***        
 0.1215  0.3268        
Academia -0.0516   -1.4736***       
 0.1347   0.079       
Suppliers 0.2159    -1.5249***      
 0.1521    0.0782      
Buyers 0.2673**     1.6234***     
 0.125     0.0758     
Farmers -0.2417*      -1.4500***    
 0.1307      0.1895    
DEFRA 0.0851       1.2813***   
 0.1256       0.4386   
Farmers Weekly 0.0342        1.4695***  
 0.1278        0.1396  
Farmers Guardian 0.0826         -0.9729*** 
 0.1239         0.3709 
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
 
 
  119 
Table 3.10, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of initial adoption of an intracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0019 -0.001 -0.0055 -0.0042 -0.006 0.0025 -0.0105** -0.0014 0.0045 -0.0057 
 0.0052 0.0049 0.0047 0.0045 0.0045 0.0045 0.0047 0.0048 0.0047 0.0049 
Formal education -0.0612 -0.1100* 0.0394 0.0929* -0.0499 -0.0764 -0.0184 -0.0664 -0.0678 -0.0876 
 0.0624 0.0601 0.0685 0.0535 0.0531 0.0529 0.0551 0.0561 0.0537 0.0581 
Hectares 0.0005*** 0.0004* 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0005** 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Full time 0.2208 0.0939 0.1311 0.1946 0.207 0.0751 0.2377* 0.1365 -0.0743 0.3576** 
 0.1557 0.1669 0.1533 0.1354 0.1321 0.133 0.1372 0.1589 0.1462 0.1486 
Environ schemes 0.104 0.0953 0.0537 0.0186 0.0809 0.0816 0.0424 0.0743 0.0938 0.0856 
 0.1144 0.0974 0.0815 0.0708 0.0764 0.0754 0.0829 0.0912 0.0783 0.0926 
Environ consults 0.2957* 0.3315** 0.2603* 0.3534*** 0.2379*** 0.2079** 0.3216*** 0.3229** 0.2613** 0.3494** 
 0.1535 0.1415 0.1356 0.0896 0.0715 0.0937 0.1195 0.1466 0.1149 0.1361 
Local adoption 0.0194** 0.0203** 0.0159* 0.0132* 0.0140* 0.0037 0.0211*** 0.012 0.0151* 0.0330*** 
 0.009 0.0085 0.0088 0.0076 0.0077 0.0076 0.008 0.0101 0.008 0.009 
Constant -1.0926** -1.4437*** -0.1408 -0.518 0.9568** -0.8983** 0.7048 -1.2340*** -1.3629*** -0.1983 
 0.5108 0.4448 0.4389 0.3695 0.3891 0.3744 0.4765 0.4186 0.386 0.4748 
ρ 
 -0.7251 0.842 1 1 -0.9998 0.8941 -0.7303 -0.9135 0.7087 
p-value  0.2402 0.1218 0.9902 0.9778 0.9103 0.0767 0.1904 0.0484 0.0637 
(Pseudo) R2 0.0772          
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.11 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for initial adoption of an intracrop technology 
 Icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0028 -0.0077 -0.0067 -0.0097** -0.0063 -0.0155*** -0.0014 -0.0103** -0.0088* 
 0.0054 0.005 0.0052 0.0049 0.005 0.005 0.0051 0.0051 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1587** 0.1540** 0.2502*** -0.0301 0.0884 0.0334 0.0574 0.0463 -0.1085* 
 0.0623 0.0602 0.0619 0.0607 0.0598 0.0592 0.0589 0.0593 0.0613 
Hectares 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008*** 0.0000 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
Full time 0.2811* -0.0973 0.0982 -0.0531 0.1726 0.1466 0.1168 0.3883*** 0.4488*** 
 0.1585 0.1484 0.1649 0.1384 0.1483 0.1495 0.1485 0.1463 0.1639 
Internet score 0.0001 0.0483 0.0418 0.0640*** -0.1298*** 0.0653 -0.0664 -0.0984** 0.1524*** 
 0.0595 0.0435 0.0345 0.0227 0.0422 0.0407 0.0492 0.0416 0.0507 
Local adoption -0.0055 0.0028 -0.0029 0.0008 0.0161* 0.0113 0.0109 0.0035 0.0386*** 
 0.0091 0.0086 0.0086 0.0087 0.0082 0.009 0.0088 0.0088 0.0087 
Constant 0.0083 -0.5784 -1.6428*** 1.1797*** -0.3947 0.5133 0.208 0.3621 -0.7147* 
 0.4153 0.3889 0.3846 0.3884 0.3798 0.3903 0.3923 0.3808 0.4043 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the initial 
adoption of the technology jointly determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.12 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on initial adoption of an intracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly Fguard 
ICC 0.0776 0.1168**         
 0.0519 0.0538         
Agents 0.0807*  0.1073***        
 0.0439  0.0151        
Academia -0.0188   -0.0198       
 0.0491   0.0139       
Suppliers 0.0787    0.0455      
 0.0551    0.0723      
Buyers 0.0974**     0.1358***     
 0.0449     0.0157     
Farmers -0.0881*      -0.0437    
 0.0472      0.0407    
DEFRA 0.031       0.0706**   
 0.0457       0.0321   
Farmers Weekly 0.0124        0.0662  
 0.0465        0.0411  
Farmers Guardian 0.0301         0.0674*** 
 0.0451         0.0113 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.13, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of intensification of an intracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.3268** 2.2753***         
 0.1365 0.3051         
Agents 0.1438  2.3882***        
 0.1027  0.2588        
Academia -0.1765   -2.1578***       
 0.1151   0.234       
Suppliers 0.0299    -0.3284      
 0.1256    0.7216      
Buyers 0.2329**     2.2242***     
 0.1023     0.2464     
Farmers -0.1818*      -0.7188    
 0.1069      1.0253    
DEFRA 0.2426**       2.2947***   
 0.1118       0.2475   
Farmers Weekly -0.0217        1.4082**  
 0.1087        0.571  
Farmers Guardian 0.0676         -0.6481 
 0.1031         0.5206 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.13, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of intensification of an intracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers Farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.006 -0.0036 0.003 -0.0119** -0.0073 -0.0029 -0.0103 -0.0052 0.0001 -0.0087 
 0.0045 0.007 0.0055 0.0052 0.0057 0.0058 0.0076 0.0062 0.0067 0.006 
Formal education -0.1211** -0.2450*** -0.2158*** 0.0826 -0.1164* -0.1341* -0.1057 -0.1437* -0.1459** -0.1406* 
 0.0532 0.0769 0.0662 0.0705 0.0663 0.0697 0.0672 0.077 0.0731 0.0725 
Hectares 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Full time 0.1996 0.0428 0.3598** 0.5125*** 0.2621 0.0638 0.2821 0.1888 0.0387 0.3675* 
 0.1419 0.2007 0.1685 0.1783 0.1742 0.1799 0.1781 0.2098 0.211 0.2 
Environ schemes 0.2971*** 0.3367*** 0.2579** 0.2927** 0.2993** 0.2740** 0.2885** 0.2950** 0.3140** 0.3094** 
 0.1057 0.127 0.1275 0.1286 0.1286 0.1281 0.1284 0.127 0.1285 0.1287 
Environ consults 0.3431*** 0.4367*** 0.3696** 0.4934*** 0.5409*** 0.4071*** 0.5464*** 0.3964*** 0.4864*** 0.5186*** 
 0.129 0.1521 0.154 0.1499 0.1551 0.1555 0.1556 0.1536 0.1556 0.1556 
Local adoption 0.0069* 0.0118** 0.0093* 0.004 0.0092* 0.0004 0.0104** 0.0026 0.0088 0.0140** 
 0.0038 0.0058 0.0048 0.0049 0.0049 0.0051 0.0053 0.0056 0.0054 0.0065 
Constant -1.2140*** -2.5142*** -2.2024*** -1.4618*** -0.9234 -1.6729*** -0.6395 -2.4824*** -2.0444*** -0.9793* 
 0.4501 0.6298 0.5335 0.5303 0.8399 0.5311 0.9654 0.6329 0.6476 0.5749 
ρ 
 -0.9764 -1 1 0.2896 -1 0.4624 -0.998 -0.8318 0.6069 
p-value  0.0025 0.9444 0.9135 0.5729 0.9936 0.5494 0.7733 0.0648 0.1228 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.14 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for intensification of adoption of an intracrop technology 
 icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.002 -0.0106 -0.0093 -0.0097* 0.0000 -0.0158*** -0.0003 -0.0099* -0.0093* 
 0.0054 0.3965 0.0156 0.0058 0.0063 0.0053 0.004 0.0051 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1738*** 0.1156 0.2411 -0.0395 0.0018 0.0288 0.0121 0.0481 -0.1146* 
 0.0554 16.7868 0.4817 0.067 1.4546 0.0604 0.1456 0.0597 0.0612 
Hectares 0.0003** 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008*** -0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0087 0.0004 0.0001 0.0141 0.0001 0.0016 0.0003 0.0001 
Full time 0.2679* -0.1718 0.2957 0.0491 0.0134 0.1141 0.0292 0.3869*** 0.4282*** 
 0.15 0.9305 1.6085 0.1683 10.8347 0.1553 0.3531 0.1482 0.1635 
Internet score -0.0055 0.0071 0.0183 0.0667 -0.0012 0.0327 -0.013 -0.0972** 0.1556*** 
 0.0465 0.2436 0.7517 0.0616 0.9987 0.0595 0.1564 0.0483 0.0525 
Local adoption -0.0043 0.0018 -0.0071 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0052 0.002 0.0007 0.0188*** 
 0.0046 0.0527 0.0468 0.0052 0.3507 0.0049 0.0236 0.0048 0.0047 
Constant -0.0479 -0.1129 -1.5413 1.1474** -0.3412 0.6735 0.2759 0.3408 -0.6429 
 0.3662 93.3135 2.9232 0.455 19.2509 0.4329 0.5172 0.392 0.4076 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a 
treatment effect from the information variable.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.15 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on intensification of adoption of an intracrop technology 
 All Icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.2737** 1.8184***         
 0.115 0.4442         
Agents 0.1204  4.2838***        
 0.0862  1.1983        
Academia -0.1478   -2.2498***       
 0.0967   0.4888       
Suppliers 0.025    -0.3123      
 0.1051    0.7747      
Buyers 0.1950**     4.3704***     
 0.0862     1.1939     
Farmers -0.1523*      -0.7387    
 0.0898      1.334    
DEFRA 0.2031**       2.7155***   
 0.0941       0.6121   
Farmers Weekly -0.0182        1.2603*  
 0.091        0.708  
Farmers Guardian 0.0566         -0.5574 
 0.0864         0.4876 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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The effects of information on initial adoption and intensification in the 
intracrop portfolio are similar to our model’s predictions, with some 
variation.  We now introduce results for the other portfolios, which are 
reported in full in Appendix B.  Rather than repeat the individual 
examination for each of these portfolios, we summarise our findings as a 
whole by constructing condensed statistics that measure how important 
each source is for initial adoption and intensification.  In table 3.16, the 
entries for each portfolio-source cell are constructed by counting 
significance stars on the marginal effects in the corresponding entries in the 
initial adoption and intensification tables (tables 3.12 and 3.15, and the 
marginal effect tables in Appendix B), and summing the two numbers.  
Thus, each entry lies between zero and six inclusive.  The two right hand 
columns sum across the portfolios to get measures of source importance for 
overall initial adoption and intensification.  Table 3.17 expresses the 
overall observed effects in comparison to the expected effects. 
 
Information from independent crop consultants has a strong influence on 
both initial adoption and intensification, as expected.  It affects initial 
adoption more strongly.  Land agent information affects both forms of 
adoption, with the impact on intensification weak.  The results are in line 
with expectations.  Academic information has a weak effect on initial 
adoption and intensification, with slightly greater influence on the latter as 
we expected.  Information from suppliers has a similarly weak effect on 
both with slightly greater influence on intensification; we anticipated that it 
would influence both initial adoption and intensification.  Buyer 
information affects both adoption types, in line with prior expectations.  
Farmer information affects mainly initial adoption, which we anticipated.  
Information from DEFRA affects both forms of adoption, as we anticipated, 
but has a stronger impact on intensification.  The Farmers Weekly 
magazine has limited effect on intensification and the Farmers Guardian 
newspaper affects only initial adoption.  Our expectation for these press 
sources was that they would only affect initial adoption.  In summary, we 
obtain quite close agreement between our expectations and the observed 
outcomes. 
  127 
Table 3.16 
Sums of significance stars across marginal effects 
 Intracrop Chemical Extracrop Weed Overall 
Source Initial Intens Initial Intens Initial Intens Initial Intens Initial Intens 
ICC 2 5 5 3 4 2 4 0 15 10 
Agents 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 3 
Academe 0 3 0 2 2 0 1 0 3 5 
Suppliers 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 4 5 
Buyers 5 5 2 4 3 0 2 5 12 14 
Farmers 1 1 0 0 2 0 3 0 6 1 
DEFRA 2 5 0 1 4 0 0 5 6 11 
FWeekly 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
FGuard 3 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 9 2 
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Table 3.17 
Sources of information, the expected types of diffusion that they influence 
(initial / intensification), and the diffusion types they are empirically found 
to influence.  (A star indicates that the finding is not a strong result.) 
Source Expected Observed 
ICC Both Both 
Agents Initial Initial 
Academe Intens Intens * 
Supplier Both Both 
Buyers Both Both 
Farmers Initial Initial 
DEFRA Both Intens 
FWeekly Initial Intens * 
FGuard Initial Initial 
 
Results under alternative gradings of information use 
The survey underlying our data asks farmers what information sources they 
use, with a response range of never, rarely, occasionally, or frequently.  In 
the analysis so far, we have reduced these responses to a use measure 
taking the value zero if response is “never” or “rarely”, and taking the 
value one if the response is “occasionally” or “frequently”.  In this 
subsection, we briefly examine results estimated under other definitions of 
the use measure.  The first alternative definition is that an information 
source is considered to be used (and the use measure is set to one) only if it 
is used frequently.  The second alternative measure is that a source is 
considered to be used if it is used rarely, occasionally, or frequently. 
 
The summary results are presented in table 3.18, which shows whether a 
source is associated with initial adoption or intensification under the 
calculation method outlined before table 3.16.  The third column of table 
3.18 presents results when sources must be used frequently to be 
considered used at all.  There are many differences between the expected 
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and actual results.  There is the possibility of misclassification introduced 
by our changed definition, which may account for some of the differences.  
Further, if use is necessarily frequent, it would tend to suggest a large 
amount of information is being extracted from the source.  The use may 
then tend to be associated more with intensification.  This mechanism 
might explain why using other farmers as a source is associated with 
increased intensification under frequent information use, but not when 
information is used less frequently.  The fourth column of table 3.18 
presents results when a source is deemed to be used no matter how light 
that use is.  Most sources are found to influence both initial adoption and 
intensification.  It is possible that some level of light information use tends 
to be associated with any adoption.  If a farmer avoids any use of a 
particular information source, they may also be more avoidant of 
technology adoption than other farmers. 
 
Table 3.18 
Sources of information and the diffusion types they are empirically found 
to influence, under alternative definitions of information use 
  Criteria on frequency of use if information  use 
is considered to have occurred 
  Frequently Rarely, occasionally, 
or frequently 
Source Expected Observed Observed 
ICC Both Both / initial Both 
Agents Initial Both Both 
Academe Intens Initial Both 
Supplier Both Both Both 
Buyers Both Initial Both 
Farmers Initial Intens Both 
DEFRA Both Intens Intens 
FWeekly Initial Initial Both 
FGuard Initial Both Initial 
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As another alternative grading of information use, we could retain the full 
four point scale.  The estimation of the technology adoption equation when 
information is treated as exogenous would then seem to present no 
difficulties.  However, if information is endogenous, the problems noted at 
the start of section 3.5 arise, namely parameter proliferation across the 
system equations and estimation difficulties.  We do not attempt the four 
point grading here.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
We have presented a model of the effect of information sources on initial 
adoption and intensification and tested it with UK farming data.  Consistent 
with our model, we found evidence that initial adoption is often driven by 
exploratory information which provides an indication of the broad 
performance of a technology, while intensification is often driven by 
technical information which improves a technology’s performance. 
 
We find that information from farmers affects the extent of initial adoption, 
but not intensification.  The result is consistent with the findings in Battisti 
and Stoneman (2005) for UK manufacturing, where the industry proportion 
of previous adopters of a technology does not significantly influence 
diffusion within companies.  However, the result contrasts with Conley and 
Udry’s (2010) finding that such information adjusts the intensification of 
adoption in Ghanaian pineapple growers.  They find close response by 
farmers to communication within the farmers’ information neighbourhoods, 
so it is unlikely that farmer information is just proxying for other forms of 
information that we have included but that they exclude.  It is possible that 
different forms of information are suitable in Ghana for reasons omitted 
from our model.  Verbal communication may be relatively ineffective for 
transfer of UK farming information relevant to intensification, or 
Ghanaians may be more willing to share information.  Alternatively, as an 
extension to our model, Ghanaian farmer information may be more suitable 
for analytical processing than UK farmer information.  Baerenklau (2005) 
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looks at US farmers and finds that neighbourhood effects are not 
significant in their intensification of new types of forage grasses, so 
conceivably the difference can be generalised to farmers in developing and 
developed countries. 
 
We examined the role of farmers as an explicit information source, 
separating it from the other effects of the number of farmers in the 
surrounding region.  The literature identifies various ways by which 
previous adopters may influence new adoption.  The mechanisms include 
strategic interaction (Hoppe, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Mariotti, 1992; 
Reinganum, 1983), network externalities such as those existing in 
computer software (Brynfolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Katz and Shapiro, 
1985), and the presence of secondary markets (Cho and Koo, 2012).  These 
mechanisms sometimes also describe relations between the presence of 
earlier adopters and information flows to a potential new adopter.  Future 
work could examine whether the proposed flows are empirically supported.  
The mechanisms could also be adapted to allow for the relations between 
previous adoption rates and different types of information. 
 
Our theoretical and empirical models could be modified to reflect other 
plausible determinants of information choice.  The relative role of 
education in initial adoption and intensification could be assessed, and the 
comparative importance of economic and information determinants.  The 
disclosure value associated with intensification could be examined, as 
could the extent to which information changes technology’s effect on 
profitability. 
 
We have lost some statistical content in forming dummies for 
informational use and technological adoption.  We could investigate 
alternative econometric models in which the ordering of the original data is 
retained.  As noted previously, the retention will create challenges in 
estimation for reasons of identification and consistency. 
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Our work has a number of policy implications.  One is that information 
encouraging initial adoption without support for detailed implementation is 
not likely to promote full technological use.  Another implication is that 
government information has a role in both initial adoption and 
intensification, although whether it is cost-effective is another issue.  A 
further implication is that although UK farmers have some role in initial 
adoption, their role in intensification is not significant so network 
construction will not necessarily lead to much fuller diffusion. 
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Appendix 3.A 
Rationale for inclusion of the non-information covariates in the technology 
adoption equation 
 
Years of farming 
Farming experience is measured by years spent farming.  The general 
adoption literature describes potentially opposing effects of establishment 
age on adoption.  Greater experience may allow for cheaper and more 
certain assessment of the value of a technology, so facilitating its adoption.  
Its use may also be easier.  However, an older establishment may be more 
committed to an existing practice, or greater financial investment in it than 
a newer entrant.  Older farmers or owners who are closely identified with 
their businesses may also have a shorter planning horizon and less 
willingness to invest.  The empirical literature findings on establishment 
and entrepreneurial age has not indicated a clear dominance of one of the 
effects.  Thus, Battisti et al (2004) find that older plants have reduced 
adoption rates of IT equipment and joint design teams, while in Battisti and 
Stoneman (2005) there is no significant relation between age and adoption.  
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) find older farmers are more likely to introduce a 
new crop, and in El-Osta and Morehart (1999) adoption of a capital 
intensive technology or a capital-management dual technology rises until 
farmers are in their 50s or 60s and declines thereafter.  In Khanna (2001), 
experience does not influence the adoption of a relatively unsophisticated 
soil testing technology, but does influence the adoption of an associated, 
more advanced soil application technology.  Läpple and Van Rensburg 
(2011) find that farmer age reduces adoption rates of organic farming, 
particularly among earlier adopters.  Padel (2001) reviews the literature and 
finds that organic adopters are often younger and less experienced than 
adopters. 
 
The results reported by Läpple and Van Rensburg (2011) and Padel (2001) 
may lead us to anticipate that experience will be negatively associated with 
adoption of organic farming generally.  Organic farming, unlike many 
technological innovations, is associated with lower technological 
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complexity than the practice it replaces.  So experience does not lead to 
such a major advantage in assessing and managing its introduction as 
would be the case with more technologically advanced innovations, and we 
may expect the longer planning horizon of younger farmers to be more 
influential on adoption than the experience of older farmers.  Whilst this 
may be true of organic farming as a combined practice, it does not 
necessarily follow for the advanced techniques of organic farming that we 
are analysing here.  Conditional on adoption of organic farming, it may be 
the case that experience again becomes significant in the decision to 
adoption the techniques.  Thus, we leave undecided the expected direction 
of influence of years of farming on technique adoption. 
 
Experience may influence the utility and selection of information.  A more 
experienced business person may find that their experiences act as a 
substitute for external information, and so have less demand for it generally.  
Alternatively, it may act as a complement to information, making 
information easier to assess and use.  As with experience’s effect on 
technology adoption, its effect on information use is two-edged.  Perhaps 
reflecting the ambiguity, neither Ortmann et al (1993) nor Foltz et al (1996) 
find farmer age to be a statistically significant influence on use of 
consultants.  It is perhaps more likely that experienced farmers would find 
relatively less value in general or non-technical sources of information and 
more value in detailed sources.  However, in Gloy et al (2000), older 
farmers are to an extent more likely to find media sources (which are 
largely general sources in Gloy et al’s classification) more useful than 
younger farmers, and younger farmers are to an extent more likely to find 
personal sources (which are largely technical) more useful.  It is 
conceivable that experience remains a substitute for more technical 
information.  This interpretation is perhaps contradicted by the results in 
Gervais et al (2001) that experienced Canadian farmers are more likely to 
use information from field days and workshops, academia, and newsletters 
and fact sheets.  The employment of these relatively technical sources 
seems to indicate that experience complements these forms of information, 
although Gervais et al (2001) also find that confidence in these sources 
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declines with experience.  Given the uncertain effect of experience on 
information use, we form no prior expectation about it. 
 
Formal education 
Formal education is measured by a categorical variable taking the value of 
one if the respondent has some schooling, two if they have completed 
secondary school, three if they have some post secondary vocational 
training, four if they have a college diploma or certificate, and five if they 
have a university degree.  As response to the variable is not our primary 
concern, for convenience we apply slightly more structure to the variable 
than is warranted by the data collection and treat it as continuous. 
 
Companies with better educated workers may be expected to be able to 
evaluate the worth of a new technology, so plausibly would be more likely 
to adopt a technology initially.  Education may be expected to ease 
implementation of a new technology and so increase its profitability, which 
would support both the initial adoption and subsequent intensification.  
Battisti et al (2009) in their analysis of European internet use find that 
education matters for initial adoption, but not subsequent intensification.  
Both Abdulai and Huffman (2005) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006) study 
Tanzanian farmers and determine that education is associated with 
increased technology adoption.  The same is found in many developed 
country studies (El-Osta and Morehart, 1999; Foltz and Chang, 2002; 
Genius et al, 2006; Gillespie et al, 2009; Khanal et al, 2010; Khanal and 
Gillespie, 2011; Tiffin and Balcombe, 2011). 
 
For organic farming adoption, the prior theoretical link between education 
and adoption is less clear than with other technologies.  Whereas many new 
technologies embody increased scientific knowledge or greater capital 
content, organic farming represents an abandonment of some of the 
scientific techniques introduced in the last hundred years.  Nonetheless, 
many papers have identified a connection between education and organic 
adoption (Padel, 2001).  For example, Läpple and Van Rensburg (2011) 
discover that higher educated Irish farmers are more likely to adopt organic 
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practices whether the diffusion was at an early, middle, or advanced stage 
(although they did not find parameter significance).  The organic farming 
to education link may be possibly explained by noting that education has 
been found to influence initial adoption more than intensification (Battisti 
et al, 2009).  Education may be associated with greater familiarity with and 
increased trust in formal scientific advances, or it may allow for valuation 
of scientific evidence that is not implementation specific.  Thus, the 
education-adoption link may not be affected by the reduced embodied 
scientific content of inputs to organic farming.  Moreover, the data in this 
paper looks at adoption of advanced organic techniques, which may be 
susceptible to productivity gains through education if any exist.  In 
summary, we expect that more educated farmers will adopt organic 
techniques more often, but possibly they will not intensify their use at a 
greater rate than less educated farmers. 
 
As well as affecting technology adoption, education may also alter the use 
of information.  Clearly, education may make it easier to assess the worth 
of information, and then implement it.  Thus, it is less costly to evaluate 
and use information, so more may be used.  Education may also increase 
familiarity and comfort with the use of information.  On the other hand, 
education may substitute for information if educated farmers are able to 
form independent judgements of technological issues without guidance 
from information sources, and so the use of information may decline with 
education.  Many empirical studies do not indicate a strong relation 
between education and use of specific information sources.  For example, 
Ortmann et al (1993) finds no significant relation of education to the use of 
consultants by a fairly select group of young, well educated US farmers.  A 
sample from a wider farming group is analysed by Foltz et al (1996), who 
also find education is unimportant as an influence on consultant use.  The 
results may be specific to use of consultants, rather than information more 
generally.  There are reasons to suspect education’s effect would vary by 
the type of information.  If some types of information are highly technical, 
they might be much more easily processed by well-educated farmers, while 
less technical information may be less educationally demanding.  For less 
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technical information, the ratio of value to cost of use may be more 
favourable for farmers with less education.  Gervais et al (2001) distinguish 
between demand for different information sources by Canadian farmers, 
but find education has generally low significance as an influence.  Gloy et 
al (2000) also report generally low significance in their examination of 
perceived information utility for US farms across various sources, but also 
find a broadly positive effect of having at least graduated from high school.  
Just et al (2002) provide some support for the hypothesis that education 
encourages more technical information use, in that some levels of 
education are associated with increased use of data (rather than processed 
information), public information (rather than more processed private 
information), and formal information (rather than informal information).  
However, the statistical significances are not high and are not corrected for 
the number of educational categories, so the evidence is not very strong.  
To condense our expectations from the theory and empirics, we anticipate 
that education may be associated with increased use of information, 
particularly technical information, but that the significance may not be high. 
 
Total agricultural area 
Farm size is measured by the area farmed, with all units converted into 
hectares.  In the general diffusion literature, larger enterprises are often 
proposed to have higher initial adoption rates.  Reasons for their earlier 
adoption are given in Mansfield (1963b).  Because of their size, they can 
benefit from economies of scale in implementation, and are more likely to 
have resources supporting implementation and diversification.  Their size 
means that conditions amenable to adoption are more likely to arise in 
them before smaller firms, and replacement of technology units occurs 
more often because there are more of them in bigger firms.  Empirical 
work has often supported the existence of a positive association between 
firm size and timing or rate of initial adoption.  Amongst others, links have 
been found for the various coal, steel, brewing, and railway innovations 
(Mansfield, 1963b); for numerical control machine tools (Romeo, 1975); 
for data telecommunications (Antonelli, 1985); for computer aided design 
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(Åstebro, 2002); for IT equipment and collaborative practices (Battisti et al, 
2004); and internet use (Battisti et al, 2007). 
 
In the agricultural literature, El-Osta and Morehart (1999) and Abdulai and 
Huffman (2005) transfer to the farming industry Mansfield’s (1963b) 
theoretical point on the resources of larger enterprises facilitating adoption.  
Resources might be brought to bear on learning about the technology and 
setting up new suppliers and buyers.  Large fixed costs may also be spread 
over a greater total production than for small farms.  Abdulai and Huffman 
(2005) make a related point for spreading costs of indivisible technologies.  
A contrary view whereby larger companies adopt later is presented in 
Genius et al (2006), who note that smaller farms may be under more 
financial pressure to innovate.  Genius et al (2006) raise a further point 
specific to organic farming.  Small farms are often more dependent on 
family labour with low opportunity cost.  As organic farming is more 
labour intensive than conventional farming, it is to them a relatively more 
efficient use of available resources.  A further point is made by Padel (2001) 
who observes that if organic farmers were entrants from urban 
backgrounds without large inherited landholdings, then organic farms will 
tend to be smaller than conventional farms. 
 
As with the general empirical literature, the agricultural empirical literature 
has often shown a positive link between enterprise size and adoption.  It 
has been shown for cow breeding technologies (Khanal and Gillespie, 
2011), milking parlours and record keeping systems (El-Osta and Morehart, 
1999), cross-breeding (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005), computers on farms 
(Amponsah, 1995), and pesticide and weedicide (Feder and Slade, 1984).  
However, the specific character of the technology can modify the relation 
between size and adoption.  Bernues and Herrero (2008) find that use of 
technologies that allow for rearing animals in smaller areas is inversely 
related to farm size.  Foltz and Lang (2002) find that with labour intensive 
grazing, increasing farm size is not associated with increased adoption, 
consistent with the point raised by Genius et al (2006) on labour use for 
smaller farms.   Farm size is not significantly associated with increased 
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organic adoption for Greek farmers in Genius et al (2006), with a negative 
coefficient on the slightly insignificant link.  In Läpple and Van Rensburg 
(2011), increasing land size is significantly associated with reduced 
adoption of organics.  However, increasing family size is also associated 
with reduced adoption, challenging the idea that more available family 
labour increases organic adoption.  Läpple and Van Rensburg (2011) 
explain the discrepancy by postulating a second effect also occurs, that 
larger families can act as a constraint on business decisions.  Padel (2001) 
notes a trend over time in the size of organic farms in the European Union, 
with their average size rising from below to above the average size of 
conventional farms. 
 
The evidence presented indicates that adoption of organic farming in itself 
may be negatively related to farm size.  However, conditional on organic 
farming adoption, the adoption of organic techniques is plausibly increased 
by larger farm size.  As we are interested in unconditional initial adoption 
of the techniques, the effect of size on adoption captures both effects at 
once.  We therefore do not have a strong prior expectation on the sign of 
size. 
 
The effect of enterprise size on adoption intensity is potentially 
qualitatively different from its effect on initial adoption.  Romeo (1975) 
outlines two possible reasons why intensity may be negatively related to 
size.  Romeo proposes (following Mansfield (1963a)) that smaller 
enterprises have to invest less in absolute terms to convert to a new 
technology.  Further, their first purchase is generally later, when the risks 
of adoption are less, so subsequent purchases can happen with less risk 
than the subsequent purchases of a large company whose initial adoption is 
early.  The former reason is not entirely convincing, as available funds 
would also be scaled with the enterprise size and economies of scale may 
be realisable in finance.  The latter reason seems more compelling.  
Antonelli (1985) further observes that intensification could be delayed for 
bigger firms due to rigid internal management structures and more complex 
fixed investment (again after Mansfield (1963a)).  We could also add 
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(repeating Mansfield (1963a) once again) that a smaller company would be 
less able to manage multiple internal technologies, so conversion is more 
likely to be rapid when the initial adoption is made.  Another reason could 
be that conditions are more likely to be uniform over the company. 
 
The empirical evidence on intensification generally supports the existence 
of a negative relation between enterprise size and intensification.  
Mansfield (1963) demonstrates the slower intensification of usage of diesel 
trains replacing steam trains, while Romeo (1975) does the same for 
machine tools, and Fuentelsaz et al (2003) for automated teller machines.  
Antonelli (1985) finds longer intensification lags on data 
telecommunications for large companies, and Battisti et al (2009) discover 
large companies are not more likely to intensify e-business usage.  Genius 
et al (2006) look at organic farming and show that larger farms are not 
more likely to intensify their adoption. 
 
The theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that larger farms intensify 
their organic practices less than smaller farms.  We therefore expect the 
coefficient on farm size in our intensification equation to be negative. 
 
The effect of farm size on information use has also attracted attention in the 
literature.  Gloy et al (2000) comment that salespeople are more likely to 
call on large farms, so their information is more likely to be perceived as 
useful.  The perception may be a result of the greater exposure to the 
information, and may arise for other sources whenever supply is sensitive 
to the size.  Gervais et al (2001) suggest that size approximates physical 
capital and personal characteristics, specifically risk preferences.  They do 
not say that this leads to any particular direction of association between 
sign and information use.  We can also note that information has a public 
good character and since large farms can use the same information over 
larger production, it may be anticipated that they would use more of it.  
The ability to spread costs will be more important if farmers find 
information acquisition costs to be burdensome, as was found by Foltz et al 
(1996) in their study of the use and discontinuation of consultant use. 
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Empirically, the evidence on the effect of farm size on information use 
provides some support for a negative link when suppliers can raise more 
revenue from large farms, but otherwise no strong results emerge.  In 
Ortmann et al’s (1993) study of US farmers, higher sales are associated 
with greater expenditure on consultants but the expenditure doesn’t rise as 
quickly as sales.  Foltz et al (1996) also find that as sales rise so does the 
use of consultants among Idaho farmers.  Gloy et al (2000) examine the 
utility of various information sources as reported by US farmers.  As farm 
size rises, the valuation attached to manufacturer salespeople increases as 
well.  However, the valuation of crop and livestock specific publications 
and other farmers falls.  In Gervais et al (2001), farm size doesn’t have a 
significant effect on use of any of the seven information sources they 
consider. 
 
We do not expect any general links between farm size and information use.  
However, in the case of information types where income to suppliers rises 
with the farm size, we anticipate a positive relation.  These types may 
include consultants, agents, suppliers, and buyers. 
 
Full time farming indicator 
A further codeterminant in our equations is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the farmer farms or produces full time.  Writing on 
management practices, Battisti and Iona (2009) propose that an enterprise 
with more diversified output will be likely to adopt a wider range of 
innovations.  However, their proposal may not apply when we are 
considering a set of innovations, such as organic farming practices, that 
apply exclusively to one part of production, rather than the full set of 
innovations used in any employment.  The agricultural literature has 
discussed the role of full time farming and off farm income directly.  Off-
farm activity may raise finance for technological adoption and create 
incentives for adoption (of labour saving technologies) by raising the 
opportunity cost of time (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Genius et al, 2006; 
Koundouri et al, 2006).  However, it leaves reduced time for acquiring 
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knowledge and making decisions, so reducing adoption (Abdulai and 
Huffman, 2005).  A full time farmer is better placed to adopt a technology 
that is time and management intensive (Khanna, 2001). 
 
The empirical evidence on off-farm labour’s effect on adoption is mixed.  
Abdulai and Huffman (2005) find that off-farm labour increases adoption 
of a crossbred cow.  Their study was in Tanzania where extra response of 
adoption to additional income may be expected.  In Khanna (2001) 
working part time has a positive but insignificant effect on adoption of soil 
testing and application technologies.  However, Khanal and Gillespie’s 
(2011) examination of breeding technologies demonstrates that negative 
relation between having an off-farm job and adoption, and Koundouri et al 
(2006) find that rising off-farm income reduces adoption of irrigation 
equipment.  Finally, in Genius et al (2006) off-farm income doesn’t 
significantly change adoption of organic farming. 
 
The outcomes of working part time on adoption seem to be sensitive to the 
financial and other conditions in which adoption occurs.  We do not form 
any prior expectations of the coefficient sign on the full time working 
dummy. 
 
There are also plausible theoretical links between working part time and 
information use.  Off farm activity may lead to increased reliance on 
information to replace experience on the farm (Genius et al, 2006).  Off 
farm activities may also increase the overall complexity of income-earning 
activities, and raise the value of general management information 
(Ortmann et al, 1993).  On the other hand, the time available for searching 
out information may diminish.  We see few results in the empirical 
literature to clarify which side of the trade-off is dominant.  In Genius et al 
(2006), information collection either actively or from extension agents is 
not affected by part time working.  Ortmann et al (1993) do not examine 
off farm work, but look at the percentage of farmers’ assets held off-farm.  
Higher holdings are significantly associated with more use of consultants.  
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To summarise for our study, we do not form a strong theoretical 
expectation on the effect of working part time on information use. 
 
Environmental scheme use 
We construct a measure of average environmental scheme membership 
from responses to survey questions on membership of eight individual 
environmental schemes.  The questions ask about membership in the 
schemes listed in table 3.A1.  Non-missing responses to each question are 
coded one for current membership, two if the farmer will consider 
membership in the next two years, and three if the farmer will not consider 
engagement.  We calculate a measure of membership as three minus the 
response for each question when a response is given, and then average over 
all scheme measures to get our combined scheme membership measure. 
 
Table 3.A1 
Environmental schemes used to measure of average environmental scheme 
membership 
 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme 
Entry Level Stewardship 
Higher Level Stewardship 
Organic Farming Scheme 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
Voluntary Initiative 
Single Farm Payment 
Other 
 
The measure rises if the farmer is a member of a component scheme, and it 
rises by slightly less if the farmer is considering membership.  There are 
various ways in which increases in the measure are likely to be associated 
with adoption of organic farming.  Farmers who join schemes may have 
higher awareness and commitment to environmental matters that is also 
manifested by adoption of organic farming.  Membership may be sought as 
a means of providing certification of organic farming practices.  A scheme 
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member may gain additional motivation from membership, for example 
from contact with like-minded farmers or earlier adopters, and the 
motivation may lead to increased adoption.  Membership may increase 
awareness of and access to technology suppliers. 
 
Environmental awareness and concern are theoretically plausible 
precursors to scheme membership.  The empirical literature has examined 
the links between the two measures of environmental attitude and organic 
farming adoption.  Läpple and Van Rensberg (2011) examine Irish farmers 
and determine that if a farmer is more concerned by environmental issues, 
they are significantly more likely to adopt.  The increased probability of 
adoption exists at early and late stages of diffusion  In Genius et al (2006), 
awareness of environmental issues among Greek farmers is associated with 
increased initial adoption.  It is also associated with intensification of use. 
 
We summarise our expectations on environmental scheme membership and 
adoption.  On the basis of theoretical and empirical evidence we expect the 
two to be positively and significantly related. 
 
Environmental group consultation 
A measure of average environmental group consultation is formed from 
survey questions on consultation of two not-for-profit organisations 
providing conservation advice and support to farmers.  The first of these 
organisations is called Linking Environment And Farming (LEAF, 
www.leafuk.org) and the second is the Farming and Wildlife Advisory 
Group (FWAG, www.fwag.org.uk).  The questions ask whether the 
organisation has ever been consulted, with responses of “yes”, “no”, or 
“never heard of it”.  The average consultation measure is then put equal to 
zero if neither group has been consulted, 0.5 if only one group has been 
consulted, and one if both groups have been. 
 
We anticipate that rises in environmental group consultation may be 
associated with increased organic farming adoption, for similar reasons that 
environmental scheme use may be.  Consultation indicates environmental 
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awareness and concern, increases exposure to environmental messages, and 
provides information on suppliers.  Empirical evidence connecting 
awareness and concern with adoption was described when we looked at 
scheme use.  Our expectation is that increases in consultation will be 
associated with increased initial adoption and intensification. 
 
Internet access score 
For each farm, a measure of internet access is constructed by linking the 
farm’s region with the average internet access there.  Our base farming data 
from the Rural Economy and Land Use Programme contains information 
on the area in which the farm is located, but no information on its internet 
access.  We therefore supplement the data with information on internet 
speed by region from the telecommunications regulator OFCOM (OFCOM, 
2013).  It provides data on average broadband speed in 2011 by UK local 
authority area.  The measure varies from one to five, with one being the 
fastest broadband and five being the slowest. 
 
Our base farming data has the first two characters of each farm’s postcode, 
which identifies a postcode area within the UK.  The internet data’s 
regional identifier is the local authority, which generally subsumes 
postcode areas.  We manually identify the local authority for each postcode 
area and include them in the farming data, giving 80 distinct local 
authorities across the farms.  Where there is ambiguity in the postcode 
between a rural and urban authority (such as the City of Nottingham and 
Nottinghamshire County), the rural authority is selected.  The farming and 
internet data are then joined by the local authority to allocate each farm the 
average internet access of its local authority. 
 
The internet may either complement or substitute for information obtained 
from other sources.  On one hand, it may facilitate the acquisition of 
information from other sources and allow for its clarification and 
supplementing.  The action of internet use may reveal personal 
characteristics not otherwise controlled for, and that tend towards 
information acquisition.  On the other hand, it may provide information 
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that is also available from other sources, and so act as a substitute for them.  
Gloy et al (2000) distinguishes between the effect on different source types.  
They note that information from media sources (with its impersonal nature) 
would be relatively easy to substitute with internet information, while 
information from personal sources could be supported by the readier 
communication. 
 
Empirical evidence has supported the existence of a positive association 
between internet use and information source adoption.  Diekmann et al 
(2009) look at how intensively Ohio farmers use twenty five information 
sources, classified into print, broadcast, electronic, and interpersonal 
sources.  They find that internet access is associated with increases in use, 
and substitution into electronic sources from other sources.  Gloy et al 
(2000) discover that US farmers who use the internet for their business are 
more likely to believe that a variety of information sources are useful, 
particularly personal ones.  Given the theoretical considerations and 
empirical findings, we anticipate that better internet access will be 
associated with increased information use (so there will a negative sign on 
the internet score coefficient). 
 
Our expectations for all characteristics are collected in table 3.A2. 
 
Table 3.A2 
Prior expectations of the effects of characteristics on adoption and 
information use 
Characteristic Initial adoption Intensified 
adoption 
Information use 
Years of farming + / - + / - + / - 
Formal education + + / - + (low significance) 
Total agricultural area + / - - + (consultants, 
agents, suppliers, 
and buyers) 
+ / - (others) 
Full time farming indicator + / - + / - + / - 
Environmental scheme use + + NA 
Environmental group 
consultation 
+ + NA 
Internet access score NA NA - 
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Appendix 3.B 
Estimation results for the chemical user, extracrop bio-controller, and weed focussed farmer portfolios 
 
Table 3.B1, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of initial adoption of a chemical user technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.7172*** -1.0124***         
 0.1854 0.1447         
Agents -0.1839  -1.4165***        
 0.1899  0.4606        
Academia 0.0808   -0.8792       
 0.2326   0.9242       
Suppliers 0.5956***    -1.0581***      
 0.2007    0.113      
Buyers 0.3445     1.8013***     
 0.2183     0.2457     
Farmers 0.1038      -1.0253***    
 0.1877      0.3868    
DEFRA 0.2141       2.0226***   
 0.1862       0.1907   
Farmers Weekly -0.0648        1.5577***  
 0.1845        0.2873  
Farmers Guardian 0.0712         -0.8484 
 0.194         0.5632 
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B1, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of initial adoption of a chemical user technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0214*** -0.0140** -0.0186*** -0.0199*** -0.0164*** -0.0109 -0.0227*** -0.0112* -0.0113* -0.0216*** 
 0.008 0.0063 0.0068 0.0072 0.0058 0.007 0.0062 0.0063 0.0068 0.0068 
Formal education -0.0783 0.069 0.0411 0.0101 -0.0523 -0.0725 -0.0205 -0.0584 -0.0522 -0.0711 
 0.0879 0.0648 0.0739 0.0852 0.0631 0.0678 0.0693 0.0624 0.0693 0.0776 
Hectares 0.0011 0.0006* 0.0009* 0.0012** 0.0007* 0.0008 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0007 0.0011* 
 0.0007 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 
Full time -0.1213 0.1678 -0.062 -0.0226 -0.0133 -0.1335 0.0055 -0.1277 -0.2422 0.0401 
 0.2359 0.1627 0.1749 0.2046 0.1637 0.1784 0.1815 0.1645 0.1873 0.2129 
Environ schemes -0.1014 -0.0939 -0.1724 -0.2305 -0.1426* -0.1812 -0.153 -0.1439 -0.1648 -0.2135 
 0.1741 0.088 0.1372 0.1523 0.0775 0.124 0.122 0.1026 0.1335 0.1463 
Environ consults 0.4245* 0.2413 0.4182** 0.4938** 0.2647* 0.3443* 0.3970* 0.3405** 0.4424** 0.5389*** 
 0.2443 0.1468 0.2072 0.2114 0.1385 0.1764 0.2055 0.1613 0.1884 0.2049 
Local adoption -0.0046 -0.0011 -0.0016 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0066 0.0036 -0.0053 0.0011 0.0061 
 0.0085 0.0061 0.0066 0.0077 0.0061 0.0067 0.007 0.0063 0.007 0.0083 
Constant 1.3018* 1.8353*** 2.2756*** 2.3035*** 2.6982*** 1.4570** 2.6254*** 0.5584 1.0028 2.5864*** 
 0.7717 0.5214 0.629 0.675 0.4669 0.634 0.5575 0.5616 0.6956 0.6224 
Rho  0.966 0.8778 0.6351 0.9881 -0.8638 0.8452 -0.9491 -0.8182 0.6276 
p-value  0.0187 0.1115 0.2535 0.0728 0.0145 0.0943 0.0025 0.0036 0.1082 
(Pseudo) R2 0.2094          
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B2 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for initial adoption of a chemical user technology 
 icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0025 -0.0088* -0.0061 -0.0094 -0.0074 -0.0162*** -0.0008 -0.0107** -0.0094* 
 0.0055 0.005 0.0055 0.0059 0.0051 0.0053 0.0049 0.0051 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1542** 0.1606*** 0.2490*** -0.0176 0.0635 0.0335 0.0565 0.0522 -0.1199** 
 0.0634 0.059 0.0682 0.07 0.0596 0.0624 0.0567 0.058 0.061 
Hectares 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008*** 0.0000 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
Full time 0.2503 -0.0949 0.0542 0.0748 0.1537 0.1142 0.1483 0.4040*** 0.4476*** 
 0.1552 0.1455 0.1593 0.1719 0.1546 0.156 0.1435 0.1488 0.1628 
Internet score 0.0817* 0.0524 0.0427 0.0854** -0.1307*** 0.0613 -0.0677* -0.1054** 0.1577*** 
 0.0479 0.0479 0.0555 0.0411 0.0484 0.0471 0.0404 0.0478 0.0523 
Local adoption 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0093 0.006 0.0064 -0.0013 0.0188*** 
 0.0061 0.0055 0.0062 0.0063 0.0057 0.006 0.0056 0.0059 0.0057 
Constant -0.2431 -0.5449 -1.6255*** 0.9645** -0.2327 0.585 0.1702 0.3927 -0.6252 
 0.4089 0.3862 0.4404 0.4326 0.3893 0.4137 0.373 0.3876 0.4077 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the initial 
adoption of the technology jointly determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B3 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on initial adoption of a chemical user technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.1020*** 0.1348**         
 0.0259 0.0609         
Agents -0.0261  0.028        
 0.027  0.0234        
Academia 0.0115   0.044       
 0.0331   0.0542       
Suppliers 0.0847***    0.1298*      
 0.0282    0.0682      
Buyers 0.049     0.0579**     
 0.0311     0.0283     
Farmers 0.0148      0.0616    
 0.0267      0.0446    
DEFRA 0.0304       0.0201   
 0.0264       0.0294   
Farmers Weekly -0.0092        -0.0001  
 0.0262        0.0109  
Farmers Guardian 0.0101         0.0364 
 0.0276         0.0265 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
  151 
Table 3.B4, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of intensification of a chemical user technology 
 All icc Agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.2003*** 0.2393**         
 0.0652 0.1203         
Agents 0.0261  0.038        
 0.0515  0.1393        
Academia 0.1074**   0.0819       
 0.0546   0.1437       
Suppliers 0.2209***    0.2202*      
 0.0689    0.117      
Buyers 0.1511***     0.2641**     
 0.0516     0.129     
Farmers -0.0052      0.1142    
 0.0559      0.117    
DEFRA 0.0994*       0.2149   
 0.0547       0.1392   
Farmers Weekly 0.0407        0.2285*  
 0.0555        0.1193  
Farmers Guardian -0.0123         -0.0191 
 0.0521         0.1293 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B4, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of intensification of a chemical user technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0042* -0.0055** -0.0054** -0.0052** -0.0052** -0.0048** -0.0050** -0.0055** -0.0046** -0.0057** 
 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 
Formal education -0.0241 -0.0183 -0.0101 -0.0116 -0.0073 -0.0129 -0.0108 -0.0107 -0.017 -0.0103 
 0.0269 0.0269 0.027 0.0296 0.0264 0.0264 0.0262 0.0264 0.0268 0.027 
Hectares 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001* 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Full time 0.0599 0.075 0.0959 0.0925 0.0916 0.0804 0.0889 0.0843 0.0587 0.0959 
 0.0667 0.0663 0.0659 0.0659 0.0659 0.0663 0.0659 0.066 0.0682 0.0686 
Environ schemes -0.0726 -0.0941** -0.1154** -0.1006** -0.0971** -0.1019** -0.1031** -0.1122** -0.1003** -0.1065** 
 0.0471 0.0462 0.0461 0.0462 0.0461 0.0463 0.0463 0.0462 0.0464 0.0463 
Environ consults 0.1497** 0.2296*** 0.2375*** 0.2357*** 0.2611*** 0.2087*** 0.2617*** 0.2335*** 0.2527*** 0.2609*** 
 0.0651 0.0625 0.0631 0.063 0.062 0.0633 0.0619 0.0625 0.0622 0.0621 
Local adoption 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 
 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 
Constant 0.9424*** 1.2994*** 1.4699*** 1.4327*** 1.2328*** 1.3839*** 1.3639*** 1.3631*** 1.3270*** 1.4695*** 
 0.2138 0.2051 0.1963 0.1924 0.227 0.1942 0.2144 0.2054 0.2027 0.2008 
Rho  -0.9351 1 1 1 -0.9378 -0.8927 -0.993 -1 0.9409 
p-value  0.7626  0.9632  0.1667 0.7673 0.002 0.9132 0.0342 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B5 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for intensification of adoption of a chemical user technology 
 icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0026 -0.0075*** 0.0034 -0.0092*** -0.007 -0.0160*** -0.0008 -0.0108 -0.0096* 
 0.0056 0.0000 0.0141 0.0000 0.0051 0.0053 0.0034 0.0084 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1472** 0.0955*** 0.3093*** -0.0553*** 0.073 0.0252 0.0241 0.1113 -0.1227** 
 0.0622 0.0000 0.1039 0.0000 0.0601 0.0604 0.0443 0.0871 0.0609 
Hectares 0.0003 0.0001*** 0.0002 -0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0008*** -0.0001 
 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Full time 0.2611* -0.0613*** 0.0412 0.0569*** 0.1572 0.1013 0.062 0.4257*** 0.4397*** 
 0.158 0.0000 0.832 0.0000 0.1531 0.1536 0.0998 0.0807 0.1631 
Internet score 0.0483 0.0606*** 0.0713 0.0673*** -0.1182** 0.0122 -0.0073 0.0289 0.1524*** 
 0.0588 0.0000 0.0959 0.0000 0.0553 0.055 0.0287 0.1589 0.056 
Local adoption 0.0000 0.0006*** -0.0008 0.0000*** 0.0026* 0.0016 0.0014 0.001 0.0059*** 
 0.0016 0.0000 0.0136 0.0000 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016 0.0012 0.0015 
Constant -0.1177 -0.4428*** -2.1365** 1.2229*** -0.3253 0.7646* 0.1785 -0.3071 -0.6137 
 0.4281 0.0000 0.9025 0.0000 0.4021 0.4131 0.282 0.9466 0.4133 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a 
treatment effect from the information variable.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B6 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on intensification of adoption of a chemical user technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.6613*** 0.7368         
 0.2159 3.1633         
Agents 0.0863  0.1253        
 0.1701  0.46        
Academia 0.3546**   0.2751       
 0.1805   0.4907       
Suppliers 0.7294***    0.6767**      
 0.2282    0.335      
Buyers 0.4987***     0.9015*     
 0.1709     0.4603     
Farmers -0.0173      0.3687    
 0.1846      0.4284    
DEFRA 0.3280*       0.6863   
 0.1807       0.4336   
Farmers Weekly 0.1343        0.7287**  
 0.1832        0.37  
Farmers Guardian -0.0406         -0.0629 
 0.1721         0.4247 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B7, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of initial adoption of an extracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.3281** -0.3864         
 0.1522 1.6         
Agents 0.2242  -0.7926        
 0.1422  0.7493        
Academia -0.3162**   -0.9085       
 0.1584   0.7287       
Suppliers 0.2643    -1.2754***      
 0.1705    0.1398      
Buyers 0.0746     1.5687***     
 0.1483     0.0967     
Farmers 0.1831      -0.8182    
 0.148      0.6151    
DEFRA 0.2554*       1.6854***   
 0.1419       0.2011   
Farmers Weekly -0.2042        1.4101***  
 0.1467        0.2027  
Farmers Guardian 0.1274         -0.5984 
 0.1451         0.5962 
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B7, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of initial adoption of an extracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.007 -0.0082 -0.0095* -0.0094* -0.0099** -0.0002 -0.0125** -0.0056 -0.0011 -0.0100* 
 0.0059 0.0056 0.0052 0.0055 0.0049 0.0049 0.0059 0.005 0.0051 0.0055 
Formal education 0.0474 0.071 0.0888 0.1027 0.0124 -0.0157 0.0497 0.0082 0.0153 0.0139 
 0.0678 0.1012 0.0692 0.0761 0.0575 0.0545 0.0609 0.0577 0.0575 0.0704 
Hectares 0.0005* 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 
 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
Full time 0.3169* 0.3495** 0.2536 0.3288** 0.2449* 0.1002 0.3197** 0.1794 0.0374 0.3797** 
 0.1699 0.1703 0.1873 0.1604 0.1466 0.14 0.1574 0.1475 0.1537 0.1644 
Environ schemes 0.4413*** 0.3949** 0.3124** 0.3569*** 0.2619** 0.2568*** 0.3421** 0.2996*** 0.3040*** 0.3718*** 
 0.1223 0.1701 0.1328 0.117 0.1028 0.0867 0.1373 0.0946 0.0911 0.1167 
Environ consults 1.0990*** 1.0269*** 0.9116*** 1.1301*** 0.7717*** 0.6819*** 0.9612*** 0.8392*** 0.8547*** 1.0652*** 
 0.192 0.3658 0.3101 0.2074 0.1572 0.1304 0.2829 0.169 0.1664 0.2029 
Local adoption -0.008 -0.0046 -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0025 -0.0115* -0.0015 -0.0094 -0.0016 0.0016 
 0.0077 0.0074 0.0069 0.0073 0.0066 0.0062 0.0075 0.0066 0.0066 0.0093 
Constant -1.8186*** -0.8027 -0.5145 -0.8967* 0.6415 -1.0134*** -0.2078 -1.6375*** -1.5813*** -0.6525 
 0.5562 1.2427 0.6413 0.4818 0.519 0.3929 0.8875 0.4112 0.4202 0.5937 
Rho  0.4675 0.6756 0.4307 0.9496 -0.9818 0.6664 -0.8764 -0.8632 0.5061 
p-value  0.6678 0.2954 0.3675 0.0664 0.076 0.234 0.0174 0.0017 0.2155 
(Pseudo) R2 0.1802          
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B8 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for initial adoption of an extracrop technology 
 icc agents academe Supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0027 -0.0082 -0.0057 -0.0087 -0.0054 -0.0161*** -0.0017 -0.0110** -0.0093* 
 0.0055 0.005 0.0055 0.0057 0.0052 0.0053 0.005 0.0051 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1447** 0.1564*** 0.2419*** -0.0348 0.0893 0.0263 0.0515 0.0571 -0.1196* 
 0.0624 0.0602 0.0675 0.0654 0.0589 0.0602 0.0573 0.0577 0.0612 
Hectares 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007*** -0.0001 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
Full time 0.2613* -0.0916 0.0556 0.0155 0.129 0.0806 0.1318 0.3805** 0.4632*** 
 0.1576 0.1461 0.1599 0.1629 0.1508 0.1567 0.145 0.1483 0.1645 
Internet score 0.0645 0.0307 0.035 0.0696 -0.0734* 0.037 -0.0525 -0.0933** 0.1463*** 
 0.0582 0.0572 0.0572 0.0429 0.0387 0.0492 0.0442 0.0447 0.0526 
Local adoption -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.004 0.0117* 0.0059 0.0062 -0.0026 0.0234*** 
 0.0073 0.0064 0.0071 0.0078 0.0067 0.0069 0.0065 0.0067 0.0067 
Constant -0.153 -0.4961 -1.5991*** 1.1425*** -0.545 0.7235* 0.206 0.3881 -0.5982 
 0.4253 0.4047 0.435 0.4186 0.3841 0.4079 0.3756 0.3787 0.4089 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the initial 
adoption of the technology jointly determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B9 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on initial adoption of an extracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.0864** 0.1332**         
 0.0396 0.0561         
Agents 0.059  0.0985**        
 0.0373  0.0423        
Academia -0.0833**   -0.0515       
 0.0413   0.0339       
Suppliers 0.0696    0.0587      
 0.0446    0.0708      
Buyers 0.0196     0.0752***     
 0.039     0.0243     
Farmers 0.0482      0.0821**    
 0.0389      0.0379    
DEFRA 0.0673*       0.0959***   
 0.0371       0.0316   
Farmers Weekly -0.0538        -0.0248  
 0.0384        0.0223  
Farmers Guardian 0.0335         0.0746*** 
 0.0381         0.0259 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B10, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of intensification of an extracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.2238** 0.2684         
 0.1035 0.1749         
Agents 0.0295  0.0948        
 0.0811  0.178        
Academia -0.05   -0.0483       
 0.0881   0.1912       
Suppliers 0.0888    0.0915      
 0.1009    0.0971      
Buyers 0.0297     0.0492     
 0.0821     0.1341     
Farmers -0.0321      0.009    
 0.0855      0.1519    
DEFRA 0.0877       0.089   
 0.0859       0.1874   
Farmers Weekly -0.1149        -0.0406  
 0.0846        0.1767  
Farmers Guardian 0.1586**         0.1747 
 0.0809         0.1576 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B10, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of intensification of an extracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0014 
 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0036 0.0035 
Formal education 0.0458 0.0271 0.0341 0.0416 0.0384 0.0373 0.0376 0.0377 0.0383 0.0485 
 0.0442 0.0435 0.0438 0.0455 0.0427 0.0427 0.0426 0.0427 0.0429 0.0436 
Hectares 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Full time 0.1293 0.1338 0.1599 0.1553 0.1549 0.1521 0.1544 0.1492 0.1612 0.1311 
 0.1066 0.1054 0.105 0.1048 0.1047 0.105 0.1049 0.105 0.1077 0.1071 
Environ schemes 0.2264*** 0.2296*** 0.2096*** 0.2125*** 0.2174*** 0.2160*** 0.2146*** 0.2137*** 0.2093*** 0.2259*** 
 0.0814 0.0801 0.0799 0.08 0.0799 0.08 0.0801 0.08 0.0801 0.0803 
Environ consults 0.4928*** 0.5119*** 0.5286*** 0.5556*** 0.5504*** 0.5390*** 0.5516*** 0.5319*** 0.5555*** 0.5421*** 
 0.1018 0.0981 0.0988 0.0979 0.0971 0.0991 0.0971 0.0982 0.0973 0.0971 
Local adoption -0.0057** -0.0045* -0.0045* -0.0045* -0.0045* -0.0046* -0.0045* -0.0047* -0.0046* -0.0054** 
 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 0.0026 0.0027 
Constant -1.0072*** -0.8890** -0.7321** -0.7063** -0.7974** -0.7238** -0.7160** -0.7527** -0.6729* -0.8330** 
 0.3619 0.3466 0.3355 0.3301 0.3451 0.3319 0.3528 0.3461 0.3487 0.3417 
ρ  -0.9291 0.8737 1 1 0.8531 0.8432 0.9949 -1 0.8725 
p-value  0.6703 0.9617 0.9039  0.965 0.9634 0.0008  0.8656 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B11 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for intensification of adoption of an extracrop technology 
 icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0026 -0.0077 -0.0051 -0.0089*** -0.0069 -0.0159*** -0.0013 -0.0137*** -0.0097* 
 0.0055 0.005 0.0539 0.0000 0.0051 0.0053 0.0031 0.0000 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1480** 0.1513** 0.2472** -0.0475*** 0.0738 0.0246 0.0151 0.0580*** -0.1274** 
 0.0622 0.0597 0.1243 0.0000 0.0603 0.0604 0.0373 0.0000 0.0604 
Hectares 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0007*** -0.0001 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 2.89E+09 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
Full time 0.2601* -0.0956 0.0694 0.0768*** 0.1565 0.1021 0.0453 0.3832*** 0.4386*** 
 0.1577 0.1473 0.6148 0.0000 0.1532 0.1536 0.088 0.0000 0.1623 
Internet score 0.0482 -0.0067 0.0274 0.0550*** -0.1205** 0.0103 -0.0065 -0.0268*** 0.1336** 
 0.0572 0.0522 0.5309 0.0000 0.0546 0.0534 0.0257 0.0000 0.0544 
Local adoption 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0002*** 0.0079** 0.0041 0.0046 -0.0016*** 0.0130*** 
 0.0041 0.0037 0.0042 0.0000 0.0037 0.0039 0.0043 0.0000 0.0037 
Constant -0.1345 -0.3948 -1.5603 1.1694*** -0.335 0.7733* 0.2333 0.2980*** -0.4974 
 0.4251 0.3944 1.0216 0.0000 0.4005 0.4099 0.2378 0.0000 0.4064 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a 
treatment effect from the information variable.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B12 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on intensification of adoption of an extracrop technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.3016** 0.3341         
 0.14 0.2292         
Agents 0.0398  0.1277        
 0.1092  0.2406        
Academia -0.0674   -0.0644       
 0.1187   0.2531       
Suppliers 0.1196    0.1198      
 0.136    0.1235      
Buyers 0.04     0.0666     
 0.1106     0.183     
Farmers -0.0432      0.0121    
 0.1152      0.204    
DEFRA 0.1182       0.1181   
 0.1159       0.2338   
Farmers Weekly -0.1548        -0.055  
 0.1142        0.1112  
Farmers Guardian 0.2138*         0.2411 
 0.1093         0.2234 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B13, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of initial adoption of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.5163*** -1.1615***         
 0.1751 0.0936         
Agents -0.1121  1.5503***        
 0.1749  0.2478        
Academia -0.3337*   -2.0810***       
 0.1912   0.3681       
Suppliers 0.158    -1.2232***      
 0.1964    0.1333      
Buyers 0.4724**     2.0324***     
 0.1984     0.1432     
Farmers 0.3331*      -1.1297***    
 0.1729      0.2155    
DEFRA 0.0982       1.9547***   
 0.1706       0.2143   
Farmers Weekly 0.1087        1.7767***  
 0.1679        0.2406  
Farmers Guardian 0.0946         -1.2329*** 
 0.1776         0.4151 
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B13, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of initial adoption of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0011 -0.0042 0.002 -0.0043 -0.0078 0.0056 -0.0112** -0.0016 0.0037 -0.0083 
 0.007 0.005 0.0056 0.0053 0.0054 0.0048 0.0055 0.0053 0.0057 0.006 
Formal education 0.0553 0.1260** -0.047 0.1797** 0.0197 -0.018 0.0628 0.0052 0.0265 -0.0003 
 0.0824 0.0586 0.0682 0.0714 0.0642 0.057 0.063 0.0619 0.0646 0.0741 
Hectares -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Full time 0.2654 0.3595** 0.2861* 0.2637 0.2519 0.0536 0.2830* 0.1362 0.0222 0.4325** 
 0.1957 0.1424 0.1618 0.1687 0.1571 0.1419 0.1589 0.1642 0.1696 0.1683 
Environ schemes 0.0499 0.0068 -0.0257 -0.0005 -0.0328 0.0420* -0.0098 0.0035 -0.012 -0.036 
 0.1506 0.0516 0.0967 0.1006 0.0848 0.0247 0.0865 0.0852 0.1046 0.1148 
Environ consults 0.5125** 0.2013*** 0.3841** 0.3981 0.3619** 0.2494*** 0.3578** 0.3325* 0.3948** 0.5018*** 
 0.2251 0.0676 0.1791 0.2843 0.1478 0.0894 0.1782 0.1819 0.1744 0.1843 
Local adoption -0.0063 -0.0027 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0089* 0.0011 -0.0057 -0.0004 0.006 
 0.008 0.0056 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0053 0.0062 0.0059 0.0064 0.0071 
Constant -0.2329 1.0115*** 0.0096 0.5356 1.8538*** -0.1344 1.4417*** -0.5109 -0.5143 1.2323** 
 0.6814 0.3833 0.4742 0.4535 0.4575 0.3709 0.4604 0.4378 0.5156 0.514 
ρ  1 -0.8974 0.967 0.9468 -1 0.9212 -0.9551 -0.8983 0.8046 
p-value  0.9859 0.0123 0.1922 0.0044 0.9868 0.0165 0.0157 0.0023 0.0277 
(Pseudo) R2 0.126          
The determined variable is a binary variable for adoption of any technology in the portfolio of technologies.  The first column is estimated by probit estimation, treating all 
information variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the information variable at the top of the column jointly 
determined.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B14 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for initial adoption of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.004 -0.0064 -0.0090* -0.0099* -0.0046 -0.0164*** -0.0021 -0.0083 -0.0084 
 0.0053 0.0051 0.0052 0.006 0.005 0.0053 0.0049 0.0052 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1684*** 0.1437** 0.2150*** -0.0401 0.0902 0.0221 0.026 0.0596 -0.0989 
 0.0648 0.0599 0.0649 0.0684 0.0592 0.0614 0.0579 0.0576 0.0637 
Hectares 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0002* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0009*** -0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Full time 0.2126 -0.1427 0.0979 0.0444 0.1862 0.1151 0.1322 0.4051*** 0.4584*** 
 0.1518 0.1505 0.1562 0.1699 0.149 0.1566 0.1428 0.1492 0.159 
Internet score 0.0795*** -0.0820** 0.0943** 0.1247*** -0.0968*** 0.0907** -0.0693* -0.1249*** 0.1998*** 
 0.0299 0.0411 0.0445 0.0449 0.0239 0.0417 0.0399 0.0445 0.0511 
Local adoption -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0018 0.0004 0.0062 0.0048 0.004 -0.0024 0.0167*** 
 0.006 0.0055 0.0057 0.0065 0.0055 0.0059 0.0054 0.0056 0.0057 
Constant -0.1612 -0.1496 -1.5677*** 0.9838** -0.5026 0.5681 0.3425 0.3321 -0.8048* 
 0.4005 0.3837 0.4225 0.4503 0.3576 0.4064 0.3667 0.3829 0.4146 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by recursive bivariate probit with the initial 
adoption of the technology jointly determined.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B15 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on initial adoption of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.0862*** 0.1079*         
 0.0289 0.0611         
Agents -0.0187  0.0139        
 0.0292  0.0154        
Academia -0.0557*   -0.0053       
 0.0318   0.1247       
Suppliers 0.0264    0.0579      
 0.0328    0.0689      
Buyers 0.0788**     0.095     
 0.0332     0.0719     
Farmers 0.0556*      0.0846**    
 0.0288      0.042    
DEFRA 0.0164       0.0342   
 0.0285       0.0348   
Farmers Weekly 0.0181        0.0135  
 0.028        0.0206  
Farmers Guardian 0.0158         0.0468*** 
 0.0296         0.0146 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B16, part one 
Estimated coefficients for information determinants of intensification of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.0978 0.1674         
 0.0724 0.1164         
Agents 0.0196  0.1042        
 0.0588  0.1129        
Academia 0.0157   0.0766       
 0.0633   0.062       
Suppliers 0.0363    0.1024      
 0.0746    0.0716      
Buyers 0.2079***     0.2571**     
 0.0589     0.1059     
Farmers 0.0331      0.1257    
 0.064      0.1034    
DEFRA 0.1263**       0.1873***   
 0.0627       0.059   
Farmers Weekly -0.0216        0.1316  
 0.0626        0.1152  
Farmers Guardian 0.0969*         0.1308 
 0.0587         0.1061 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B16, part two 
Estimated coefficients for non-information determinants of intensification of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0023 
 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 
Formal education 0.0204 0.0157 0.0179 0.017 0.0232 0.0194 0.0205 0.0215 0.0159 0.0287 
 0.0309 0.0307 0.0307 0.0304 0.0302 0.0302 0.0301 0.0302 0.0303 0.0307 
Hectares -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Full time 0.1259 0.1492* 0.1664** 0.1610** 0.1611** 0.1484* 0.1569** 0.1530** 0.1386* 0.1431* 
 0.0776 0.0769 0.0766 0.0764 0.0765 0.0767 0.0765 0.0765 0.0782 0.0779 
Environ schemes 0.017 0.0045 -0.0107 -0.002 -0.0008 0.0031 0.0035 -0.0067 -0.0054 0.0037 
 0.0553 0.054 0.0538 0.0539 0.0539 0.0541 0.0541 0.0539 0.054 0.054 
Environ consults 0.1505** 0.2295*** 0.2317*** 0.2408*** 0.2516*** 0.1907*** 0.2492*** 0.2200*** 0.2473*** 0.2469*** 
 0.074 0.0713 0.0717 0.0714 0.0706 0.072 0.0705 0.0712 0.0708 0.0706 
Local adoption -0.0018* -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0016 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Constant 0.4112* 0.6274*** 0.7181*** 0.7362*** 0.6360*** 0.6593*** 0.6234*** 0.6449*** 0.6903*** 0.6565*** 
 0.2486 0.2357 0.2273 0.2239 0.2369 0.2254 0.2409 0.2265 0.2363 0.2314 
ρ  -0.9686 -0.9395 -1 -1 -0.9059 -0.877 0.8145 -1 0.9109 
p-value  0.2356 0.6513 0.982 0.9844 0.7614 0.886 0.9956  0.3987 
The determined variable is a count of the number of technologies adopted in the portfolio.  The first column is estimated by Poisson estimation, treating all information 
variables as exogenous.  The remaining columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a treatment effect from the information variable at the top of the 
column.  The p-value is for a test of ρ=0.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
  169 
Table 3.B17 
Estimated coefficients for determinants of information use for intensification of adoption of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
Years farming -0.0031 -0.0078 -0.0117 -0.011 -0.0072 -0.0160*** -0.002 -0.0131*** -0.0097* 
 0.0067 0.005 0.0307 0.0764 0.0051 0.0053 0.005 0.0000 0.0052 
Formal education 0.1470** 0.1490** 0.1679 -0.0748 0.0717 0.0243 0.05 0.0271*** -0.1244** 
 0.0609 0.0614 0.4513 2.8294 0.0602 0.0604 0.0587 0.0000 0.0604 
Hectares 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0001 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0023 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 1.03E+09 0.0001 
Full time 0.267 -0.0933 0.3325 0.1474 0.1597 0.1039 0.132 0.3423*** 0.4350*** 
 0.1664 0.1481 0.6056 6.8215 0.153 0.1534 0.1483 0.0000 0.1622 
Internet score 0.0487 -0.0055 0.0222 0.1177 -0.1151** 0.0119 -0.019 -0.0656*** 0.1341** 
 0.0612 0.0526 0.4487 5.7113 0.0544 0.0536 0.0523 0.0000 0.0546 
Local adoption -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0000 0.0023 0.0013 0.0014 -0.0019*** 0.0067*** 
 0.0022 0.002 0.0082 0.6782 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0000 0.002 
Constant -0.0945 -0.3659 -1.2134 1.0908 -0.2818 0.7955* 0.1313 0.5985*** -0.4856 
 0.4275 0.4016 3.6538 29.1286 0.3992 0.4097 0.3926 0.0000 0.4062 
The determined variable is a binary variable for use of the information at the top of the column.  The columns are estimated by a Poisson technology adoption model with a 
treatment effect from the information variable.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. 
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Table 3.B18 
Marginal effects of using an information sources on intensification of adoption of a weed focussed farmer technology 
 All icc agents academe supplier buyers farmers defra fweekly fguard 
ICC 0.249 0.4063         
 0.1845 7.62E+24         
Agents 0.0498  0.2659        
 0.1497  14.1719        
Academia 0.0399   0.1983       
 0.1612   0.1635       
Suppliers 0.0923    0.2525      
 0.1898    0.1708      
Buyers 0.5292***     0.6750**     
 0.1507     0.2893     
Farmers 0.0844      0.3122    
 0.1629      0.2509    
DEFRA 0.3215**       0.4626***   
 0.1598       0.1416   
Farmers Weekly -0.055        0.328  
 0.1592        0.2815  
Farmers Guardian 0.2466*         0.3386 
 0.1497         0.2757 
The entries are the differences in adoption probability when the information at the top of the column is used compared with when it is not used.  The other variables are held 
at their mean.  * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance.
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Chapter 4 
 
Introduction of innovations during the  
2007-8 financial crisis: US companies 
compared with universities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The 2007-8 financial crisis marked a period of financial decline and 
disruption unusual since 1945 (Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), figure 1).  
Defaults on loans in the US subprime mortgage market resulted directly 
and indirectly in losses to lenders and their resulting bankruptcies (Acharya 
et al, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009).  The cost of lending rose across many 
debt instruments (Acharya et al, 2009), and the crisis spread to 
international financial markets through losses and reduced availability of 
external finance (Claessens et al, 2010). 
 
The resulting real economic disruption affected industrial innovation.  
Paunov (2012) finds that many Latin American companies stopped 
innovation projects, while Archibugi et al (2013b) and Filippetti and 
Archibugi (2011) determine broad innovation expenditure reductions for 
European companies.  Laperche et al’s (2011) examination of French 
businesses finds them streamlining and prioritising R&D during the crisis.  
Makonnen (2013) looks at European government R&D expenditures by 
innovation type, and shows that governments tended to reduce their 
budgets during the crisis. 
 
If funding sources suffered losses in the crisis, or if their means of 
transferring funds to recipients were interrupted, the cost of finance would 
have risen and institutions dependent on it would have found their 
operations curtailed (Campello et al, 2010; Dell’Ariccia et al, 2008; 
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Kroszner et al, 2007).  Research on the 2007-8 crisis’ effect on innovation 
has examined the role of dependence on external finance in passing.  
Paunov’s (2012) investigation of Latin American companies uses indicator 
variables for corporate access to public funding (which significantly 
reduces the chance of discontinuing an innovation project) and private 
external funding (which has no significant effect).  Archibugi et al’s (2013a) 
European study uses an indicator variable for whether companies 
considered availability to be an innovation obstacle prior to the crisis.  It 
has a negative insignificant effect on innovation expenditure growth before 
the crisis, and positive insignificant effect during it.  Filippetti and 
Archibugi (2011) examine behaviour of an ordinal variable indicating 
whether European firms moved from decreasing innovation investment to 
maintaining or increasing it during the crisis (or other permutations of this 
movement).  They find that in countries with large national private credit 
markets there was a tendency to move from declining investment to 
increasing investment during the crisis, and interpret the result as showing 
that the financial system depth counteracts the effect of the financial crisis. 
 
In this paper we address more fully questions about whether necessity and 
ability to attract funding had a major effect on innovation during the crisis.  
How did US company innovation respond to external funding requirements 
during the crisis?  What was the response of US university innovation?  
How did their innovation respond to asset intangibility, a measure of the 
ability to attract external funding? 
 
To answer these questions, we examine the funding relations that financiers 
have with companies and universities, and how they are affected by the 
crisis.  We find that the change during the crisis in aggregate R&D funding 
to companies and universities can be used to predict how their innovation 
responds to external funding dependence.  We also determine the relation 
between asset intangibility and innovation for both types of innovator.  The 
results are used to predict that when US companies are undertaking 
innovation, the dependence of a class of project on external finance does 
not significantly change output from that class during the crisis.  By 
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contrast, when universities are innovating, more externally dependent 
classes have increased output during the crisis.  A further prediction is that 
if a project class has a higher ratio of intangible to total assets, then its 
innovative output will increase during the crisis for university innovators. 
 
We test our hypotheses by examining how predicted patent counts change 
during the crisis for each innovator type.  A database is constructed by 
joining US patent data with Compustat data, in which the unit of analysis is 
patent counts in each patent class.  The construction allows us to associate 
measures of external funding dependence, R&D intensity, and other 
financial quantities to specific innovation classes and their statistics.  The 
empirical results are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions.  
We use our parameter estimates to investigate the effect of US company 
innovation responding to the crisis in the same way as US university 
innovation, but acting on the same portfolio of US company innovation 
projects, and vice versa.  US company responses are associated with more 
patenting than US university responses, acting both through financial and 
non-financial effects. 
 
Section 4.2 looks at aggregate innovation funding to US companies and 
universities, section 4.3 gives our theoretical framework, section 4.4 
describes our data, section 4.5 gives our empirical method, section 4.6 
presents our results, section 4.7 looks at counterfactuals, and section 4.8 
concludes. 
 
4.2 Aggregate innovation funding before and during the crisis 
4.2.1 Funding sources 
In 2008, total R&D expenditures in the US were $404 billion, or 2.8 
percent of GDP (National Science Board (2012), appendix tables 4-1 and 
4-44).  US business R&D alone accounted for 1.7 percent of GDP, with 
government accounting for a further 0.8 percent of GDP.  Universities and 
colleges invested 0.1 percent of GDP from their own funds, with smaller 
investments from non-profit and foreign sources making up the balance.   
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Industrial R&D is mainly self-funded by industry, with industrial self-
funding accounting for around 90 percent of total expenditure throughout 
the 2000s (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3).  
Government funding rose slightly to 13 percent in 2008 and 14 percent in 
2009, but remained at historically low levels having exceeded 50 percent 
throughout most of the 1960s. 
 
By comparison, around two thirds of funding for university R&D came 
from government in the 2000s, and industry only provided around six 
percent (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3).  Internal 
university and college monies accounted for about a fifth of the total, with 
non-profit funding outstripping industrial funding in the final years of the 
decade.  The funding shares were quite stable. 
 
4.2.2 The effect of the financial crisis 
Many US banks and financial institutions faced large declines in their 
capital reserves during the 2007-8 financial crisis.  Debt defaults were 
common, credit lines were quickly used up by borrowers, and short-term 
creditors to banks withdrew their lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).  
As a consequence, a number became bankrupt, and others were severely 
financially compromised.  Regaining sufficient reserves became important 
for maintaining an acceptable level of bankruptcy risk and to meet 
regulatory requirements.  The opportunity cost of loaning new money 
therefore increased sharply.  The increased difficulty in raising finance is 
manifested in aggregate data: bank loans to the corporate sector fell sharply 
from the middle of 2007 (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), and a 
precipitous decline was also observed in venture capital funding (OECD, 
2009). 
 
Government finances were also severely impacted by the financial crisis.  
Nevertheless, despite large deficits developed country governments 
generally provided substantial fiscal stimuli over the crisis period (OECD 
(2009), figure 5).  In the US, the total fiscal package between 2008 and 
2010 exceeded five percent of 2008 GDP.  Specific funds for innovative 
 183 
investment were made available through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA, 2009) which was passed in February 2009.  The 
occurrence of an increase in government support for industrial R&D at the 
same time as a substantial downturn in industry’s own funding was unique 
in the period since 1953 (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-
3). 
 
Industry self-funding for industrial R&D underwent a large decline in 2009 
at an annual rate of 5.5 percent, marking the second largest percentage 
decline since the 1950s (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-
3).  The absolute level remained near historically record levels.  
Government expenditure in 2008 and 2009 rose with fiscal measures 
including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, but was still far 
less than industrial funding.  The extra government spending was not 
sufficient to offset the decline in industrial expenditure in 2009.  
Nevertheless, total R&D funding to industry in 2009 was at its second 
highest level ever. 
 
4.3 Theoretical framework 
4.3.1 Corporate innovation during the crisis 
Innovation can be expensive (DiMasi et al, 2003; Adams and Brantner, 
2006; DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007), time-consuming (Griffin, 1997), and 
risky (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995).  It may require substantial 
financing over extended periods in the presence of high risk.  Some 
companies may be able to use internal funds to finance their R&D, but 
many will not have sufficient available assets and will have to seek 
external financing for innovation.  There are a number of difficulties for a 
commercial external funding source that are liable to restrict the 
availability of external finance, or at least make it more expensive than 
internal finance (Hall, 2002).  One problem is information asymmetry 
between investors and innovators.  Because innovation is usually 
technically demanding, and because innovators often want to preserve 
secrecy to protect their ideas from rivals, investors generally know less 
about the projects than the innovators.  Thus, a lemons market (Akerlof, 
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1970) can emerge where investors make higher charges than the better 
innovators will accept, and the market shrinks. 
  
Financial markets connect investors with fund recipients and can mitigate 
these informational problems (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  Expert 
intermediaries operate in financial markets, and they can monitor agent 
behaviour more closely and enforce better corporate governance.  Financial 
markets often require companies operating on them to follow accounting 
and disclosure rules, and adopt behavioural standards.  These requirements 
may improve investor knowledge about the companies. 
 
A financial crisis can affect the ability of companies to finance themselves 
on a commercial basis.  In the 2007-8 crisis, funds available from 
commercial sources were reduced by large scale defaults experienced 
against their portfolios particularly from US sub-prime mortgages 
(Calomiris, 2008), which resulted in reduction of revenue streams either 
directly or through counterparty exposure.  The inability to use these assets 
as collateral reduced the sources’ borrowing ability and so the cost of funds 
available for investment (Acharya et al, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 
2009).  In addition to contraction in the available stock of funding, 
potential innovators may be less attractive as recipients of funding due to a 
concurrent recession.  The value of monitoring to information 
intermediaries may be reduced in a depressed market and the credibility of 
their monitoring may fall for potential investors (Holmström and Tirole, 
1997), so increasing the uncertainty associated with investment.  
 
To elaborate on the consequences of these considerations, it is helpful to 
consider the problems solved by investors and managers considering 
investment in a project.  A private investor deciding on whether to invest in 
the project during the crisis expects to receive an immediate utility (net of 
investment cost) of  
 
εµ +Σ−  
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where μ is the net income from investment, Σ is a measure of the risk from 
investment due to the crisis interrupting normal market information 
provision and so leading to ignorance about managerial quality, and ε is an 
error term with distribution function )(εf .  The crisis risk Σ declines with 
a rise in T, the level of tangible assets available as collateral to protect 
against the consequences of imperfect information, so 0/ <Σ dTd .  
Investment occurs if 
 
0>+Σ− εµ  
 
or 
 
µε −Σ> . 
 
The manager who has perfect information about their own managerial 
quality would act on behalf of the investor and invest if 
 
µε −> . 
 
Thus, the excess in investment by managers over external investors during 
the crisis occurs in the region given by 
 
µεµ −>≥−Σ        (4.1) 
 
This is the region in which a project that had to be entirely externally 
financed would not be given approval, while the same project that was 
entirely internally financed would result in investment. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the market informational provision functions normally, 
and so the investor faces no crisis risk and 0=Σ .  They receive an 
immediate net utility from investment of 
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εµ +b  
 
where μb is the net income from investment before the crisis.  Since there is 
a recession at the same time as the financial crisis, µµ >b .  Investment 
occurs if 
 
bµε −> . 
 
Investment occurs before the crisis but not during it if  
 
bµεµ −>≥−Σ , 
 
which happens with probability ∫
−Σ
−
µ
µ
εε
b
df )( .  As we saw in section 4.2, 
there was a small change in observed company investment during the crisis 
relative to investment before it, so this probability is small. 
 
From equation (4.1), the probability that a manager invests but an investor 
does not invest is ∫
−Σ
−
µ
µ
εε df )( .  Since µµ >b , it follows that 
 
0)()( >> ∫∫
−Σ
−
−Σ
−
µ
µ
µ
µ
εεεε dfdf
b
 
 
and so there is a very small probability that a project would be financed if 
internal finance is available but not financed if external finance is 
necessary.  It follows that there is a very small negative change in expected 
investment when the project moves from being entirely internally 
dependent to entirely externally dependent.  Assuming innovative outputs 
are positively related to investment, we then have the following hypothesis: 
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H1: For US companies during the financial crisis, dependence on external 
finance will not change significantly the innovative output from project 
classes. 
 
We next investigate the effect of asset intangibility on innovation during 
the crisis.  Intangible assets N are assumed to rise with the level of 
investment, other things being equal, so 0/ >dIdN .  We also assume that 
innovative outputs P, being a subset of intangible assets, increase when 
they do, so 0/ >dNdP . 
 
From equation (4.1), we have the lower and upper limits on the region over 
which non-investment occurs.  Since 0/ <Σ dTd , the upper limit µ−Σ  
reduces with tangible assets T, while the lower limit µ−  is unchanged and 
so the probability of investment rises.  Hence the expected investment rises 
as well and 0/ >dTdI . 
 
The intangibility ratio of a company is the value of intangible assets 
divided by the value of total assets, or )/( NTN + .  It can measure how 
much protection an investor has in the event of a company being wound up, 
and has been as a performance determinant in financial crises (Kroszner et 
al, 2007).  The response of innovative outputs to changes in the 
intangibility ratio is given by ))/(( NTNd
dP
+
.  We analyse the properties of 
this quantity. When the derivative is non-zero, the inverse function theorem 
says that 
1))/((
))/((
−





 +
=
+ dP
NTNd
NTNd
dP
.  The derivative in the 
bracket can be expanded using the chain rule to give 
 
1))/((
))/((
−





 +
=
+ dI
NTNd
dN
dI
dP
dN
NTNd
dP
 
 
or, using the inverse function theorem again and the product rule, 
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The terms 
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Thus, innovative outputs grow as the intangibility ratio increases if and 
only if the product of growth of intangible assets as investment increases 
and the growth of investment as tangible assets increase is sufficiently 
large.  In other words, growth in intangible assets is induced by tangible 
asset growth through investment, and for innovative output growth to be 
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associated with a rising intangibility ratio, the intangible asset growth has 
to be large enough to outpace the tangible asset growth.  Hence, we cannot 
state certainly how the intangibility ratio will affect company innovative 
outputs. 
 
4.3.2 University innovation during the crisis 
Many US university laboratories consider basic research as their primary 
objective, with much of their time spent on publishing academic research 
(Bozeman, 2000).  Nevertheless, their work often has an applied character 
(Mowery et al, 2001), and some of that work gives rise to commercial 
innovations.  The funding for such innovations may come from, among 
other sources, industry or government.  The latter source has become more 
important through a series of government policy initiatives including the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowing universities to commercialise federally 
funded innovations, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 and its 
amendment in 1993 facilitating research collaborations, and the Advanced 
Technology Program from 1990 and the Technology Innovation Program 
from 2007 providing funding for research projects that often resulted in 
university-private sector partnerships (Bozeman, 2000; Hall et al, 2003). 
 
A source providing funding to a university faces information problems 
similar to those faced by a funder of a company.  It typically has less 
information than the university or the funded academic about their ability 
to implement a project, or about the project’s progress.  However, 
commercial sources funding universities usually extract information from 
the recipients directly rather than through the information intermediaries 
commonly used in financing companies, reflecting the frequent utility to 
the funding source of the university knowledge generated.  The direct 
information extraction can take the form of technical queries, consultancy, 
direct employment, co-authoring papers, and hiring graduates and post-
doctoral researchers (Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; Bozeman and 
Gaughan, 2007).  The US federal and state governments generally limit the 
information gap by competitive tender of grants, with applications having 
to give detailed information on their planned technological and financial 
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aspects (see for example, Department of Health and Human Services (2007) 
or National Science Foundation (2013)).  The applications are subject to 
monitoring during their progress and the possibility of non-renewal for 
ongoing projects.  Expert evaluation of applications is maintained by use of 
peer review. 
 
The provision of funding for US university innovation is not necessarily as 
badly disrupted by a financial crisis as provision for company innovation.  
The largest university funding source is the US government which is less 
financially constrained than US companies during crises.  It could run 
deficits and make available extra funds to universities, which it did in 
2007-8.  Available funds from commercial sources may be subject to acute 
pressure due to the financial crisis and recession, as described above.  
Given the non-market form of the informational ties between universities 
and capital providers, the collapse of the information provision function of 
the market does not affect information passing directly between them. 
 
These observations can be given a formal mathematical form in order to 
theorise on how university innovation responded to the financial crisis.  We 
analyse investment by a government investor who values the income from 
a project (whether it accrues to the government or the university), and also 
other consequences from investment.  During the crisis, a government 
investor in a project expects to receive an immediate utility (net of 
investment cost) of  
 
εµ ++ P  
 
where μ is the net income from investment, P is a measure of the political 
value of other consequences of investment in excess of any benefits before 
the crisis, and ε is an error term with distribution function )(εf . 
 
Investment occurs if 
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0>++ εµ P  
 
or 
 
µε −−> P . 
 
A commercially motivated university manager will invest if 
 
µε −> . 
 
Thus, the excess in investment by investors over managers during the crisis 
occurs in the region given by 
 
µεµ −−>≥− P        (4.2) 
 
This is the region in which a project that was did not have access to 
external finance would not be given approval, while the same project that 
was externally financed would result in investment. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the additional political benefits of investment in the 
crisis are not present, so 0=P .  They receive an immediate net utility 
from investment of 
 
εµ +b  
 
where μb is the net income from investment before the crisis.  Since there is 
a recession at the same time as the financial crisis, µµ >b .  Investment 
occurs if 
 
bµε −> . 
 
Investment occurs during the crisis but not before it if  
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µεµ −−>≥− Pb , 
 
conditional on the political benefits being sufficiently large so that 
µµ −> bP .  The error term lies in the region with probability ∫
−
−−
b
P
df
µ
µ
εε )( .  
In section 4.2, we saw that there was a reasonably large increase in 
observed government funding to R&D investment during the crisis relative 
to investment before it, so the probability is quite large. 
 
From equation (4.2), the probability that a investor would fund a project 
but a manager would not is ∫
−
−−
µ
µ
εε
P
df )( .  Since µµ >b , it follows that 
 
0)()( >> ∫∫
−
−−
−
−−
b
PP
dfdf
µ
µ
µ
µ
εεεε  
 
and so there is a quite large probability that a project would be financed if 
external finance is necessary but not financed if internal finance is the 
source.  It follows that there is a quite large change in expected investment 
when the project moves from being entirely internally dependent to entirely 
externally dependent.  Assuming innovative outputs are positively related 
to investment, we then have the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: For US universities during the financial crisis, dependence on external 
finance will increase the innovative output of project classes. 
 
The effect of the intangibility ratio on university innovation during the 
crisis is analysed in a similar way as for company innovation.  We again 
assume intangible assets N rise with the level of investment so 0/ >dIdN , 
and innovative outputs P increase with intangible assets, so 0/ >dNdP .  
The limits on the region in which investors invest more than managers in 
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equation (4.2) are both independent of tangible assets T, so investment I 
during the crisis is independent of T, and 0/ =dIdT . 
 
The derivative of innovative outputs with respect to the intangibility ratio 
can be expanded as before to 
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since 0/ =dIdT .  The terms 
dN
dP
, 
dI
dN
, NT + , and 





+
−
NT
N1  are all 
positive, so 0))/(( >+ NTNd
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So, university innovative outputs grow as the intangibility ratio rises.  We 
therefore have the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: For US universities during the financial crisis, higher intangibility 
ratios will increase the innovative output of project classes. 
 
4.3.3 Control variables 
The main variables for testing our hypotheses will be external financial 
dependence and the asset intangibility ratio, whose construction we will 
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describe in section 4.4.  We also include several control variables in the 
analysis.  Together with lagged innovative outputs, they are used to capture 
other influences on the change in innovation during the crisis, including the 
effect of demand shifts due to the associated recession.  In this subsection, 
we present the expected effect of the control variables on innovation. 
 
The novelty of the type of innovated product 
The financial crisis may have been associated with either of two 
Schumpeterian hypotheses, namely creative accumulation or creative 
destruction (Archibugi et al 2013a).  Under the creative accumulation 
hypothesis, innovations are incremental and due to established innovators.  
They are the innovators who persist during the crisis, and we may expect 
them to build on their existing work with more established products.  Thus, 
the age of the product type could be positively associated with changes in 
the volume of innovation.  Under the creative destruction hypothesis, 
innovations are radical and occur in new areas.  The financial crisis created 
instability and weakened the position of existing innovators.  The crisis 
would be a time of new product type introduction, so that the age of the 
product type could be negatively associated with change in the amount of 
innovation.  We do not take a prior position on which hypothesis best 
describes innovation during the crisis, and leave the data to determine the 
result. 
 
R&D intensity 
R&D intensity is measured as R&D divided by sales.  Between 2008 and 
2009, R&D funding for companies reduced (National Science Board 
(2012), appendix table 4-3).  As a result, they had lower funds for 
sustaining research in previously initiated projects and for bringing 
partially finished projects to completion.  The difficulties may have been 
most acute for expensive and risky R&D intensive projects.  Thus, during 
the financial crisis we may expect bigger declines in commercial 
innovation for companies undertaking more R&D intensive projects.  
Universities had increased R&D funding indicating that the effect of R&D 
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intensity would increase, but the impact would be moderated by their 
primary non-commercial objectives. 
 
Capital to labour ratio 
Large investments are made in R&D in the US (see section 4.2.1), and 
single successful innovative products can be very costly (see DiMasi et al 
(2003), Adams and Brantner (2006), and DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) for 
the costs of pharmaceuticals).  Human skill and ingenuity is important in 
the innovation process, and employee remunerations are a large cost in it.  
For example, in 2008 the total wage bill for US corporate R&D workers 
was around $114 billion1 compared with total business R&D investment of 
$291 billion (see section 4.2.1).  We do not have any strong prior 
expectations of whether a high capital to labour ratio for a production 
process will be associated with higher or lower innovation rates.  During 
the financial crisis, capital was rationed and innovation projects dependent 
on capital may have been hindered more than those with greater 
dependence on labour.  Innovative output from such projects may have 
declined.  However, as we do not expect a strong initial relation between 
innovation and the capital to labour ratio, the decline may be weak.  
Kroszner et al (2007) finds the capital to labour ratio has an insignificant 
effect on industrial value added growth changes between financial crisis 
periods and the periods preceding them. 
 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Preparation 
In this section, we present the data used in our empirical testing2.  It comes 
from two sources, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) online 
patent database and Compustat financial data.  The cross-sectional unit of 
analysis is patent class, a USPTO classification of inventions according to 
technological type.  There are 473 such classes, given directly in the 
USPTO data.  For the Compustat financial data, we aggregate the data by 
                                                 
1
 National Science Board (2012), table 3-7 puts average annual salaries for science and 
engineering workers at $80,170 in 2010.  Table 3-13 gives total company R&D workers at 
1,424,000 in 2008.  We multiply to give a total wage bill of $114 billion. 
2
 The data and STATA code used in estimation are available from the author on request. 
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industry code and then use the code to map into patent class.  The patent 
class thus serves as a means of identifying technological and financial 
characteristics of innovation undertaken by US companies and US 
universities.  By construction, the quantities derived from the Compustat 
data (external dependence, intangibility, R&D intensity, and the capital to 
labour ratio) allow for the industrial composition of their patent class. 
 
USPTO data 
The USPTO online patent database contains details of patent applications 
in the US unless the applicant has explicitly requested privacy prior to 
grant.  Patent applications are published eighteen months after the applicant 
files for a patent.  The database records applicant name, country of 
residence of the organisation or person to whom the application is issued, 
the application date, and the patent class of the invention.  We accessed the 
data in March 2014. 
 
Compustat data 
We use data from all companies on Compustat for constructing our 
financial measures.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Kroszner et al (2007) 
also use the full set of Compustat companies in preparing measures of 
external dependence, which results in the statistics reflecting the finances 
of US publicly quoted and larger companies.  Our measures are all ratios of 
financial quantities, and are used for companies and universities operating 
commercially by undertaking patenting.  Conceivably the relevant ratios of 
financial quantities in commercial operations run by US universities may 
be different from those in US companies.  If true, then our hypothesis 
testing remains valid if the adjustment factor between the financial ratios of 
companies and university commercial operations is constant across 
different innovation projects.  Moreover, we run separate estimates for 
companies and universities, so there are no interpretational ambiguities for 
a combined coefficient. 
 
Our statistics for Compustat data are grouped by two digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) System codes.  As our cross-sectional unit 
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for estimation is the USPTO patent class, we map from SIC based statistics 
to patent class based statistics using the concordance file between the two 
classifications provided by USPTO (2008b).  The mapping to patent class 
is not unique as there are multiple subclasses which may be allocated 
different SIC codes, so we calculate average statistics over subclasses.  For 
every patent class, the percentage of each SIC code corresponding to the 
class is calculated.  The statistics for the patent class are derived as the sum 
of the percentage weighted statistics for the individual SIC codes.  The 
formulas take the form 
 
∑
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where SC is the statistic for patent class C, Si is the statistic for SIC code i, 
nC,i is the number of subclasses in class C corresponding to SIC code i, and 
the summations run over all SIC codes. 
 
As a means of determining the financial conditions under which an 
innovation was produced, the mapping is inevitably inexact.  The difficulty 
arises from the allocation of patents to specific industries, as noted by Jaffe 
and Palmer (1997) in their matching of patents to industrial environmental 
cost data.  An invention may have been produced by an innovator whose 
core operation is not in the SIC code allocated to the invention.  So the 
invention may have been produced in financial conditions that differ from 
those that apply to companies producing under the allocated SIC code.  We 
assume that any mismatches occur as random noise in the data and do not 
distort our results. 
 
Our statistics Si derived from Compustat data (external dependence, 
intangibility, R&D intensity, and the capital to labour ratio) all take the 
form of ratios and depend on the SIC code i.  To calculate them, we first 
calculate the corresponding statistics Si,j for each SIC code and company 
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code j.  They are calculated as ten year averages over 2000-9, with for 
example the intangibility ratio given by 
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where kji ,,ν  are the total intangible assets for company coded j in year k 
operating in industry i, and kji ,,τ  are the total tangible assets over the same 
period.  The statistic Si for the SIC code are then the median of Si,j over all 
companies. 
 
Variables 
Patent counts 
We use counts of patent applications as our measure of innovation within 
each patent class and split by innovator type, using USPTO data.  Patents 
have long been used as such a measure (Scherer 1965, Schmookler 1962), 
and their advantages and disadvantages extensively discussed (Archibugi 
and Pianta, 1996; Basberg, 1987; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003).  The 
extent to which patents measure innovation may differ by innovator type.  
Universities may have a lower proclivity to patent their innovation than 
companies because of their largely different objectives (Bozeman, 2000).  
We may nevertheless infer that a contraction due to the crisis in the number 
of innovations, and in particular in the number of innovations produced 
with a commercial orientation, will generally be associated with a 
reduction in the number of patents for any innovator type. 
 
We collect monthly data for the period from January 2006 to December 
2009, giving 348,000 patents in total.  There is an 18 month delay between 
filing and publication of applications, but as our data was collected in 
March 2014 the delay does not affect included applications.  Applications 
that are made with a request of privacy, and are due to be successfully 
granted, and take more than four years to process may not be included in 
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the data (with potentially greater effect on patent counts in later months).  
However, we expect the numbers to be small because the mean delay 
between patent application and issue or abandonment was 32 months in 
2008 (USPTO (2008a), workload table 4) so that the large majority of 
applications would have been handled four years after they were made.  
Moreover, any omissions will not change the comparative results across 
innovators. 
 
There is no single US country code to allow us to identify all US applicants 
on the USPTO database, but it does record the US state in which an 
American applicant is resident.  We sum the patent counts for each state to 
obtain a patent counts for the whole US.  The academic origin of applicants 
is not recorded on the USPTO database.  We separate academic and non-
academic applicants by searches on the applicant name.  A representative 
subset of academic applicants is identified by searching the name for the 
words “university”, “college”, “school”, or “institute of technology”.  
These search terms identify most of the primary institutional names for 
academic applicants, including the largest patenters 3 .  Some academic 
institutions may patent under secondary names omitting these terms, and 
these patents will be included in our non-academic counts.  As the number 
of company patents far exceeds university patents, the contamination of 
company patent counts will be very limited. 
 
External dependence 
External dependence is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditures not 
financed by net operating cash flow to capital expenditure.  The Compustat 
code for capital expenditures is capx, and for net operating cash flow is 
oancf, so the formula for external dependence is capxoancfcapx )( − .  
The list of external dependence values by patent class is available at our 
website in .csv format4. 
 
                                                 
3
 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/total_counts/univ_ct_list_2012.htm 
4
 http://ebasic.easily.co.uk/02E044/05304E/Ext_dep_by_patent_class.csv 
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Intangibility 
Intangibility is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets.  The Compustat 
code for intangible assets is intan, and for total assets is at. 
 
The novelty of the innovated product class 
The novelty of the innovated product type is measured by the date at which 
the USPTO introduced the corresponding patent class.  The earliest 
establishment date is 1899 for patent classes including wood turning 
products and envelopes.  The latest introduction date is 2007 for 
combinatorial chemistry technology. 
 
The USPTO class introduction date is likely to measure the novelty of a 
type of innovated product only with a delay.  It may not be immediately 
clear that the early patents in the product type represent a major departure 
from existing product types, and their citations will necessarily locate them 
within existing classes.  The USPTO may only wish to introduce a new 
class only when a sufficient number of relevant patents is reached, and the 
identification and decision processes will not be immediate.  Our 
econometric method will absorb into the constant term the average delay 
between the date at which a product type was first innovated and the date at 
which the corresponding USPTO class was introduced5. 
 
R&D intensity 
R&D intensity is calculated as the ratio of R&D to sales.  The respective 
Compustat codes are xrd and sale. 
 
Capital to labour ratio 
The capital to labour ratio is calculated as fixed assets divided by number 
of employees.  The Compustat code for fixed assets is ppent, and for 
employees is emp. 
 
                                                 
5
 Thanks to Pia Weiss for pointing out the likely difference between innovation date and 
patent class introduction date, and suggesting reasons for it. 
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Time 
Time is measured in months since April 2001 (the first month of data 
availability), with April 2001 = 1. 
 
4.4.2 Summary statistics 
In table 4.1 we see summary statistics for the financial and other 
characteristics of the innovation undertaken by each innovator type.  The 
mean external dependence of company innovation is lower than university 
innovation.  For the classes in which companies innovate, internally 
generated funds are around 164 percent of total capital expenditures in US 
commercial conditions, while for universities the amount is 124 percent.  
The mean level of asset intangibility in those classes is similar for both 
innovator types at 14 and 15 percent.  The mean establishment dates of the 
patent classes in which they operate is also similar, in the second half of the 
1970s.  Both innovate in the oldest and newest classes.  The R&D intensity 
is higher in classes in which companies innovate compared with those in 
which universities innovate.  The capital to labour ratio is lower for the 
projects of companies than those of universities. 
 
Table 4.1 
Summary statistics for innovation portfolios of each innovator type 
 US companies US universities 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
External 
dependence -0.64 -5.55 0.84 -0.24 -5.49 0.84 
Intangibility 0.14 0 0.66 0.15 0 0.66 
Date 
established 1975 1899 2007 1978 1899 2007 
R&D 
intensity 0.0029 0 0.0866 0.0017 0 0.0865 
Capital/labour 115.3 0 2783.3 173.3 0 2783.3 
Notes: mean values are weighted by patent counts. 
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4.4.3 Changes in aggregate patent counts during the crisis 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Aggregate patent counts by US companies with OLS lines fitted for 2006-7 
and 2008-9. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows aggregate patent counts by US companies.  There are 
326,000 patents in total over the period 2006-9, and the aggregate patenting 
appears to slow down around the end of 2007.  To demonstrate the change 
in broad terms, the patent counts from the period 2006-7 are regressed on a 
time trend by OLS, and then the same is done for the period 2008-9.  The 
two fitted lines are superimposed on the graph.  The change in level and 
trend between the two periods is clear.  Figure 4.2 shows aggregate patent 
counts for US universities; there are 22,000 patents over the whole period.  
Their patenting seems to change after the start of the financial crisis, in 
both level and trend. 
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Figure 4.2. Aggregate patent counts by US universities with OLS lines fitted for 2006-7 
and 2008-9. 
 
To examine whether the change in aggregate patent rates for US companies 
is significant, we ran F tests for the constant and trend coefficient in the 
pre-break and post-break periods being jointly equal, allowing for possible 
break dates between January 2007 and December 2009.  Figure 4.3 shows 
the p-values against break dates.  The p-values are low throughout the 
period, indicating a significant structural change.  The most likely break 
date is at the end of 2007, giving us confidence to take December 2007 as a 
change date in the subsequent analysis. 
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Figure 4.3. P-values against break dates for an F-test of OLS parameter change between 
(January 2006, break date) and (break date, December 2009).  US company data is used. 
 
To demonstrate the changes for patent classes around the financial crisis, 
we ran negative binomial estimations for patent counts in each class in the 
periods 2006-7 and 2008-9, with the logarithm of the expected value 
linearly dependent on time (this procedure forms part of the estimation 
method we describe for our full analysis in section 4.5).  Predicted patent 
counts in January 2008 were calculated from the estimation results for both 
periods, giving us a set of predicted patents for the 2006-7 estimates and a 
set for the 2008-9 estimates.  Figure 4.4 plots the predicted patents from the 
US company data as kernel densities.  The solid line shows the predictions 
from the 2006-7 estimates, and the dashed line shows the predictions from 
the 2008-9 estimates.  The 2008-9 density is a compression towards zero of 
the 2006-7 density, representing a general reduction in patenting. 
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Figure 4.4. Kernel density of estimated patents in January 2008 across patent classes.  
Notes: the solid line is for estimates from 2006-7 and the dashed line is for estimates from 
2008-9.  US company data is used. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Kernel density of estimated patents in January 2008 across patent classes.  
Notes: the solid line is for estimates from 2006-7 and the dashed line is for estimates from 
2008-9.  US university data is used. 
 
In figure 4.5, we see the corresponding densities for US universities.  The 
number of patent classes predicted to have just a single patent increases in 
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the 2008-9 estimates, and there is again a broad compression towards zero, 
indicating a reduction in patenting. 
 
4.5. Empirical method 
In this section we present our testing and estimation method.  We assume a 
multiplicative model for predicted patent counts conditional on the 
information available during the crisis, relating it to the predicted patent 
counts prior to the crisis and an adjustment factor influencing the relation 
between the two.  The adjustment factor is exponential and guarantees 
positive patent counts, as is standard in the empirical literature (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998).  The functional form is 
 
)'exp()|(|
,, iititi uXIpIp +Γ+=
−+ γα β     (4.3) 
 
where Ip ti |,  are predicted patent counts in patent class i at time t and 
conditional on information set I, I + is the information available during the 
crisis, I - is the information available before the crisis, α, β and γ are 
constants with α > 0, Xi is a vector of time-invariant patent class 
characteristics, Γ is a vector constant with the same dimension as Xi, and ui 
is a zero mean normal error. 
 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 examine how external dependence affects the 
change in innovation during the crisis for different innovator types.  
Equation (4.3) may be written as 
 
)'exp()|()|/()|( 1
,,, iitititi uXIpIpIp +Γ+=
−−−+ γα β  
 
The left hand side of the equation is the ratio of patents predicted during 
the crisis to those predicted before the crisis, and so measures innovation 
change.  We test hypothesis H1 by looking at the significance of external 
dependence on the right hand side of the equation when company data is 
used, and hypothesis H2 by looking at the sign and significance of external 
dependence when university data is used.  Hypothesis H3 examines how 
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intangibility ratios affect innovation, and we test it by looking at the sign 
and significance of the intangibility ratio on the right hand side of the 
equation when university data is used. 
 
Taking logs of equation (4.3) we have 
 
iititi uXIpIp +Γ+++=
+−
')|ln(ln)|ln(
,,
γβα .   (4.4) 
 
This specification for examining the crisis’ effect is similar to that used in 
Archibugi et al (2013a), where the change in innovation between two years 
is measured.  We could bring our specification even closer to their model 
by comparing changes in patents in successive time periods, t and t + 1.  
However, we prefer to examine an instant effect, rather than a delayed one.  
The reason is that any crisis effect may tend to correct itself over time 
especially in patent classes where it has been severe, so that an estimation 
using successive periods may not capture the full crisis effect.  Moreover, 
we prefer to use extended evidence of patenting behaviour to estimate 
mean patenting rates rather than patent rates in one period, in order to 
reduce measurement volatility.  As a prediction method for calculating 
+Ip ti |,  and −Ip ti |, , we could use averages or sums over successive 
periods (for example, to give annual rates of innovation, as in Archibugi et 
al (2013a)), which would be acceptable in the absence of trends in the data.  
However, trends in patenting in each class are likely.  So we use an 
equivalent method to averaging, but one which allows for trends.  We 
calculate the predicted patents +Ip ti |,  and −Ip ti |,  in class i at time t by 
running two sets of negative binomial regressions for counts in each patent 
class: 
 
tP iiti ψϕ +=)log( , ,       (4.5) 
Pi,t ~ negative binomial, 
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where Pi,t are patent counts in class i at time t, and φi and ψi are class 
specific constants.  Patenting in each class may be generated by distinct 
processes and be at different life stages, and so we make no assumptions 
about the commonality of parameters across classes in generating 
predictions. 
 
The estimation is performed first over the 24 month period from January 
2006 to December 2007, which we call the pre-crisis period, and then over 
the period from January 2008 to December 2009, which we term the crisis 
period.  We exclude any patent classes in which the number of patents is 
ten or less over the whole 2006 to 2009 period.  Once we have the 
regression coefficients, we take −Ip ti |,  to be the predicted value at time t 
from the early period equation, and +Ip ti |,  to be the predicted value from 
the late period equation. 
 
We estimate equation (4.4) using OLS across classes i with robust standard 
errors, with the predicted patents evaluated in January 2008.  The influence 
of extreme patent class values is eliminated by excluding any classes in 
which the predicted January 2008 patent counts from either the 2006-7 or 
2008-9 periods exceed 100 for US companies, and 20 for US universities.  
The exclusion is of less than the top seven percent of values for each 
innovator type. 
 
We also estimate a modified version of equation (4.4) using cumulative 
patents over a time period T, 
 
ii
Ti
ti
Tt
ti uXIpIp +Γ+++=
+
∈
−
∈
∑∑ '|lnln|ln ,, γβα .  (4.6) 
 
The values for cumulative predicted patents are produced by predicting two 
sets of cumulative patents over the period T, using estimates from equation 
(4.5) based on the data from 2006-7 to predict −
∈
∑ Ip
Tt
ti |,  and from 2008-9 
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to predict +
∈
∑ Ip
Tt
ti |, .  In the OLS estimation of equation (4.6), we exclude 
classes with early estimated or late estimated cumulative patents exceeding 
5000 for companies, and 500 for universities.  Less than the top five 
percent of values are excluded for each innovator type. 
 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Immediate and cumulative effects of the financial crisis 
In this section we present our results, starting with the crisis’ immediate 
and cumulative effects on innovation in table 4.2.  The first two columns 
present regression results where the determined variable is the logarithm of 
the patent count in January 2008 as predicted using data from 2008-9.  In 
column one, we see the results for US companies.  External dependence 
has an insignificant effect on the count, consistent with hypothesis one was 
that there would be no significant link between the two.  Column two gives 
coefficients for US universities.  External dependence is significantly 
associated with increased patenting during the crisis, consistent with 
hypothesis two, while intangibility is significantly associated with 
increased patenting during the crisis, as anticipated in hypothesis three. 
 
Columns three and four look at regressions with the logarithm of 
cumulative predicted patents as determined variable.  Column three has 
results for companies.  External dependence has a significant positive 
effect on the cumulative patenting over 2008-9, indicating that the effect in 
January 2008 becomes more positive over time.  Column four presents 
results for universities, with a significant positive links between cumulative 
patenting and both external dependence and intangibility.  The same links 
are observed in January 2008. 
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Table 4.2 
Determinants of the logs of the predicted patent count at the start of the crisis and the sum 
of the predicted patent counts during the crisis 
Dependent 
variable: 
Log late predicted patents in 
January 2008 
Log late predicted patents 
cumulated over 2008-9 
 US companies US universities US companies US universities 
 OLS regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External 
dependence 0.0254 0.1990* 0.0858** 0.2439** 
 0.0306 0.1012 0.0415 0.103 
Intangibility -0.0857 1.1103** 0.305 1.0084** 
 0.2238 0.4257 0.3645 0.4088 
Log early 
predicted 
patents 
0.9497*** 0.6994*** 0.7663*** 0.4038*** 
 0.0329 0.0617 0.036 0.0505 
Establishment 
date -0.0008 -0.0057** 0.0011 0.0018 
 0.0009 0.0025 0.0014 0.003 
R&D intensity -2.9369 -7.8922* -5.2830* -9.7988* 
 2.1868 4.7325 2.8048 5.6922 
Capital to 
labour ratio -0.0002** -0.0006** -0.0002* 0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 1.488 11.0805** -1.225 -1.6421 
 1.7817 4.9167 2.646 6.0256 
     
R2 0.87 0.62 0.77 0.46 
Observations 369 140 372 134 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
* Ten percent significance. 
** Five percent significance. 
*** One percent significance. 
 
4.6.2 Results split by age of patent class 
Table 4.3 presents estimations split by the age of the patent class, with new 
patent classes established after 1990 and old patent classes established 
before 1991.  This division gives a reasonable approximation for the split 
between high technology and other technology.  The results for new classes 
are shown in columns one and two.  Coefficient estimates for US 
companies are presented in column one, where external dependence is 
insignificantly associated with patenting.  The results for US universities 
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are in column two, where neither external dependence nor intangibility is 
associated with patenting.  The small sample size will have influenced the 
low coefficient significance. 
 
Table 4.3 
Determinants of the logs of the predicted patent count in January 2008, by patent class age 
 Dependent variable: log late predicted patents in January 2008 
 New classes Old classes 
 US companies US universities US companies US universities 
 OLS regressions   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External 
dependence -0.0428 0.0186 0.0224 0.2162* 
 0.118 0.3345 0.0313 0.1102 
Intangibility 0.1676 0.7474 -0.2079 1.1014** 
 0.9583 1.3296 0.2272 0.468 
Log early 
predicted 
patents 
1.1308*** 0.6025*** 0.9223*** 0.7856*** 
 0.072 0.1117 0.0364 0.0767 
Establishment 
date -0.0065 0.0296 -0.0002 -0.0078** 
 0.0233 0.0342 0.001 0.0036 
R&D intensity 4.0078 -17.9753 -2.8549 -6.7787 
 4.2495 10.7814 2.3566 4.7261 
Capital to 
labour ratio -0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0001 -0.0003 
 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 12.2738 -59.3178 0.4251 15.1319** 
 46.257 68.3041 1.9659 6.9697 
     
R2 0.92 0.6 0.86 0.67 
Observations 61 43 308 97 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
* Ten percent significance. 
** Five percent significance. 
*** One percent significance. 
 
Columns three and four give estimates for data based on old patent classes.  
Column three shows that for US companies there was no significant 
association between external dependence and patenting.  A significant 
positive relation is shown for US universities in column four.  The 
association is also significant and positive between external dependence 
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and patenting.  Hypotheses one, two, and three all hold for patenting in old 
classes. 
 
4.6.3 Estimates based on OLS predictions of patenting 
In calculating the results in section 4.6.1, the predicted patent counts are 
derived from negative binomial estimation within each patent class, so they 
grow exponentially over time.  In this section, we calculate results in which 
the predictions are derived from OLS estimations in each class, with linear 
growth in patenting over time.  The extra caution comes at the cost of 
allowing negative patenting in classes and of a discrete non-symmetric 
random variable being approximated by a normal variable; however, as 
section 4.7 will show, the aggregate OLS behaviour predicts actual 
patenting after the crisis more closely than aggregate negative binomial 
predictions. 
 
We continue to estimate results from our main cross sectional regressions 
given by equations (4.4) and (4.6).  However for predicting patents within 
classes we replace the negative binomial equation (4.5) with an OLS 
equation 
 
tiiiti vtP ,, ++= ψϕ , 
 
where φi and ψi are class specific constants and vi,t is a zero mean normal 
variable.  The estimation is performed over the period from January 2006 
to December 2007, then over January 2008 to December 2009.  We again 
exclude any patent classes in which the number of patents is ten or less 
over the whole 2006 to 2009 period.  Once we have the regression 
coefficients, we use predictions from the early period and late period 
estimations as variables in our main regressions. 
 
Table 4.4 contains our results, with the first two columns presenting 
coefficient estimates when the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
predicted January 2008 patents.  In column one, US company data is used 
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and external dependence is found to have an insignificant association with 
patenting, as expected from hypothesis one.  Column two shows that for 
US universities there is a significant positive relation between external 
dependence and patenting, consistent with hypothesis two.  The relation 
between intangibility and the patent count is significant and positive, as 
hypothesis three anticipated.  Overall, the evidence provided for 
hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 is strong here as in the main table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.4 
Determinants of the logs of the predicted patent count at the start of the crisis and the sum 
of the predicted patent counts during the crisis; prediction by OLS 
Dependent 
variable: 
Log late predicted patents in 
January 2008 
Log late predicted patents 
cumulated over 2008-9 
 US companies US universities US companies US universities 
 OLS regressions   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External 
dependence 0.0329 0.2534** 0.0689** 0.2781*** 
 0.0319 0.1001 0.0289 0.0667 
Intangibility -0.1108 1.1115** 0.3049 0.8959*** 
 0.2471 0.4496 0.2076 0.3237 
Log early 
predicted 
patents 
0.9447*** 0.8276*** 0.8857*** 0.6662*** 
 0.0394 0.0446 0.0393 0.0567 
Establishment 
date -0.0006 -0.0042* -0.0002 -0.0026 
 0.001 0.0024 0.001 0.0022 
R&D intensity -4.1775 -7.2524 -3.5887 -9.0298*** 
 2.8012 4.5322 2.188 3.2574 
Capital to 
labour ratio -0.0001* -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0003** 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 1.3011 8.1784* 0.8929 6.4551 
 1.9036 4.6957 1.8581 4.31 
     
R2 0.88 0.74 0.89 0.68 
Observations 386 134 373 129 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
* Ten percent significance. 
** Five percent significance. 
*** One percent significance. 
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Columns three and four report estimates where the dependent variable is 
the logarithm of patents cumulated over 2008-9.  In column three we see 
that for companies there is a positive relation between external dependence 
and cumulative patenting.  Column four employs university data, and 
shows that there is a significant positive association between cumulative 
patenting and both external dependence and intangibility.  As a whole, the 
findings are similar to those in table 4.2 where negative binomial 
projections are used. 
 
7. Counterfactuals 
The growth of unregulated debts among financial institutions has been 
presented as a major contributing factor to the 2007-8 crisis (Brunnermeier, 
2009; Calomiris, 2008), and market-based solutions have been advanced to 
alter and constrain the behaviour of financial institutions (Acharya et al, 
2009).  They offer the possibility of insulating the financial and real 
economies from systemic build up of risk, such as that emerging from the 
sub-prime mortgage market.  More stringent measures would reduce the 
role of the financial markets in funding companies, but the direction of 
international travel has been towards increased market based development.  
A movement towards a more commercial approach has been seen in US 
universities as well, for regulatory, technological, administrative, and 
financial reasons (Mowery et al, 2001). 
 
In this section, we investigate the effect of alternative responses to 
portfolio characteristics on innovation during the crisis.  In our first 
counterfactual companies continue to work on the same projects as before, 
and the patenting in January 2008 and over 2008-9 is calculated as if they 
were experiencing the same output response to those projects as 
universities.  Our second counterfactual examines outcomes when 
universities adopt the response of companies.  Calculations are performed 
based on the parameters estimated in table 4.2. 
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The statistics we examine are expected late predictions calculated from 
equations (4.4) and (4.6), minus the early predictions, and summed across 
all patent classes: 
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where E denotes the expectations operator, Y  denotes the fitted value of Y, 
and the other notation is as for equations (4.3) and (4.6).  The expected 
predicted patents counts are calculated as 
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where the additional notation is as below equation (4.3).  The exponential 
error term is calculated as 
 
)5.0exp())(exp( 2σ=tuE  
 
where σ is the root mean squared error from the estimations in table 4.2.  
For the counterfactuals, we replace one or more of the coefficients and 
exponentiated error term from the estimated equation with the coefficients 
and error from the alternative equation.  In the summations, we do not sum 
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over elements with extreme predicted values, using the same definitions of 
extreme values as in section 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 
Patenting change during the crisis on switching to a different institution’s response 
parameters while maintaining the original institution’s innovation portfolio 
Estimation method Negative binomial OLS  
From parameters and 
innovation portfolio of 
US 
companies 
US 
universities 
US 
companies 
US 
universities 
     
To parameters of US 
universities 
US 
companies 
US 
universities 
US 
companies 
In January 2008     
Expected patent crisis 
change before adjustment -558 -54 -262 -34 
 
    
Expected change after all 
adjustment -2890 -6 -2,359 22 
Cumulative over 2008-9 
    
Expected patent crisis 
change before adjustment -110,912 -11,455 -46,367 -2,419 
 
    
Expected change after all 
adjustment -194,716 -5,589 -95,092 -1,337 
 
Table 4.5 presents our results, with the top panel showing patenting in 
January 2008 and the bottom panel showing cumulative patenting over 
2008-9.  Columns one and two use negative binomial predictions, while 
columns three and four use OLS predictions.  In column one we see the 
consequences of the crisis response to the characteristics of US company 
innovation becoming like that experienced by US universities.  The top 
panel shows the immediate effect.  There is a substantial impact on 
patenting in January 2008, with 2,300 fewer patent applications.  In the low 
panel, the cumulative effect of the change is shown.  The decline in US 
company patenting goes from 111,000 applications to 195,000 applications, 
representing an additional loss of innovation outputs of 84,000 applications. 
 
In the counterfactual in column two, US universities are fully integrated in 
the market and their patenting changes as if they were US companies 
during the crisis.  From the top panel, it can be seen that adopting the 
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alternative responses is associated with an increase in patenting of 48 
applications.  The lower panel shows that the cumulative effect over 2008-
9 of adopting the alternative responses is large relative to base patenting; 
the decline in innovation goes from 11,500 applications to 5,600 
applications, so there are an extra 5,900 patents.  Columns three and four 
show that OLS estimated effects of changing responses are qualitatively 
similar to negative binomial estimated effects. 
 
Our counterfactuals find that US university responses diminish patenting 
for US companies, while US company responses increase patenting for US 
universities.  Company responses ensure greater innovation given the 
portfolio characteristics of companies and universities.  Their advantage 
occurs both in relation to the financial external dependence of innovation 
projects, and other factors including market demand. 
  
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have looked at how the innovator type affected innovation 
during the 2007-8 financial crisis.  Our theoretical and empirical results 
indicate that, at the start of the crisis, the effect of external financial 
dependence on the change in patent counts was insignificant for projects 
undertaken by companies but significantly positive for projects undertaken 
by universities.  Higher proportions of intangible assets were associated 
with increased university patenting.  The effects were similar over the 
2008-9 period, although external financial dependence gained a significant 
positive association with company patenting.  Similar effects are shown for 
innovative projects in technology classes introduced before 1991; the 
results for newer classes are not as strong but may be influenced by a 
relatively small sample size. 
 
Counterfactuals indicate that if US company patenting responded in the 
same way as university patenting its decline would have been greater.  
Conversely, US universities would have had smaller declines if they had 
the same patenting response as US companies.  We have not considered the 
possibility of innovation portfolio characteristics being selected in response 
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to the funding used, which would alter counterfactual patent count changes.  
An analysis of endogenous selection could start from the theoretical basis 
described in the managerial literature on multiple interactions and 
influences between enterprise capabilities, competitive environment, and 
strategy (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997). 
 
Our results echo those of Paunov (2012), who found that use of public 
funds by Latin American companies was associated with less 
discontinuation of their innovative projects during the crisis, whereas use 
of private funds was not significantly associated with it.  Our data 
inspection and theoretical model suggest that the results can be explained 
by the increase of aggregate public R&D funding and moderate persistence 
of aggregate private R&D funding, at least in the US.  The question then 
arises, why did private innovation funding not collapse during the crisis?  
Campello et al (2010) present a possible explanation, by finding that while 
total international company investment did fall sharply during the crisis, 
capital investments were relatively robust.  Future work could establish 
whether innovation projects are accorded a protected status during crises, 
and whether particular types of projects are given more protection than 
others. 
 
Although we did not dwell on the matter in the main text, it is interesting to 
note that persistence of innovation in each patent class was much higher for 
companies than for universities.  One possible explanation is that 
universities are more willing to break radically with their past innovation 
during crises, perhaps acting as agents of creative destruction to a greater 
extent than companies (see Archibugi et al (2013a) and Archibugi et al 
(2013b)).  Universities may have fewer institutional constraints stopping 
them from becoming radical innovators.  However, groundbreaking 
innovations may be put by the USPTO into the same patent class as less 
significant innovations in the short term, because of delays in introduction 
of new classes.  So short term patent classification is an imperfect way of 
recognising technological shifts.  Moreover, an alternative institutional 
explanation for the persistence gap is possible, in that universities are able 
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to retreat from the market in a way that is not possible for companies.  
Further study could clarify the reasons for the gap. 
 
Our theoretical and empirical results suggest policy applications relating to 
the selection of solutions to informational and control problems in the 
principal-agent relations that arise in innovation.  Solutions using financial 
markets may be susceptible to collapse during financial crises, and when 
they occur or are threatened it may be preferable to adopt elements of the 
non-market solutions used in university funding by industry or government, 
including direct or peer monitoring rather than commercially intermediated 
monitoring, and sharing technologies and profits between the funding and 
funded parties.  However, the value of these relations during a crisis is 
dependent on the political commitment to fund innovation.  If this 
commitment is lacking – which it generally was in crises prior to 2007-8 – 
then university relations may perform worse than company relations as 
funding conduits.  Moreover, even during the crisis of 2007-8, company 
commercial innovative outputs were maintained at a higher level than 
university outputs.  If maintenance of such outputs is sought by 
policymakers, universities could learn from the productive process of 
companies during crises.  We leave it to future work to determine the exact 
nature of the lessons. 
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